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Abstract 
Electricity is a vital instrument for economic growth and human development. The 
measure of growth in developing countries like Bangladesh is synonymous with the level of 
electricity use. Energy (oil) price shocks are often identified as a source of macroeconomic 
fluctuations since they affect economic development as well as business cycle. Accordingly, 
it has been argued that electricity market reforms are a possible tool to improve economic 
performance, efficiency, welfare and overall economic development. The Bangladesh 
economy is vulnerable to energy (oil) price shocks and the government has adopted 
different electricity reform policies in the past few years. However, there is a real gap in the 
energy literature with regard to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
consequences of energy (oil) price shocks and electricity market reforms towards the 
Bangladesh economy.  
This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part contains two chapters titled, “A 
Survey of Literature” and “Energy Scenario in Bangladesh” which extensively review the 
related literature and underline the research gaps that this thesis intends to address. The 
second part of this thesis includes three novel papers in the literature on energy (oil) 
prices, electricity market reforms and the macro economy, all applied to the case of 
Bangladesh: “Energy Price Shocks and Real Business Cycle”, “A DSGE Analysis of Oil Price 
Shocks” and “A DSGE Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Alternative Electricity Pricing 
Schemes”. The following research questions are addressed: 
1. How important aggregate energy price shocks are to explain business cycle fluctuations 
for the Bangladesh economy?  
ix 
 
2. How would oil price shocks affect the macro economy of a small, oil importing, 
developing country like Bangladesh?  
3. How would electricity market reforms affect the Bangladesh Economy? 
To answer these questions we develop a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model and a Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for Bangladesh, the latter including a 
detailed model of the energy (electricity) sector which has not been attempted before in 
the literature. We conclude that the RBC model does a reasonable job in capturing the 
qualitative changes of selected endogenous variables considering the energy and 
productivity shocks. We find that oil price shocks have a negative welfare effect on 
consumers and GDP. However, industry expands to produce more exportable goods as 
higher oil price makes the country worse off with regard to Terms of Trade (TOT). Lower 
wage and capital interest rate allow industry to employ more labour and capital and 
increase production. Our results also reveal that electricity reform policies (restructuring 
of prices and subsidy arrangements) increase household welfare and GDP in Bangladesh. 
Given our results, it is advisable that policymakers carefully assess the overall welfare 
effect of oil price shocks and electricity market reforms and when appropriate take some 
measures to redistribute welfare across sectors. The heterogeneity nature of the 
households would be more appropriate for policy analysis and the analysis of these 
redistribution policies is left for future research. As some other developing countries face 
the same issues as Bangladesh, the novel framework and results of this thesis are of 
relevance not only for Bangladesh but also for developing countries in general. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Energy is considered as the lifeblood of the economy and an essential input for almost 
every good and service. Energy plays a decisive role in the development process of a 
country. It not only enhances the productivity of factors of production, but also promotes 
higher living standards. The term “energy” mainly covers a wide range of products such as 
electricity, oil, natural gas, coal, biomass and other renewable sources. However, electricity 
is known as one of the most widely used forms of energy and therefore the electricity 
industry is an important sector for any economy. Electricity, being an energy carrier, 
provides energy input to different development processes that vary depending on 
consumer group such as industrial, service, residential and government.  
According to World Bank (2000) no country has managed to develop beyond a subsistence 
economy without ensuring at least minimum access to electricity services for a broad 
selection of its population. Moreover, in a study of over 100 countries, Ferguson et al. 
(2000) find a strong correlation between electricity usage and the level of economic 
development and growth. Oil is another vital source of energy in the economy and always 
been considered as an indicator of economic stability due to the world’s high dependence 
on oil products. 
Energy price is a crucial driver of the world economy and changes in the price of energy 
can have significant effect on macroeconomic condition and welfare in both developed and 
developing countries around the world. The transmission mechanisms through which 
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energy prices have an impact on real economic activity include both supply and demand 
channels. There is the classic supply side effect according to which rising energy prices are 
indicative of the reduced availability of a basic input to production, leading to a reduction 
of potential output (Brown and Yücel, 1999). An energy price increase may also have a 
negative effect on consumption through its positive relation with disposable income. From 
demand side perspective, when energy prices rise, consumers are unable or unwilling to 
reduce energy consumption and may reduce expenditures on other goods and services, 
potentially upsetting the macroeconomic condition (Lescaroux et al., 2008). Naturally, the 
bigger the energy price increase and the longer higher prices are sustained, the bigger the 
macroeconomic impact.  
The macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks have been extensively examined since the 
1970’s. This relationship between oil prices and macroeconomy has been investigated 
using several approaches. Different methods of analysis have yielded different results, 
sometimes sharply different, sometimes modestly. However, in general, macroeconomists 
have viewed changes in the price of oil as an important source of economic fluctuations, as 
well as a paradigm of a global shock, likely to affect many economies simultaneously 
(Blanchard and Gali, 2008). It is worth noting that existing literature mostly focuses on oil 
or aggregate energy in investigating energy price and macroeconomic relationship. 
Subsidies in energy markets are another important policy issue for many developing and 
emerging countries in the world (Plante, 2014). Energy (electricity, gas and petroleum) 
subsidies lower the prices paid by energy consumers, lower the cost of energy production 
or raise the revenues of energy producers (IEA, OECD and World Bank, 2010). Subsidies of 
energy are provided through several common channels such as price control and direct 
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financial transfers. Energy subsidies may also occur when the government provides under-
priced access to scarce resources that are under its own control (Manzoor et al., 2012). In 
particular, state-owned companies are allowed to produce, transmit and sometimes 
distribute energy to end-use customers. For example, countries like Bangladesh and Iran, 
the government sets the price in the market, where there is no competition. However, in 
developed countries, government mainly abstains from interfering with market processes. 
They can tax goods or inputs to implement any reform policies. Energy (mainly fuel and 
electricity) subsidies are very important for many developing countries because of the cost 
of providing them. According to Mujeri et al. (2013), subsidies on electricity and petroleum 
products in Bangladesh are 1.62% of GDP in 2012. Moreover, energy subsidies depress 
growth through a number of channels. Subsidies can discourage investment in the energy 
sector; can crowd out growth enhancing public spending. Some countries spend more on 
energy subsidies than on public health and education. Reallocating some of the resources 
freed by subsidy reform to more productive public spending could help boost growth over 
the long run (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
Electricity prices in many developing countries are highly distorted as the prices are 
controlled by government and set below the long run marginal cost. This electricity prices 
are not based on economic principles but rather on vested interests and political motives. 
In Nepal, electricity is supplied to consumers at highly subsidised rates creating distortions 
in demand (Jamasb and Nepal, 2011). In a competitive market, cost reflective price can 
send correct signals to the market participants. Cost reflective prices can also eliminate the 
subsidy prevailing in the energy sector which can be used to increase electricity access in 
rural areas. Higher electricity price can also be socially defended as this reduce government 
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budget deficit and enhance the opportunity the poorer class to get electricity access. Hence, 
cost reflective tariffs and proper subsidy schemes are crucial for the sustainability of 
reforms. 
Having realised the importance of electricity sector, the policymakers in different countries 
have focused on electricity sector reform to achieve higher efficiency and to promote better 
services across the world during the last two decades. The electricity sector reform started 
in the 1980’s which is limited to a few countries (Chile, UK and Norway), but by the 1990’s 
widespread reform activity has been extended in many other countries. However, most of 
the developing countries face a range of challenges in their electricity sectors. Electricity 
industries in the developing countries are still mostly or entirely dominated by government 
and electricity and fuels prices are set by government. Moreover, there is very little 
competition, low rate of electrification, low per capita electricity consumption, prevalence 
of high energy subsidies and distorted prices, high technical and non-technical energy 
losses in the transmission and distribution networks, vertically integrated setup in the 
market despite the fact of private firms’ entrance in electricity generation and the 
distribution and transmission of electricity remains in the hands of monopolies, usually 
owned by government in most of the developing countries. Therefore, electricity reform 
policies are crucial in order to ensure an adequate supply of electricity so that their 
economies continue to grow and the livelihoods of their people continue to improve. 
In almost all reforming countries, electricity reform has been a part of wider policies 
towards a liberal market economy (Erdogdu, 2010). Many developing countries started 
putting effort on implementing market-oriented electricity reforms in developing countries 
since early 1990’s. The major reforms that have been taking place in the developing 
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countries are structural changes and privatisation of electricity utilities. Moreover, most of 
the countries reforming their electricity sector have mainly corporatised their utilities and 
invited private Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to balance the generation shortfall 
experienced by the state-owned utilities. The reforms mainly aimed at introducing energy 
policies, legislation, regulations and institutions that would unfetter the monopoly of state-
owned utilities and provide opportunities for private actors to participate in a competitive 
market. Jamasb et al. (2014) argue that the reforms consisted of both high and low level 
reform measures. The high level reforms focussed on introducing competition in the 
wholesale and retail segments of energy supply, the horizontal unbundling of the 
incumbents to create viable competitors, the creation of an independent regulatory body 
and often (but not necessarily always) privatisation. The low level reforms included 
aspects of cost-reflective pricing (such as removal of subsidies and subsidies restructuring, 
tariff liberalisation and price setting), adoption of new energy technology, new financial 
schemes and community involvement (Prasad, 2008). These reform programmes are 
particularly very important and the main thrust of electricity sector reform is price reform 
in many developing countries who takes initiatives to move from a planned to a market 
economy. According to Jamasb (2006), in most developing countries, electricity reform 
requires extensive restructuring of prices and subsidy arrangements.  
Furthermore, electricity reform should however be seen in its wider macroeconomic 
context (Pollitt, 2008). Electricity, as an energy carrier is considered as a key sector in the 
modern economy and moves to improve the operation of the market more generally since 
1980, form the backdrop to electricity reform. In all of the leading countries, electricity 
reform has been part of wider moves towards privatisation, smaller government 
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participation and the extension of the role of the market. This is especially true in 
transition economies where electricity sector reform is clearly merely a part of wider 
reforms. From this wider perspective electricity reform requires careful evaluation, not just 
in terms of its effect on electricity consumers and producers but also in terms of the 
promotion of efficient markets and good government more generally (Pollitt, 2008). 
Jamasb and Nepal (2011) propose a two stage electricity reform programmes. In the short 
run and medium run, priority should be given towards tariff and subsidy restructuring and 
creating an effective independent regulatory body. As the economy develops, in the long 
run, focus can be shifted towards complete vertical separation of utility networks. 
Bangladesh has also experienced a process of institutional reforms in energy sector during 
last two decades. Although the energy sector in Bangladesh covers a wide range of 
products such as electricity, petroleum products, natural gas, coal, biomass and other 
renewable sources, policy makers have been most pre-occupied by electricity, the most 
widely used form in energy (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2010). 
The operation of the power sector has been the responsibility of the Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB), reporting to the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral 
Resources (MPEMR). Since the mid-1990s, the government of Bangladesh has continued 
with the vertical unbundling of the sector, through the creation of separate publicly owned 
entities for generation, transmission and distribution utilities. The unbundling has led to 
the creation of a number of independently managed entities which are gradually taking 
over the operational responsibility previously vested with BPDB, thereby changing its 
status to that of a holding company, with management control being decentralised into the 
business units. As part of the on-going programmes of power sector reform, a regulatory 
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body, the BERC (Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission) has been set up, and a unit 
called Power Cell has been set up within the MPEMR to drive the reform process forward. 
Although Bangladesh government has adopted a comprehensive energy development 
strategy for exploring supply-side options along with demand management, still the 
country is unable to ensure necessary energy supplies to meet the energy demand of the 
country and faces energy crisis. However, Bangladesh has shown significant economic 
performances in recent past, maintaining an average of 6.01% GDP growth rate since 2010. 
It is widely believed that the country’s growth might even be higher figure if it could 
mitigate the energy crisis. The government has committed to ensuring access to affordable 
and reliable electricity for all citizens by 2021 (Planning Commission, 2012). But, only 69% 
of the population in Bangladesh has access to electricity compared with 74.5% in South 
Asian region and 83.1% worldwide. The picture looks even gloomier in the rural areas of 
Bangladesh where only 42.5% of rural population has access to electricity compared to 
66.3% in South Asia and 70.2% globally (World Development Indicator, WDI, 2012).  
Moreover, the state owned energy utilities suffer from large deficits. The energy sector has 
also failed to attract adequate private investments due to poor pricing policies along with 
other bottlenecks such as lack of appropriate organisational structure, efficiency in 
decision making process, political instability etc. Bangladesh Energy Regulatory 
Commission (BERC) is the responsible agency to fix the tariff rates of electricity, natural 
gas, petroleum products, coal and other mineral resources. However, in setting energy 
prices, BERC mainly gears the governmental decisions which are highly politically 
motivated rather than economical. BERC occasionally fixes the prices of all energy products 
such as petroleum products and electricity which is controlled by the government. So, 
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government controls some energy prices in Bangladesh and market has a very limited role 
in fixing the energy prices. Energy subsidy is also very high in Bangladesh as these results 
mostly from setting retail prices for fuel and electricity at lower than their true market 
prices. 
There are two types of electricity subsidies in Bangladesh. One type of subsidy lowers 
production cost through subsidised fuel (e.g., natural gas, coal, diesel, furnace oil, etc.) in 
electricity generation. Another type offers electricity tariffs for groups of consumers 
(including residential customers and farmers) that are lower than production costs. It may 
be noted that, the electricity tariff structures in Bangladesh differ across sectors and levels 
of consumption. Industrial and service sectors pay higher tariffs while domestic and 
agriculture sectors pay lower, subsidised tariffs. Thus, the domestic sector is partially 
cross-subsidised by the industrial and commercial sectors. As a result of the latter, the 
Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), which generates around 60% of the 
country’s total electricity, has consistently incurred losses by selling electricity at prices 
lower than the break-even point. Obviously, these losses are the results of distorted 
electricity prices and adjusted mainly through budgetary transfers by the government 
every year. 
In recent years, macroeconomic pressures have intensified on the Bangladesh economy 
resulting from a number of adverse internal and external developments (Mujeri et al., 
2014). While the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 created certain pressures, 
one of the major domestic factors creating fiscal pressure on the economy is the below-cost 
provision of fuel and electricity against the backdrop of a rapid expansion in oil-dependent 
quick rental power generation firms to increase electricity generation (IMF, 2012). Here it 
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needs to be mentioned that, the Power System Master Plan (PSMP), adopted by Bangladesh 
government in 2010 allows a number of Quick Rental (QR) power plants as immediate 
measures to meet the electricity demand in the short run. Thus, the energy crisis in 
Bangladesh is exaggerated because of fuel constraints, poor performance of the state 
owned electricity sector, absence of rational tariff policy, lack of appropriate organisational 
structure, efficiency in decision making process, high dependence on imported fuel used by 
the privately owned quick rental electricity companies and poor energy structure. 
Since electricity tariffs and fuel subsidies have important macroeconomic implications for 
the developing countries who consider energy as a prerequisite for future development, 
electricity reform requires extensive restructuring of tariffs and subsidies arrangements 
(Jamasb, 2006). The tariffs can contain government subsidies to specific users, cross 
subsidies from industrial and commercial users to residential customers, and cross 
subsidies among residential customer groups. The extent of price distortions in many 
developing countries is considerably higher. Restructuring of tariffs can result in 
substantial price increases for residential customers while commercial and industrial are 
usually the first group to benefit from cost-reflective pricing reforms (Jamasb, 2002). Cost-
reflective tariffs and proper subsidy schemes are crucial for the sustainability of reforms. 
Economic theory suggests that cost-reflective prices result in net social welfare gain. This 
implies that the welfare economic gains by those who benefit from lower prices will exceed 
the welfare losses incurred by those who stand to lose from price increases (Jamasb, 2002). 
So, pricing reform continues to be one of the most important and challenging tasks facing 
by the policymakers in the electricity sectors of developing countries. The historic policies 
of under-pricing and cross-subsidies are being reversed but only very gradually.  In many 
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countries, efforts to rebalance tariffs have been encountering considerable public 
opposition on social equity grounds (Kessides, 2012). Therefore, there is an urgent need to 
identify electricity pricing schemes that strike a more satisfactory balance between 
economic efficiency and social equity. 
In order to strengthen the country’s macroeconomic stability and withstand the adverse 
developments, among other measures, the government of Bangladesh also undertook steps 
to reduce subsidy costs through adjustment of fuel and electricity prices. Despite a series of 
retail energy price adjustments since the adoption of the programmes in 2011, the total 
subsidy bill still remains high, especially in view of the rapid expansion in demand for fuels 
and sustained increase in supply costs. This shows the urgent need to introduce further 
price adjustments and subsidy reforms to ensure economic sustainability. The policy of 
reducing subsidies in electricity sector thus requires narrowing the gap between the selling 
prices and supply cost. Recently, government has expressed its intention to adjust fuel 
price gradually to eliminate the disparities with international prices. Moreover, 
government needs to exercise greater scrutiny of rental power plant contracts, which 
burns imported oil to generate electricity and absorb a disproportionate share of subsidy 
costs (BPDB, 2015). If government could implement such efforts of removing price 
distortions in energy sector and ensuring gradual phase out of prevailing subsidies, this 
would build  up more space for development spending and enhance economic activities 
and welfare. 
Thus, reforms in the electricity market and the interaction between energy (especially, oil) 
price shocks and macroeconomy in the developing countries are still an area which 
requires extensive research to develop appropriate models for policy experiments. The 
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complex dynamics between energy and economy have increasingly attracted modelling 
studies over the past decade. Theoretical models developed through mathematical 
programing that incorporate effects of energy (oil) price and subsidy changes have played 
an important role in the energy literature (Jebaraj and Iniyan, 2004). Mathematical 
programing is the study and use of optimisation and dynamic models available to assist 
private and public sector in decision making process. The method of mathematical 
programing not only can generate operational level planning for individual operators, they 
can also help policy makers to capture a big picture of any industry, like the electricity 
industry. These models can be defined as the computation of market equilibrium prices, 
flows and quantities which is often accomplished by solving an appropriate optimisation 
problem or sequence of optimisation problems. Since the oil embargo of the 1970’s, 
researchers have used extensive mathematical modelling to analyse various energy issues 
and develop a national energy policy. Among these efforts, Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models have played an important role. Modern macroeconomics is 
based on DSGE models which are built on microeconomic foundations (Wickens, 2008). 
DSGE models are dynamic, focusing how the economic variables evolve over time. These 
models are also stochastic because they consider the fact that the economy is affected by 
random shocks such as technological change, fluctuations in the price of oil, etc. Moreover, 
DSGE models are of particular importance to policy makers in that they give insights 
concerning the trading prices and quantities while generating more comprehensive and 
higher level information relevant to the entire market. DSGE model also facilitates the 
forecast of the changes in the level of welfare that would be caused by a change in market 
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condition such as an improvement in the technology or a new government subsidy or tariff 
policy. 
Researchers have spent considerable efforts in attempting to explain the relationship 
between energy (both at aggregate and disaggregate level) and overall economy. Despite of 
the extensive literature on Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, to the 
best of our knowledge there is no model that focuses on a detailed disaggregation of the 
energy sector incorporating government price controlling mechanism and consequently 
implicit subsidies. Some features of energy market situations in developing countries such 
as prevalence of fuel subsidies, electricity price distortions, transmission and distribution 
losses etc. are also overlooked in the literature. Amidst of the methodological differences in 
investigating the energy macroeconomic relationship, most of the existing models do not 
distinguish between demand for different types of consumption goods.  
Furthermore, the RBC models are a combination of the stochastic neoclassical growth 
model and some kind of real shocks to study business cycle fluctuations (quantitative 
analysis) in an environment with flexible prices. Many macroeconomic researchers pay 
attention to the RBC model because it constitutes a useful benchmark framework as a 
vehicle for developing DSGE model to address the source fluctuations and the behaviour of 
different macroeconomic variables for policy analysis. The main principle of RBC approach 
is that a benchmark model of a frictionless and perfectly competitive market economy, 
populated by utility-maximising rational agents who operate subject to budget constraints 
and technological restrictions, could replicate a number of stylised business cycle facts 
when hit by random productivity shocks or any other form of exogenous shocks. This RBC 
model has made a lasting methodological contribution. Most of the DSGE models adopt the 
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general structure of a RBC model, i.e. they feature an impulse response structure built 
around optimising agents in a general equilibrium setting. Both theoretical and 
computational issues are explored when setting up a DSGE model and applying it for 
macroeconomic analysis. The seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982) started the 
RBC theory in particular and DSGE modelling in general.  
The macroeconomic effects of electricity price reform policies, for example, the 
introduction of uniform electricity price for all consumers or the reductions in fuel 
subsidies, are complex and require an explicit dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
modelling approach. Despite the focus on the fact that electricity price reform policies have 
some impacts on macroeconomy, the macroeconomic implications of electricity price 
reform policies and energy (oil) price shocks for the Bangladesh economy are not yet 
known precisely. Three decades have elapsed since the introduction of first reforms in 
Bangladesh and there is now a need for a detailed evaluation on the economic impact of the 
reforms because understanding how the economy evolves in response to energy (oil) price 
shocks and electricity price reform policies is important to policy makers and economists 
to achieve efficiency in energy market.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the energy literature by focusing on the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of energy (oil) price shocks and 
electricity market reforms (mainly electricity tariff reforms) for the Bangladesh economy. 
This thesis is divided into two main parts. First part reviews the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature in the areas of energy (oil) price shocks, electricity market reforms and 
their effect on economy across the world, emphasis on the energy augmented dynamic 
models focusing on the relation between macroeconomy and energy (oil) price shocks and 
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energy market reforms and give a brief overview of Bangladesh energy scenario. In the 
second part, we construct an energy augmented Real Business Cycle (RBC) model and 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for Bangladesh to analyse the 
effects of energy (oil) price shocks and electricity market reform on different 
macroeconomic variables. The model developed in this thesis assumes a mixed economy 
where electricity comes both from private and public sectors and government controls 
electricity and fuel prices. Our model further assumes the prevalence of implicit subsidy 
(due to government controlling prices) and the existence of a fixed rate of system loss. The 
framework of the models allows us to examine electricity price reforms adjustments on 
economy as a movement from mixed economy towards free market economy. This study is 
a first step towards a quantitative analysis of electricity price reform policies for 
Bangladesh. It is expected that the analysis of this thesis will not only benefit the policy 
makers in Bangladesh but also guide the policy makers of other countries with similar 
economic conditions and characteristics.  
Highlighting this research gap, the following research questions are addressed in this 
thesis: 
1. How important aggregate energy price shocks are to explain business cycle fluctuations 
for the Bangladesh economy?  
2. How would oil price shocks affect the macro economy of a small, oil importing, 
developing country like Bangladesh?  
3. How would electricity market reforms (Restructuring of electricity price and subsidy) 
affect the Bangladesh economy at macro level? 
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1.2 Contribution of this thesis 
The major contribution of this thesis is twofold. At first, we develop a Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a detailed disaggregation of the electricity sector 
for a mixed economy where government still controls electricity prices when electricity 
and fuels enter both production and consumption functions and the economy burns oil to 
generate electricity (Methodological Contribution). Then, we propose some alternative 
electricity pricing schemes for Bangladesh (as part of electricity price reforms and 
liberalisation towards free market economy) and analyse the consequences of the 
electricity price reforms on household welfare, electricity market condition and 
macroeconomy in Bangladesh (Policy Contribution). 
The followings may be the other key contributions of this thesis to the existing energy 
literature. 
 This study is a first step towards dynamic modelling analysis of energy (electricity) 
sector in Bangladesh.  
 This thesis simulates and calibrates an energy augmented RBC model for 
Bangladesh economy to investigate the interactions between aggregate energy price 
and overall economy. This model represents a small first step to examine the 
stylised evidence on energy and macroeconomic variables in Bangladesh and to 
develop a DSGE model for energy (oil) price shocks and electricity policy related 
analysis (Chapter 4). 
 Another novelty comes from the development of a detailed disaggregation of the 
electricity sector including both public and private sectors. We construct a Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyse the effects of oil price 
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shocks in a small open developing economy. The main difference of this model is the 
presence of three different electricity generating firms and the inclusion of multi 
fuel options in the production process across the electricity generating firms in 
addition to two production sectors which has not been experimented in energy 
literature till now. This feature is particularly important for developing countries 
perspective as electricity supply in these countries comes from both private and 
public electricity generating companies and most of the developing countries are 
now opt for fuel mix options in generating electricity to reduce dependency on 
mono-fuel option (Chapter 5). 
 Our model offer richness focusing on the feature that all the economic agents in the 
economy rely on energy (both at aggregate and disaggregate level) either for 
household energy consumption or for firm’s production. 
 Calibrating the DSGE model for Bangladesh economy this thesis contributes to the 
existing energy literature by asking the question of how the oil price shocks would 
affect the macro economy of a small, oil importing developing country, like 
Bangladesh (Chapter 5). 
 This thesis explores a set of analytical and numerical results that show how the 
macroeconomy in Bangladesh behaves if government can implement some 
electricity reform policies (Chapter 6). 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part reviews the related literature and 
highlighting the research gap that this thesis intends to address. The second part of this 
thesis includes three novel papers in the literature on energy (oil) prices, electricity market 
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reforms and the macroeconomy and presents RBC and DSGE models to examine the impact 
of energy (oil) price shocks and electricity market reforms on Bangladesh economy. Figure 
1.1 and Table 1.1 at the end of this chapter display the structure of this thesis, and the main 
features, results and contribution of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 surveys existing theoretical and empirical literature in the areas of energy (oil) 
price movements, electricity market reforms and their effect on economy across the world. 
This chapter also highlights the energy augmented dynamic models focusing on energy 
price shocks and energy market reforms. Some relevant DSGE models similar to this thesis 
are also extensively discussed in this chapter. From our analysis it is revealed that the 
DSGE literatures are biased in examining the macroeconomic effects of energy (oil) price 
shocks rather than the electricity market reforms. Finally, Chapter 2 focuses on the fact that 
the energy literature on the macroeconomic performance of electricity market reforms 
across the developing countries needs to be modelled in a DSGE framework considering the 
large gap in the energy literature. 
 The 3rd chapter focuses on overall energy scenarios in Bangladesh with an emphasis on 
different types of energy used in Bangladesh with their availability and environmental 
impacts. The same chapter also provides a detailed overview of electricity sector in 
Bangladesh with historical energy and electricity reform policies and reviews some 
experiences in energy sector reforms in Bangladesh.  
Chapter 4 presents an energy augmented Real Business Cycle (RBC) model for Bangladesh 
economy in the spirit of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) analysis 
considering two policy shocks namely: productivity and aggregate energy price shocks. 
Calibrating the RBC model we would like to examine how the fluctuations of key economic 
18 
 
variables such as investment, consumption and output are explained by the exogenous 
shocks. The model’s ability to describe the dynamic structure of the Bangladesh economy is 
analysed by means of Impulse Response Functions. Overall, the RBC model developed in 
this chapter does a reasonable job to capture the qualitative changes of selected 
endogenous variables like consumption, output, investment etc. when economy faced the 
exogenous shocks. Our results show that aggregate energy price shock has a negative 
impact on macroeconomic variables in Bangladesh economy. Moreover, our results reveal 
that an aggregate energy price shock does not explain the business cycle fluctuations in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, output fluctuations in Bangladesh are mainly driven by productivity 
shock. For further research, we would like to extend the model by explicitly modelling the 
electricity market (including the public and private electricity firms with multi-fuel 
generating capacity) so that electricity policy reforms and their impact on the overall 
economy can be accurately analysed. 
Considering a detailed disaggregation of electricity sector for a mixed economy where 
government still controls electricity prices, the Chapter 5 asks the question of how the oil 
price shocks would affect macro economy of a small, oil importing developing country. We 
construct an energy augmented DSGE model which is then calibrated and simulated for 
Bangladesh economy. The model offer richness focusing on the feature that all the 
economic agents in the economy rely on energy (both at aggregate and disaggregate level) 
either for household energy consumption or for firm’s production. Electricity and fuel 
enters in the model as electricity consumption good for households and as a productive 
input for electricity generating firms in the form of oil and natural gas. The main difference 
of this model is in the respect to the presence of three different electricity generating 
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sectors with multi-fuel generating capacity in addition to two production sectors which has 
not been experimented in energy literature till now. This develops an entirely new 
macroeconomic framework to address the impact of oil price shocks on economy. We run 
the program Dynare version 4.4.3, which is a pre-processor and a collection of Matlab 
routines to solve the model and to approximate the dynamics of our model economy. We 
analyse the impacts of oil price shocks on model economy through Impulse Response 
Functions (IRF). Our results reveal that oil price shocks have a negative welfare effect on 
consumers. However, higher oil price makes the country worse off with respect to Terms of 
Trade (TOT). So, industry expands to produce more exportable goods. Given our results, it 
is advisable that policymakers carefully assess the overall welfare effect of oil price shocks 
and when appropriate take some measures to redistribute welfare from industrial sector to 
the household sector. This is left for future research. 
The electricity pricing structures in the developing countries generally follow a differential 
pricing system among various groups of consumers and highly distorted. For example, the 
largest electricity price faced by the commercial electricity consumers is at least two times 
higher than electricity price paid by the household consumers in Bangladesh. Additionally, 
subsidies on electricity sector have been an important issue for many developing countries 
because of huge cost of providing them. In order to bring the fiscal burden under control by 
removing subsidy and price distortion in electricity market, the Chapter 6 proposes some 
alternative electricity pricing schemes (For example, Equal electricity price scheme for all 
consumers, Flexible electricity price scheme etc. as a step towards electricity tariff 
liberalisation) and analyses the consequences of the electricity price reforms on household 
welfare, electricity market conditions and macroeconomy in Bangladesh. Thus, we consider 
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the same energy augmented DSGE model developed in the previous chapter. The model is 
calibrated for Bangladesh economy to compute steady state values for different variables in 
the model and household’s welfare in the presence of existing electricity pricing schemes in 
Bangladesh. Then we compute the changes of the steady state values and household’s 
welfare from the proposed alternative electricity pricing schemes to draw policy 
implications. Our results show some common outcomes in all the policy experiments, for 
example, higher GDP, reallocation of fuel within electricity industry, higher household 
welfare etc. Given our results, it is worthwhile that government could offer monetary and 
non-monetary incentives to the electricity generators for the use of renewable inputs in the 
production process or for the introduction of renewable technology. As other developing 
countries face the same issues as Bangladesh, this analysis is of relevance not only for 
Bangladesh but also for developing countries in general. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the 
entire thesis with a summary of results, a discussion on the limitations of this thesis and 
further directions for research. 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of this Thesis 
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Table 1.1: Basic Framework, Contribution & Results of the Chapters Presented in the Thesis 
Chapter 4: Energy Price Shocks and the Real Business Cycle: The Case of Bangladesh 
Basic Framework 
An energy augmented RBC model is developed to explain the quantitative business cycle properties 
of macroeconomic variables in Bangladesh economy and to examine how the fluctuations of key 
economic variables are explained by the exogenous shocks, once the model is extended to allow for 
energy price shocks. 
Key Contribution 
To date, no researcher has calibrated energy augmented RBC model for Bangladesh economy to 
investigate the interactions between energy and overall economy.  
Main Results 
Overall, the RBC model developed in this chapter does a reasonable job to capture the qualitative 
changes of selected endogenous variables like consumption, output, investment etc. when economy 
faced the exogenous shocks. Our results show that energy price shocks have a negative impact on 
macroeconomic variables in Bangladesh economy. Moreover, we find that output fluctuations in 
Bangladesh are mainly driven by productivity shock.  
 
Chapter 5: A DSGE Analysis of Oil Price Shocks: The Case of Bangladesh 
Basic Framework 
We construct a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyse the effects of oil 
price shocks in a small open developing economy. The model includes domestic energy generating 
firms and different types of consumption. The model is then calibrated for Bangladesh economy. 
Key Contribution 
The main contribution of this chapter is to develop a DSGE model with a detailed disaggregation of 
the electricity sector which focuses on a mixed economy where government still controls some 
electricity prices when energy enters both production and consumption functions This chapter 
considers disaggregation in energy sector including both public and private sectors. The model also 
allows the flexibility of multi-fuel option in the electricity generating sectors. All these features are 
very important for developing country’s perspective. 
Main Results 
Our results reveal that oil price shocks have a negative effect on household welfare and economic 
output in Bangladesh economy. 
 
Chapter 6: A DSGE Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Alternative Electricity Pricing                        
Schemes: The Case of Bangladesh 
Basic Framework 
This chapter considers the same energy augmented DSGE model developed in previous chapter to 
study electricity pricing experiment for policy purposes in Bangladesh as a small developing 
country where government controls electricity prices and energy subsidy is high. 
Key Contribution 
This chapter proposes some alternative electricity pricing schemes (Restructuring of electricity 
prices and energy subsidy) and analyses the consequences of the electricity price reforms on 
household welfare, electricity market condition and macroeconomy in Bangladesh. 
Main Results 
Our results reveal that reforms in electricity market (restructuring tariff and subsidy) increase 
household welfare and GDP in Bangladesh. Moreover, our results reveal a reallocation of fuel within 
electricity industry in all the policy experiments. 
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PART I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Chapter 2  
A Survey of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
Energy is considered as an important driver of economic development. The term “energy” 
generally comprises a variety of products such as electricity, oil, natural gas, coal, biomass 
and other renewable sources. The strength of the link between energy and macroeconomy 
is affected by different factors. The long run level of economic activity is determined 
principally by labour productivity, which is determined part by the net supply of energy 
(Kaufmann and Kuhl, 2015). In the short run, economic theory argues that an increase in 
energy prices leads to an increase in the domestic price level and a decrease in output due 
to higher cost. There is growing recognisation that energy supply can transform people’s 
lives and does serve as an engine for economic and social opportunity (World Bank, 2013). 
Therefore, subsidies in energy market are widespread and a common phenomenon across 
the world, especially in the developing countries to ensure the adequate supply of energy 
to the energy consumers and producers. However, the effectiveness of these subsidies 
schemes seems to be questionable as they can place a heavy burden on government 
finances and hamper the economic development. These subsidies are most common for 
electricity but are still important for oil products, coal and natural gas. Subsidies might be 
justified if overall social welfare is increased. However, Moltke et al. (2004) provides 
evidence that, in many instances, the net effect of subsidies is negative. So in addition to 
consider the standard reform sequence and steps, in most developing countries, electricity 
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reform requires extensive restructuring of prices and subsidy arrangements (Jamasb, 
2006). 
After the first oil crisis in 1973, the energy resources and their prices have gained much 
more research attention and energy (oil) price movements have been considered by many 
economists and econometricians as a major source of business cycle fluctuation. Since then 
efforts have been made to analyse the mechanisms whereby energy (oil) price shocks 
affect the macroeconomy and to measure the impact of these shocks on macroeconomic 
condition (Jones and Leiby, 1996 and Brown and Yücel, 2002). However, the existing 
literature is more concentrated on aggregate energy and oil price shocks rather than 
energy (electricity) price/subsidy reform. This chapter reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on macroeconomic effects of energy (oil) price shocks and energy 
(electricity) market reform and highlights their special features, findings and evolution 
through time as well as their limitations. A wide range of macroeconomic models used in 
energy studies show that such models are suitable for studies on energy (oil) price shocks 
and macroeconomy interactions. As a consequence of these efforts, the understanding of 
the interplay between energy (oil) prices and macroeconomy has improved. Of the vast 
literature, on the macroeconomic effects of energy (oil) price shocks, one particular stream 
(consists of studies that examine the role of energy (oil) price shocks in a DSGE 
framework) is more germane to this thesis. DSGE models have become dynamic, stochastic 
and systematically being used for energy policy analysis. Therefore, we also stress 
reviewing a number of earlier energy augmented DSGE models and explore the possibility 
of developing DSGE model with energy for a developing country like Bangladesh to test 
whether aggregate energy price shocks can mimic the business cycle properties of 
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developing countries and examine the channel through which oil price shocks can affect the 
macroeconomy of a small oil importing developing country. This would also create the 
platform for analysing the macroeconomic effects of electricity market reforms. 
2.2 Empirical Literature on Energy and Macroeconomy: Some 
Stylised Facts 
Although economic theories do not have a conclusive relationship between energy, energy 
price and economic development, their relationship is now well documented in the 
empirical literature. This has been a significant issue of concern among economists and 
policymakers. Since the seminal work of Kraft and Kraft (1978), many studies have 
examined the relationship between energy, energy price and economic development across 
the world. Although the energy sector covers a variety of products, existing energy 
literature focusing causality has mostly focused on aggregate energy or electricity, the most 
widely used form in energy. 
Ferguson (2000) analysed the correlations between electricity use and economic 
development in over 100 countries and found strong correlation between these concerned 
variables throughout the globe. Since the strong associations between these two variables 
do not imply a causal relationship, recent empirical literature till to date observes over a 
hundred studies on causality between GDP and energy (both at aggregate and disaggregate 
level) consumption using various methodologies across the countries. For example, 
Karanfil and Li (2015), Dagher and Yacoubian (2012), Payne (2010), Ouedrago (2010), 
Tsani (2010), Odhiambo (2009), Halicioglu (2009), Belloumi (2009), Zamani (2007), Al-
Irani (2006), Wolde-Rufael (2006), Narayan and Smith (2005), Yoo (2005), Oh and Lee 
(2004), Shiu and Lam (2004), Moritomo and Hope (2004), Jumbe (2004), Sari and Soytas 
27 
 
(2003), and Ghosh (2002) have focused on the causal relationship between energy 
consumption (like electricity consumption) and economic growth for several developing 
countries using various methodologies across the countries. Determination of the explicit 
direction of causality is not simply an issue of empirical concern, but one that has 
significant policy implications. 
The overall findings vary significantly with some studies concluding that causality runs 
from economic growth to energy consumption, other conclude the complete opposite, 
while a number of studies find bidirectional causality. One of the first relevant studies was 
the one from Kraft and Kraft (1978) that examined energy consumption and GNP of the 
USA within the period 1947-1974. They found out that the causality runs from GNP to 
energy consumption. This pioneering study intensified the interest in the research of the 
relationship between economic growth and energy consumption. Akarca and Long (1980) 
changed the time period used in Kraft and Kraft and found no statistically significant causal 
relationship. Erol and Yu (1987) found a significant causal relationship between energy 
consumption and income in the case of Japan for the period 1950-1982, supporting the 
view that Granger causality runs from energy consumption to income. Inconsistent results 
for the causality direction might be due to the methodological differences and the choice of 
different time periods. 
Broadly speaking, existing empirical literature finds support for four possible hypotheses 
between energy consumption and economic growth; they are growth, conservation, 
neutrality and feedback hypotheses. The growth hypothesis suggests that causality runs 
from energy consumption to economic growth and an economy is energy dependent where 
energy consumption leads to growth. Conversely, a shortage of energy may negatively 
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affect economic performance, leading to a fall in income and employment (Jumbe, 2004). It 
is argued that energy is a vital and necessary input along with other factors of production 
(such as labour and capital). Consequently, energy is a necessary requirement for economic 
and social development so that energy is potentially a “limiting factor to economic growth” 
(Ghali and El-Sakka, 2004). On the other hand, the conservation hypothesis suggests that 
causality runs from economic growth to energy consumption and an economy is not energy 
dependent where energy conservation policies may be implemented with no adverse effect 
on growth and employment (Masih and Masih, 1997). However, it is possible that a 
growing economy constrained by politics, weak infrastructure, or mismanagement of 
resources could generate inefficiencies and the reduction in the demand for goods and 
services, including energy consumption (Squalli, 2007). The feedback hypothesis suggests 
that energy consumption and real GDP are interrelated and complementing each other. 
Finally, the neutrality hypothesis suggests that there is no causality in either direction and 
changes in energy consumption are not associated with changes in GDP, so that energy 
conservation policies may be pursued without adversely affecting the economy (Jumbe, 
2004). They have argued that since the cost of energy is a very small proportion of GDP, it 
is unlikely to have a significant impact; hence there is a “neutral impact of energy on 
growth”.  
Most of the studies evaluated the relationship between energy (electricity) consumption 
and economic development within a bivariate model framework. However, a common 
problem of bivariate model is the possibility of omitted variable bias (Lutkepohl, 1982). 
The problem with including just energy and GDP is that energy may not be enough to act as 
a spur for aggregate output. The potential gains from economic development may depend 
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on the degree to which capital, energy and labour act as complements. Although 
multivariate analysis is commonly used in recent literature, most studies suffer a lack of 
theoretical underpinnings. Ghali and El-Sakka (2004), Soytas and Sari (2007) and Yuan et 
al. (2008) have utilised the capital-energy-labour-GDP approach originated with Stern 
(1993). Ghali and El-Sakka (2004) assume a neoclassical one sector aggregate production 
function with three inputs where energy consumption is included as an additional input 
because of its technological progress effect on economic development for Canada and find 
bilateral causality between energy use and output. Employing a four variable model (value 
added, capital, labour and energy), Soytas and Sari (2007) found unidirectional causality 
from electricity consumption to output in the Turkish manufacturing industry. Karanfil 
(2009) suggests that there are other potentially interesting variables, like financial 
variables, that could impact the demand for energy. 
Stern et al. (2014) carry out a meta-analysis of the very large literature on testing for 
Granger causality between energy use and economic output to determine if there is a 
genuine effect in this literature or whether the large number of apparently significant 
results is due to publication or misspecification bias. Their model extends the standard 
meta-regression model for detecting genuine effects in the presence of publication biases 
using the statistical power trace by controlling for the tendency to over fit vector auto 
regression models in small samples. Granger causality tests in these over fitted models 
have inflated type I errors. They cannot find a genuine causal effect in the literature as a 
whole. 
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2.3 Energy and the Macroeconomic Models 
Energy and environmental problems are often complex and detailed modelling are 
necessary to analyse the interactions of the energy sector and the overall economy for 
policy references. Therefore, the complex dynamics between energy and economy have 
increasingly attracted modelling studies over the past decade. Analysing the interaction of 
the macroeconomy and the energy sector is also essential for gaining understandings into 
the mid to long term development of each of them (Bauer et al., 2010). The field of 
macroeconomics and the corresponding models is organised into many different views on 
how the markets and their participants operate. These macroeconomic models may be 
logical, mathematical, and/or computational and widely used in academia and research, 
and are also widely used by international organisations, national governments and 
policymakers. For example, studies linking energy (oil) prices to the macroeconomy 
through the channels of labour market dispersion (Loungani, 1986; Finn, 2000; Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 2001), investment uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983), consumption smoothing in 
durable goods (Hamilton, 2003) and the consequences for inflation (Mork, 1989; Bruno 
and Sachs, 1985) suggest that indirect transmission mechanisms may be the crucial means 
by which energy (oil) price shocks have macroeconomic consequences.  
2.3.1 Earlier Macroeconomic Models, Energy and Ecological Models 
Economic theory has long struggled in attempting to explain the energy-macroeconomic 
relationship (Finn, 2000). Researchers investigated the theoretical relationship between 
the use of energy and macroeconomy through different possible channels. For example, 
Tsani (2010) mentions that energy is an intermediate input of production. Bartleet and 
Gounder (2010) argue that there are some mechanisms by which economic growth could 
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remain in spite of a limited source of energy resources. Proponents of this view focus on 
the possibility of technological change and substitution of other physical inputs for energy 
to use existing energy resources efficiently, and to generate renewable energy resources 
that are not subject to binding supply constraints (Solow, 1974, 1997; Stiglitz, 1974). The 
advocates of this theory support the ‘neutrality hypothesis’ and ‘conservation hypothesis’. 
These hypotheses imply that energy would not have any negative effect on economy. Thus, 
the government can simultaneously adopt the energy conservation and macroeconomic 
policies (Bartleet and Gounder, 2010). 
In contrast, the ecological economic theory states that energy consumption is a limiting 
factor to economic growth. Ecological economists judge that technological progress and 
other physical inputs could not possibly substitute the vital role of energy in production 
process (Stern, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2010). They even consider energy as the prime source of 
value because other factors of production such as labour and capital cannot perform 
without energy (Belloumi, 2009). The advocates of this theory highlights the so-called 
‘growth hypothesis’. They advise that any shock to energy supply will ultimately have an 
inverse effect on economic growth. Consequently, they stand against the energy 
conservation policies. 
After the oil crisis in 1973, many researchers have extended the mainstream 
macroeconomic models including energy (oil) on it as a step toward reconciling 
macroeconomic models and ecological economic models and to examine whether energy 
could be a vital factor in explaining economic fluctuations and if so, what factors affect the 
strength of the relationship between energy and economy (Among others, Smulders 
(2005), Bovenberg and Goulder (1998)). Another reason behind the formulation of 
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theoretical energy macroeconomic model is to understand the effect of energy (oil) price 
shocks on economy.  
Contributions which utilise models without rigorous micro-foundations include, among 
others, Bhandari (1981), Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Lee 
and Chang (2005), Wohltmann and Winkler (2008) and Stern (2010). 
2.3.2 Energy Augmented CGE Models 
The development of energy and environment statistics made it possible to develop 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models with a rigorous description of energy 
supply and demand, and the inter linkages between economic activity, energy production, 
energy use, and emissions to air. These integrated CGE models have been used for 
forecasting purposes and numerous analyses of energy and environmental policies during 
the last two decades. Especially, the models have been developed to be suitable for 
analysing different economic policy options to deal with the global climate issue as design 
of optimal carbon tax or carbon quota schemes. Over time energy and emission modules 
have been integrated in the economic core model, allowing for consistent analyses of 
economic, energy and environmental issues based on one and same modelling framework. 
Alves and Pereira (2006) and Bhattacharyya (1996) survey the literature on computable 
general equilibrium models as applied to energy studies, and reports their special features 
to identify and analyse the main areas of investigation in general equilibrium models 
applied to the environment and energy. The models presented in their survey are applied 
to various countries: Norway (Bruvoll and Ibenholt, 1997), Germany (Böhringer and 
Rutherford, 1997), U.S.A. (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1997), India (Fisher-Vanden et al., 
1997), Pakistan (Naqvi, 1998), Italy (Pench, 2001) and Turkey (Sahin, 2002). They also 
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analyse GEM-E3, which models an open economy representing 14 countries of the 
European Union. Additionally, there are also few CGE exercises in modelling energy price 
reforms and evaluating the impacts of energy policies on specific issues like climate change 
(Böhringer et al., 2006), income inequality (Yang, 2000), social security finance (Felder and 
Nieuwkoop, 2000), non-energy markets (Gohin and Chantret, 2010), labour market 
(Welsch, 1996), output and welfare (Manzoor, Shahmoradi and Haqiqi, 2012) and capital 
formation (Struckmeyer, 1986). 
However, a standard static CGE model examines one period sectoral reallocation of 
resources, while, in contrast, a dynamic stochastic CGE model allows us to analyse the path 
of a transitional dynamics toward a new steady state after an initial shock. Moreover, in 
contrast to a static CGE model, a dynamic counterpart is characterised by the inclusion of a 
driving force to move the economy from period to period. This driving force may be the 
growth in the underlying labour force and/or a change in the level of technology in one or 
more sectors of the economy. Unlikely the CGE models, DSGE models are typically limited 
with respect to the number of variables under consideration due to computational issues. 
Additionally, In contrast to computable general equilibrium models, agent maximisation 
takes place within a stochastic environment. Technological progress is assumed to follow 
an AR (1) process; the level of technology in each period depends on the previous period 
level plus a random component. 
2.3.3 Energy Augmented DSGE Models  
Economists of 1980s and 1990s began to construct micro founded macroeconomic models 
based on rational choice which have come to be called Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models. In modern macroeconomics, the economy is described as a 
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DSGE system that reflects the collective decisions of rational individuals over a range of 
variables that relate to both the present and the future. These individual decisions are then 
coordinated through markets to produce the macro economy.  
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling began with work in Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) analysis (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983). The 
models assume fully-specified optimising behaviour by forward-looking agents, possess 
well-defined stochastic structure of exogenous forces, and impose explicit general 
equilibrium structure. In providing the microeconomic underpinnings which were largely 
absent in macroeconomic models, DSGE models provide a theoretically consistent 
framework for testing macroeconomic theories and for quantitative policy assessment 
(Kydland and Prescott, 1982). 
The earliest DSGE models were formulated in an attempt to provide an internally-
consistent framework to investigate RBC theory. RBC models are underpinned by 
neoclassical general equilibrium economic theory (Kydland and Prescott, 1991). In these 
models, rational, infinite-lived, identical households maximise inter-temporal utility over 
consumption and leisure, use of capital and labour in production of an aggregate good is 
governed by constant returns to scale technology, and markets clear each period. Net 
investment in each period determines the change in capital stock. Apart from the extensive 
empirical literature examining energy-economic activity, there is another kind of literature, 
which has analysed the energy shocks on economic variables using RBC models. The case 
for incorporating energy shocks into the RBC models has been made credibly by McCallum 
(1989). Moreover, the RBC model is considered as a simple neo-classical growth model 
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which is the building block of almost all modern DSGE models with energy (Kim and 
Loungani (1992)). 
It is also worth noticing that, the impact of rising energy (oil) prices has never received 
substantial attention from growth economists, possibly because this has been perceived as 
a short run issue. The main concentration of the mainstream economic growth literature 
has been on the optimal depletion and the price path of exhaustible resources, following 
the original study of Hotelling (1931) as mentioned in Berk and Yetkiner (2014). Main 
contributors of this stream are Solow (1956, 1974, 1978, 1997, 1993), Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979), Stiglitz (1974a, 1974b), Pyndick (1978, 1981). More recently, the “new” growth 
economics, i.e. the endogenous economic growth literature, has focused on 
transition/substitution between energy sources (Tahvonen and Salo (2001), Chakravorty 
et al. (1997)), directed technical change in an economy with energy sources (Smulders and 
De Nooji, 2003) and induced energy-saving technologies and environmental issues 
(Smulders (1999, 2005) and Goulder and Schneider, 1999). Therefore, the issue of effects 
of energy prices on economic growth seems to be an unexplored area in the theoretical 
economic growth literature. 
2.4 Macroeconomic Effects of Energy (Oil) Price Shocks 
A large body of research suggests that energy (oil) price fluctuations have considerable 
consequences on economic activity. The link between energy (oil) prices and GDP can be 
understood via the classic supply side effect according to which rising energy (oil) prices 
are indicative of the reduced availability of a basic input to production, leading to a 
reduction of potential output (Barro, 1984; Brown and Yücel, 1999; Abel and Bernanke, 
2001). Consequently, there is an increase in production cost, and the growth of output and 
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productivity are slowed. This link between energy (oil) prices and GDP has been widely 
studied in the literature (Brown and Yücel, 2002; Hamilton, 2005). Generally, the studies 
tend to find that energy (oil) price increases have a negative impact on output, while this 
impact seems to have weakened over time, especially since the late 1990s. One 
interpretation is that, since the late 1990s, the global economy has experienced two major 
oil shocks. While being of a sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s, GDP 
growth and inflation have remained quite stable in the majority of industrialised countries. 
According to Blanchard and Gali (2007), a plausible explanation is that the effects of an oil 
price increase are similar across periods, but have coincided in time with large shocks of a 
very different nature: large increases in other commodity prices in the 1970s, and high 
growth of productivity and world demand for oil in the 2000s. 
An energy (oil) price increase may also have a negative impact on consumption, 
investment and employment. Consumption is affected through its positive relation with 
disposable income, and investment by increasing firms' costs. Considering households, an 
energy (oil) price increase generates a rise in domestic fuel prices leading to a decrease of 
their purchasing power and slowing their consumption expenditures. This effect can 
however be tempered if consumers expect the rise in energy (oil) prices to be transitory. In 
this case, they will attempt to smooth their consumption by saving less or borrowing more, 
pushing upward real interest rates. Turning to employment, if the energy (oil) price 
increase is long lasting, it may lead to a change in the production structure and have a 
deeper impact on unemployment (Lescaroux and Miggon, 2008) 
The analysis of the macroeconomic effects of energy (oil) prices has evolved along two 
distinct dimensions. On the one hand, the oil price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s 
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generated extensive empirical studies, aimed at investigating the relationship between 
energy (oil) price change and macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation etc. 
Depending on estimation technique (GARCH Model/VAR model etc.), the identification of 
energy (oil)  price ‘shocks’, or the sample period, very different conclusions can be drawn. 
Some researchers focus on short term interactions (causality analysis) between energy 
(oil) prices and economic activity in developed countries (Hamilton (1983), Burbidge and 
Harrison (1984)) while others focus on the long run (cointegrating) interactions between 
energy (oil) price and macroeconomic variables (Hooker, 1986). The remaining 
researchers made an attempt to investigate both short run and long run relationship 
between energy price and the various macroeconomic variables (Lescaroux, 2008). On the 
other hand, theoretical studies have investigated different channels through which energy 
(oil) prices might affect macroeconomic outcomes. While these studies provide important 
insights regarding the transmission of energy (oil) price changes, the practical relevance of 
the different theoretical channels is not always clear, given the lack of empirical evidence. 
2.4.1 Empirical Contributions on Macroeconomic Effects of Energy (Oil) Price 
Shocks 
The two oil price shocks in 1970s and the subsequent global recession sparked a wave of 
empirical studies. There have been extensive empirical studies on the interactions between 
energy (especially oil) prices and macroeconomic indicators following the pioneering 
study of Hamilton (1983). Although there has been debate over the nature of the 
relationship, such as non-linearities (Hamilton (1996, 2003, 2009) and Kilian et al. (2011)) 
and asymmetries, i.e. differences in response to positive and negative shocks ((Mork 
(1989) and Balke et al. (2002)), there seems to be a consensus on the fact that energy (oil) 
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price changes would at least have a particular, if not pivotal, effect on macroeconomic 
variables (Brown and Yücel (2002), Sill (2007), Kilian (2008, 2009)). 
Many researchers have concluded that there is a negative correlation between increases in 
oil prices and the subsequent economic downturns in the United States (Hamilton 1983; 
Burbidge and Harrison 1984; Gisser and Goodwin 1986; Mork 1989; Hamilton 1996; 
Bernanke et al., 1997; Hamilton and Herrera 2004; and Hamilton 2003). Also, other studies 
for other countries found that strong correlation or cointegration relationship between 
world oil prices and macroeconomic variables exist in the long run (Boukez et al., 2008; 
Hamilton 2003; Jones et al., 2004; Rodrigues and Sanchez 2005). This relationship seems 
weaker, however, when data from 1985 onwards is included. Nevertheless, the role of the 
break-date, 1985-1986, has been considered by only very few researchers, where most of 
them argued that the instability observed in the relationship may well be due to a 
misspecification of the functional form employed. The linear specification might as well 
misrepresent the relationship between GDP growth and oil prices. Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) propose explanations for the observed change in the effects of the oil price shocks. 
First, they argue that labour markets are more flexible now than in the past, and hence 
some of the negative effects of the oil price shocks can be observed by the labour market. 
Second, more credible and stronger anti-inflationary stance of monetary policies may have 
kept inflation relatively stable. 
Early studies documented and explained the inverse relationship between an increase in 
the oil price and aggregate economic activity. A major illustration of the extent and 
relevance of this relationship was put forward by Hamilton (1983), who argued in one 
important paper that nine out of ten North-American recessions since the Second World 
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War had been preceded by increases in oil prices, i.e. he finds evidence of Granger causality 
between oil prices and real GNP. Gisser and Goodwin (1986) employ a reduced-form 
approach to assess the quantitative significance of crude oil prices on US economy using US 
data for the period of 1961 and 1982. They have revealed that crude oil prices have had a 
significant impact on a broad range of macroeconomic indicators and this relationship 
appears to have been remarkably stable during the sample periods. Mork (1989)  
highlights the fact that the Hamilton’s (1983) study pertained to a period in which all the 
large oil price movements were upward, and thus it left unanswered the question that 
whether the correlation persists in periods of price decline. Therefore, he extends his 
analysis adding the real price of oil to the six-variable equation and extending the sample 
size till 1988. However, Mork (1989) confirms Hamilton’s (1983) observation of a negative 
correlation between output growth and oil price increases. 
Hooker (1996) reveals that the fact that oil prices Granger cause a variety of U.S. 
macroeconomic indicator variables in data up to 1973 but not in data from then to the 
present is shown to be robust. He refutes the linear relation between oil prices and output 
(Hamilton 1983) and the asymmetric relation based on oil price increases (Mork 1989). 
Later on Hamilton (1996) agrees completely with Hooker refuting linearity and asymmetry 
in the oil price macroeconomy relationship. Additionally, aanalysis of the late 1980s 
indicates that the oil price-macroeconomy relationship has changed in a way not well 
represented by a simple price increase/price decrease asymmetry (Hooker, 1996). Earlier 
studies for oil price change and economic growth relationship were carried out mostly for 
developed countries using VAR model. However, over the following years studies for 
developing countries have also been carried out. 
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Abeysinghe (2001) carried out a study for 12 different countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, USA and rest of 
OECD as a group) using a structural VARX model. Results from this study showed that for 
oil importing developing countries like Philippines and Thailand, direct impact of oil price 
increase by 50% would cause GDP growth to decline by 5.5% and 5.7% respectively in the 
long run. Direct impact on growth of developed countries like USA and rest of OECD was 
comparatively small. USA GDP growth declined by 0.7% and OECD growth was reduced by 
0.2% in the long run. So, he conclude that the transmission effect of oil prices on growth 
may not be that important for a large economy like the US but it could play a critical role in 
small open economies. 
Bacon (2005) concluded a study for 131 countries. The study finds that impacts of higher 
crude oil prices were more severe for oil importing poorer countries as compared to 
developed countries. The findings showed that with $10 per barrel increase in the price of 
crude oil, for some poor countries with GDP per capita below 300 US$, economic growth 
could decrease up to 4%. If oil price increase was $20 per barrel, the shock was doubled. In 
contrast, countries with higher foreign reserves and GDP per capita over 900 US$, 
economic growth shock could be 0.4% on average. 
Kumar (2009) assesses the oil prices-macroeconomy relationship by means of multivariate 
VAR using both linear and non-linear specifications. Scaled oil prices model outperforms 
other models used in the study. It studies the impacts of oil price shocks on the growth of 
industrial production for Indian economy over the period 1975Q1-2004Q3. It is found that 
oil prices Granger cause macroeconomic activities. Evidence of asymmetric impact of oil 
price shocks on industrial growth is found. Oil price shocks negatively affect the growth of 
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industrial production and he find that a 100% increase in oil prices lowers the growth of 
industrial production by 1%. Moreover, the variance decomposition analysis while putting 
the study in perspective finds that the oil price shocks combined with the monetary shocks 
are the largest source of variation in industrial production growth other than the variable 
itself. 
Blanchard et al. (2007) with evidence from USA, France, Germany, UK, Italy and Japan 
economies concludes that effects of oil price shocks have changed over time. Impacts of 
crude oil price change have become smaller on prices, wages, employment and output over 
time. Kilian (2008) empirically analysed the effects of oil supply shocks on US real GDP 
growth and Consumer Price Index (CPI). Study concluded that oil supply shocks negatively 
affected real GDP growth after five quarters. Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) investigate the 
links between oil prices and various macroeconomic and financial variables for a large set 
of countries, including both oil-importing and exporting countries. Both short run and long 
run interactions are analysed through the implementation of causality tests, evaluation of 
cross-correlations between the cyclical components of the series in order to identify 
lead/lag relationships and cointegration analysis. Their results highlight the existence of 
various relationships between oil prices and macroeconomic variables and, especially, an 
important link between oil and share prices on the short run. Turning to the long run, 
numerous long-term relationships are detected, the causality generally running from oil 
prices to the other variables. An important conclusion is relating to the key role played by 
the oil market on stock markets.  
Du et al. (2010) conducted a study to investigate crude oil price shocks on macroeconomic 
growth of China. Through a VAR analysis they concluded that oil price increase had positive 
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significant impacts on macroeconomic activity of China. Their results showed that a 100% 
increase in crude oil price showed a positive growth of Chinese economy by 9% and CPI by 
2.08% for linear model specification. The non-linear model specification results were 
asymmetric and yield different results for different transformation. Results showed that a 
100% decrease in world oil prices cumulatively decreased the growth rate of China’s GDP 
by 17% for Mork (1989) transformation, 10% for Hamilton (1996) transformation and 1% 
for transformation as suggested by Lee et al. (1995). 
Narayan et al. (2014) test whether oil price predicts economic growth for 28 developed 
and 17 developing countries. They use predictability tests that account for the key features 
of the data, namely, persistency, endogeneity, and heteroskedasticity. Their analysis 
considers a large number of countries, shows evidence of more out-of-sample 
predictability with nominal than real oil prices, finds in-sample predictability to be 
independent of the use of nominal and real prices, and reveals greater evidence of 
predictability for developed countries. Ftiti et al. (2014) assesses the impact of oil prices 
on economic growth of the four major OPEC countries (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela) over the period spanning from 2000 to 2010. They aim at 
complementing the results from existing analyses (mainly focused on oil-importing 
countries) by using the evolutionary co-spectral analysis as defined by Priestley and Tong 
(1973). They find that co-movements between oil and economic growth have different 
patterns depending of the studied horizons. This interdependence is a medium lived 
phenomenon, revealed on a three years and one quarter horizon, being weak in the short-
run (ten months). They show that oil price shocks in periods of world turmoil or during 
fluctuations of the global business cycle (downturn or growth, as for instance the 2008 
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financial crisis) have a significant impact on the relationship between oil and economic 
growth in oil-exporting countries. 
Cuando et al. (2015) analyses the macroeconomic impact of structural oil shocks in four of 
the top oil-consuming Asian economies, using a VAR model. They identify three different 
structural oil shocks via sign restrictions: an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven 
by global economic activity and an oil-specific demand shock. The main results suggest that 
economic activity and prices respond very differently to oil price shocks depending on 
their types. In particular, an oil supply shock has a limited impact, while a demand shock 
driven by global economic activity has a significant positive effect in all four Asian 
countries examined. Their finding also includes that policy tools such as interest rates and 
exchange rates help mitigating the effects of supply shocks in Japan and Korea; however, 
they can be more actively used in response to demands shocks. 
From the existing literature it is difficult to draw conclusive results about the impacts of 
energy (oil) prices on economic growth. It varies country to country. The majority of 
researchers for developed countries agree upon the negative relationship between energy 
(oil) price and economic growth. Empirical findings for developing countries vary 
depending on the model specification and choice of variables.  
2.4.2 Theoretical Contributions on Macroeconomic Effects of Energy (Oil) Price 
Shocks 
The search for the routes by which energy (oil) price shocks work their way through the 
economy has had led to the development of theoretical analyses relying on aggregate 
models of the economy and connected with data by simulations. 
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Now we will briefly explain the detailed model structure of some selected DSGE papers 
which are mostly relevant to our proposed model (as some similarities can be found in the 
specification of production and utility function). 
Kim and Loungani (1992) Model 
In their seminal paper Kim and Loungani (1992) included energy as a productive input and 
modelled the relative price of energy as an exogenous random process in a standard RBC 
model. They examine the extent to which the introduction of energy price shocks reduces 
the reliance of the RBC model on unobserved technology shocks. And the main goal of their 
paper is to see how important technology shocks are to the basic RBC model, once the 
model is extended to allow for the possibility of other real shocks, like energy price shocks. 
The Model 
The production technology of firms is described by a nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) function with Constant Returns to Scale (CRS): 
y= h  (1   )  
     
    
   
  
In addition to the usual inputs, labour (h) and capital (k), production is assumed to require 
the use of energy (e). The parameter   is equal to (1-s)/s, where s is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and energy. Labour’s distributive share is given by the 
parameter θ. This functional form allows them, potentially, to relax the assumption of 
unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and energy that would be imposed by a 
Cobb-Douglas (CD) function. 
The law of motion of the stochastic technology shock,  , is assumed to be: 
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Where,  ’s are i.i.d. with standard deviation σ. The relative price of all energy used in the 
economy, P, is given exogenously and follows the process 
                       
with an error variance of   . In order to determine a suitable process for the relative price 
of energy, the authors tried to fit several ARMA processes to the actual data on P for the 
period 1949 to 1987 and the above model best fitted the data. 
Capital accumulates according to the law of motion: 
    (1   )         , 
Where 0<δ<1 is the depreciation rate and    is the period t investment. The economy’s 
resource constraint for period t is given by  
c + i  pe ≤ y, where c is consumption. 
Households in the economy are infinitely-lived and have preferences defined over 
consumption and leisure. Each household’s endowment of time is normalised to 1 so that 
leisure is equal to 1-h. So, the utility function considered in Kim and Loungani’s (1992) 
paper is as follows: 
U(c, h) = log c + A log (1-h) 
Model Calibration 
Following Kydland and Prescott’s (1991) approach, they calibrate the model based on 
microeconomic evidence and also on long-run considerations, i.e., it is  required that values 
for the parameters are chosen such that the model steady state values are close to average 
values for the U.S. economy over the data period being studied. For this purpose, they 
compute the steady state for the model. To hold the steady state conditions, they present 
results for two cases,  =0.001 and  =0.7. The remaining parameters are chosen in 
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conformity with earlier studies. The parameter θ, labour’s share in production, is set equal 
to 0.64, the depreciation rate, δ, assumed to be 10% a year and the annual discount factor, 
β, is set equal to 0.96. The parameter A in the utility function is set equal to 2. 
Model Results 
They present results for three model economies to check the robustness of their findings. 
The first model is simply the energy augmented basic RBC model. For this model, the 
standard deviation of the error term in the technology shocks, σ, was picked to match the 
standard deviation of Solow residuals, measured using actual data on output, capital, hours 
and energy for the 1949-87 period. The second model allows for both technology and 
energy price shocks where,    is picked to match the actual volatility of energy prices over 
the 1949-87 periods. In the third model, σ was set equal to zero which implies the model 
abstracts completely from stochastic shocks to technology. 
The authors found that the inclusion of energy price shocks leads to only a modest 
reduction in the RBC model’s reliance on unobserved technology shocks. The addition of 
energy price shocks raises the percentage of output volatility explained by the basic RBC 
model by about 13% (from 80 to 90%) in the CD case (s =1) and by 4% in the CES case (s 
=0.6). So, the basic RBC model does a good job replicating the broad features of the data. 
For example, investment is far more volatile than consumption, and the correlation 
between output and capital predicted by the model is close to that observed in the data. 
A model with only energy price shocks accounts for 16% of output volatility in the CES case 
and 35% in the Cobb-Douglas case. While these are not trivial amounts, this model does not 
mimic other features of the data, such as the fact that consumption is much smoother than 
output, with the same success as the basic RBC model. 
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So, their model simulation showed that energy price shocks can only generate a small 
fraction of the output fluctuations observed in the U.S. data. A strong conclusion from their 
research is that output volatility is mainly driven by shocks to Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), and going one step further-all previous recessions would have occurred even 
without energy price shocks.  
Dhawan and Jeske (2007) Model 
Dhawan and Jeske (2007) highlighted that the literature on DSGE models with energy price 
shocks mainly uses energy on the production side only. In those models, energy shocks are 
responsible for only a negligible share of output fluctuations. In order to study the 
robustness of the earlier findings, Dhawan and Jeske (2007) extended Kim and Loungani’s 
(1992) model by explicitly modelling private consumption of energy at the household level 
in addition to energy use at the firm level to account for total energy use in the economy. 
Additionally, they distinguish between investment in consumer durables and investment in 
capital goods. Introducing durable goods and household energy consumption actually 
decreases the relevance of energy price shocks for output volatility, despite higher total 
energy use. This surprising outcome happens because households now have two margins 
of adjustment for their investment decision-durable consumption goods and fixed capital-
in response to exogenous shocks. This ability to rebalance their portfolio is missing in a 
typical DSGE model, with or without energy use, when responding to a shock (TFP or 
energy). 
The Model 
The representative household gets utility from consuming three types of consumption 
goods: consumption of nondurables and services excluding energy (N), the flow of services 
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from the stock of durables goods (D) and energy use (E). The household uses the following 
aggregator function to combine these three types of consumption into CA: 
C 
  N 
 
  (    
 )
 
  (1   )  
 
 
   
  
Where   (0, 1) and  ≤ 1. With this aggregation the elasticity of substitution between 
energy and durable goods is 
 
   
. They picked ρ<0, which implies that the durable goods 
and energy are complements. The elasticity of substitution between non-durable 
consumption and the composite of durables and energy goods is 1 in their model. This is 
similar to the aggregator function used by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001) who 
use a Cobb-Douglas aggregator between non-durable and durable consumption. However, 
they have extended it to include the third type of consumption good, which is energy. This 
feature is motivated by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) who found that in the U.S. data the 
elasticity of substitution between durables and nondurable goods was close to 1. It is worth 
noticing that the stock of durables from last period enters today's utility function. That way 
the timing of durable goods investment is analogous to fixed investment where yesterday's 
capital stock     enters today's production function. 
They write the t period utility function as following: 
U (C 
 , h )= logC 
  (1   ) log(1  h ) 
Where    (0, 1) and h denotes hours worked. This log-utility specification is the same as 
in Kim and Loungani (1992). 
The timing convention is as follows: Households set the durable goods stock D   in period 
t-1 and this stock will produce the flow of durable goods services in period t. In other 
words, the durable goods stock      is a state variable at time t: Durable goods depreciate 
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at rate    per period. Moreover, there are convex adjustment costs for adjusting the stock 
of durable goods. Thus, the durable goods investment  I ,  necessary to alter the durable 
goods stock from D    to D  is: 
  ,     (1    )     
  , 
1    , 
(
       
    
)    ,  
Where  ,   0,   ,  0. Notice that in steady state adjustment costs will be zero. 
Following Kim and Loungani (1992), firms produce output by combining three inputs, 
labour h, capital K and energy e according to the following production function: 
F=Zt η    
 
 (1   )  
 
 
 
   
    
Where the term Zt is a TFP shock that follows a stochastic process and ≤ 1. 
Similar to the durable goods, there is an adjustment cost for altering the capital stock from 
K    to K , which implies that capital investment   ,  is: 
  ,     (1    )     
  , 
1    , 
(
       
    
)    ,  
Where  ,   0,   ,  0. 
Just as Cooley and Prescott (1995), they assume that log-TFP follows AR (1) process:  
            ,  
The authors then consider the following shock process for energy price as in Kim and 
Loungani (1992): 
             ,      ,    
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Model Calibration 
The model economy is calibrated to match total energy use and durable goods 
consumption as observed in the US data. They follow the same techniques as explained in 
Kim and Loungani’s (1992) model. 
Main Results 
The main conclusion from their work is that energy price shocks are not a major factor for 
business cycle fluctuations even when incorporating three distinct categories of 
consumption: durables, nondurables and energy. Simulation results indicate that, despite 
higher total energy use, the economy has an even smaller proportion of output fluctuations 
attributable to energy price shocks. Productivity shocks continue to be the primary force 
behind business cycle fluctuations. The driving force behind their results is that the 
household now has the flexibility to rebalance its investment portfolio. Specifically, the 
energy price hike is absorbed by reducing durable goods investment more than investment 
in capital goods, thereby cushioning the hit to future production at the expense of current 
consumption. Therefore, the household in their model can cushion the drop in output by 
adjusting on the durable goods margin instead of just fixed capital. This rebalancing ability 
keeps productivity shocks as the driving force behind output fluctuations. 
They further show that an energy price increase has a larger negative effect on durables 
than on fixed capital. Even though both capital stocks decrease in response to higher 
energy prices, the fixed capital drops by less than the stock of durables after households 
rebalance their portfolio. Furthermore, the drop in fixed capital is less than that in a Kim 
and Loungani type economy, which explains why energy accounts for less output 
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fluctuation in our model. Consequently, productivity shocks alone account for the majority 
of output fluctuations. 
Tan (2012) Model 
Tan (2012) introduces an RBC model with energy that expands upon those of Finn (2000) 
and Dhawan and Jeske (2007) to investigate the roles of energy in the economy. The aim of 
Tan’s (2012) paper is to contribute to the theoretical side of the energy research by 
developing a multiple sector model with endogenous energy production. The goal is to 
explore the set up as a further step forward in the theoretical efforts to model energy in the 
macroeconomy. The model has multiple sectors, and introduces energy as endogenously 
produced. It also models durables explicitly in the household’s utility function, and all 
agents in the economy rely on energy either for household’s durables consumption or for 
production of various goods. All these elements enable the analysis of how the effects of 
changes in energy prices are transmitted in the economy, in particular the impact on 
overall output and on durables consumption and production. Overall the model is quite 
successful in replicating the aggregate behaviours of the economy in the events of adverse 
energy price shocks from the supply side. It is able to model large impacts on overall 
output, emphasising the important role that energy plays. 
Model Description 
In the setup of this model, household consumes a CES aggregation of durables (  ) and 
non-durables (  ), and also derives utility from leisure. They also decide how much time to 
devote to labour (  ) and what is the utilisation rate (  ) of its stock of durables. Similar to 
Dhawan and Jeske (2007), it implicitly models the consumption of durables and 
nondurables in the household’s utility function with the following form of utility function: 
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  log  (    )
   (1   )  
 
 
 
  (1   ) log(1  h ) 
Household’s use of durables needs energy, the amount of which (  , ) is variable in each 
period and directly dependent on the utilisation rate and the stock of durables that the 
household has at the start of the period. As can be seen, energy consumption does not enter 
the utility function directly, but rather it is needed to enable the household to derive utility 
from the stock of durables that it has. Therefore, the cost of energy used in the household 
enters into each period’s budget constraint. 
The amount of energy used in each period by the household can be thought to be a function 
of the stock of durables times its utilisation rate   ,   (    ). In all analyses carried out in 
their paper the amount of energy needed to sustain a utilisation rate    of a stock of 
durables    is assumed to be linearly dependent on their product      that is   ,  
 (    ), where a is a constant to be calibrated. This should be a fairly reasonable 
approximation to the relationship between durables and their energy consumption, and 
suffices to demonstrate the dynamics of the model. 
In each period the household also makes new investments in capital (  , ) and durables 
(  , ), both of which are subject to adjustment costs. For income, it earns interest and wage 
from the labour and capital it provides to the producers. The budget constraint for the 
household in each period is thus: 
  ,  (    )    ,      ,    ,            
Investment in capital and durables are subject to the following adjustment costs: 
  ,       (1    )   
  , 
1    , 
(
       
  
)    ,  
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  ,       (1    )   
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1    , 
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)    ,  
With the incorporation of variable utilisation rate of durables it is fairly intuitive to also 
employ variable rate of depreciation of durables in this model. Naturally, the depreciation 
rate should vary positively with utilisation rate. In the paper, Tan (2012) mainly use a 
power-function form for the depreciation rate 
  ,    
  
  
  
 
Where    and    was calibrated in the model. 
On the production side, three sectors have been considered in Tan’s (2012) model: a 
durable sector, a non-durable sector and an energy sector. The energy sector is needed to 
provide energy to the other two sectors including the own sector and also energy to the 
household in their use of durables. Each sector’s energy use is tied directly to its use of 
capital. In their model calibration, this relationship is captured by a simple linear function; 
that is, each sector’s energy consumption is given by   ,     , where b is a parameter and 
constant for all three sectors. 
All three sectors are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas production functions, but with 
different capital share parameters. The durables and non-durables sectors share the same 
productivity factor/process, while the energy sector has its own. This serves the purpose of 
simulating a productivity shock to the energy sector alone to bring about adverse energy 
price shocks. All the firms are profit maximiser and wage and interest rate are assumed to 
be equalised across all three sectors. 
The three sectors’ production functions are given as: 
  ,  exp (  )  , 
    , 
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  ,  exp (  )  , 
    , 
     
  ,  exp (  )  , 
    , 
     
Tan (2012) assume that all energy produced in each period is consumed; while durables 
and non-durables produced are used for consumption of non-durables and investments in 
capital and durables. The capital and labour market, as usual, also clear in every period. 
Also in the model prices are introduced for non-durables and energy and these prices are 
thus relative price only. No money is involved in the model. The market clearing conditions 
are: 
  ,   (    )      
  ,    ,   ,    ,   +   ,  +  ,  
     ,    ,    ,  
     ,    ,    ,  
Additional price relations need to be imposed, so that a composite price of consumption (or 
output) can be calculated. This allows for the quantity of real output to be extracted from 
the model. 
    (    )
  (1   )  
 
 
 
    ,  (    )    ,    
       ,    ,   ,    ,   ,  
To make the model complete and consistent, an additional relation is introduced in the 
model. A kind of aggregate production needs to be imposed in the model, since there are 
three separate sectors. For this, it is assumed that the three production functions can be 
aggregated into one single production function: 
  exp (  
 )  
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where y, k, h are total output, total capital and total labour respectively and γ is the 
aggregate share of capital. 
The basic model is driven by two shocks: the conventional productivity shock that is 
common to both the durables and non-durables sectors, and a productivity shock that 
affects the energy sector alone. Both the shocks are assumed to follow an AR (1) Process. 
            ,  
  ,      ,      ,  
Model Calibration 
To facilitate comparison the various macro data series are obtained from the US economy 
provided by NIPA, the same ones obtained in Dhawan and Jeske (2007). The computed 
aggregate moments are also pretty close to those in Dhawan and Jeske (2007), hence their 
values are used here for the calibration of the model. 
Certain standard parameters are calibrated following standard literature. The discount 
factor β is set at 0.99; the share of consumption in the household’s utility function   is set 
at 0.34. The share of durables α in consumption is set at 0.2. Empirical research puts the 
elasticity of substitution between durables and nondurables close to 1. In the paper, the 
household’s utility function follows a general CES form, meaning that it cannot be used to 
model an elasticity of substitution of exactly 1. Here it is set at 0.9 for the main analyses, 
and the CES parameter of the household’s utility function ρ is therefore 1 1/ 0.9, which is 
negative and indicates that durables and non-durables are somewhat complementary. 
Other parameters are calibrated to produce theoretical moments of model aggregates that 
reproduce as best possible the empirical moments found in aggregate US data. 
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Main Results 
Tan’s (2012) model performs well with respect to that in Dhawan and Jeske (2007) and 
Finn (2000) and with respect to empirical investigations on the impact of oil prices on the 
macroeconomy. Overall the model is quite successful in replicating the aggregate 
behaviours of the economy in the events of adverse energy price shocks from the supply 
side. Tan (2012) observe the not insignificant effects of a supply-side shock to energy 
prices on the overall economy, confirming the important role of energy on both the 
household’s side and the side of producers. They also gain insights on the interplay among 
the different production sectors when such shocks hit, and the feedback into the 
production of energy carried by the changing energy demands, since energy price is no 
longer exogenously imposed upon the agents in the economy but is endogenously 
determined. 
De Miguel, Manzano and Martin-Moreno (2003, 2005) 
De Miguel et al. (2003, 2005) develop a standard DSGE model to analyse the effects of oil 
price shocks on the business cycle and welfare of a small open economy that needs to 
import oil to produce goods such as in the case of the Spanish economy. Calibrating the 
same model for EU-15 countries, they also check the robustness of their model. 
The Model 
Following Kim and Loungani (1992), they assume the economy produces an internationally 
tradable good (y), combining labour (n), capital (k) and oil (e) using the production 
function as follows:  
y=n  (1   )  
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The parameter   is equal to (1-s)/s, where s is the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and energy. Labour’s distributive share is given by the parameter θ. 
The aggregate resources constraint is given by the following equation in their model where 
c is private consumption, i is investment and xn are net exports: 
             
Capital (k) accumulates according to the law of motion: 
        (1   )    (  ,     ) 
Where δ is the depreciation rate and Ф is the capital adjustment cost function which they 
assume to be quadratic: 
 (  ,     ) = 
 
 
       
  
 
 
The firm which operates under perfect competition maximises profits as following: 
     (  ,   ,   )                 
Where w is the wage rate, r is the interest rate and p is the relative oil price.  
The relative oil price follows a stationary stochastic process: 
ln       ln        ,        (0,    ) 
The representative household is infinitely lived and has preference over consumption (c) 
and labour (n) is defined in the following utility function: 
 (  ,   )  
1
1   
 (      
 )    1  
Where σ 0 is the parameter of relative risk aversion, ν is one plus the inverse of the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution of labour supply and ψ is a positive parameter. 
They also propose a measure of the Welfare Cost (WC) of energy price fluctuations as 
follows: 
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WC = x.
    
    
  
Where WC is the percentage increase in the GDP needed to make households indifferent 
between an economy with or without energy price fluctuations and x is the percentage 
consumption increase needed to equalise both utilities.  
Model Calibration 
The models are calibrated to reproduce average values of the Spanish economy during the 
period 1970:1-1998:4 and the European Union in annual data from 1960-2003.  
Model results 
They reveal that the case of the US economy does not seem to be applicable to the rest of 
the oil importing countries whose economies depend heavily on energy especially, oil. They 
show that the ability of the RBC model to reproduce the cyclical path of the Spanish 
economy, especially in those periods when oil price shocks were most dramatic. They 
further mention that oil shocks can account for a significant percentage of GDP fluctuations 
in many of the European countries, but the explanatory power is quite smaller for others 
which can be explained by differences in the strength of monetary policies. A possible 
source for a weak link between energy prices and economic activity might be the fact of a 
declining importance of energy for industrial production and in addition industrial 
production becomes less important for the overall added value in US economy.  They also 
show that the increase in the relative price of oil had a negative and significant effect on 
welfare both in Spanish economy and European Union.  
Manzano and Rey (2012)  
Manzano and Rey (2012) extends De Miguel et al. (2003, 2005) model to quantify the 
welfare cost of energy price fluctuations. The aim of their paper is to provide a 
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macroeconomic measure of the welfare cost of energy insecurity since energy security has 
become once again a priority of energy policy. The high volatility and uncertainty on the 
energy markets has increased the interest in this dimension of the energy policy. The 
literature has put much effort into trying to define and measure energy security. 
Nevertheless, little is known about its economic consequences. They relate energy security 
to energy price volatility and, therefore, quantify the welfare cost caused by the 
fluctuations in the energy price. They focus on the price dimension of energy security. They 
assume that analysing the fluctuations in the price of energy is a good way to quantify 
energy security. 
The Model 
They take mainly the De Miguel et al. (2003, 2005) model and one of the differences 
observed between the two models is in the utility function. Unlike the previous model, they 
assume that the representative household has now preferences over non-energy and 
energy consumption and leisure that are defined in the following utility function: 
 (  ,   )  
(  
   
(1    )
 ) 
 
 
With  (  ,    )   (1   )  
      
  
 
  
A is the aggregate good that combines non-energy (c) and energy consumption (eh). The 
elasticity of substitution between non-energy and energy is 1/ (1-α).  
Since the main focus of this model is on the welfare issue, they do not consider the capital 
adjustment cost like the previous model. 
Thus, in this model, energy is considered as consumption good for households and 
production input for firms. Thus, energy price fluctuations affect households' utility in two 
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ways. First, energy enters utility function as a consumption good, and therefore, energy 
price fluctuations have a direct impact on energy consumption and, consequently, on 
households' welfare. Second, firms use energy for production and, thus, the fluctuations in 
the energy price lead to increase the volatility of output, leisure and non-energy 
consumption, which affect ultimately households' welfare. 
Model Calibration 
Their model is calibrated for the Spanish economy following De Miguel and Manzano 
(2011). The parameters are chosen to reproduce the main long run characteristics of the 
Spanish economy. 
Model Results 
Their results also show that energy price fluctuations mainly affect utility through 
household energy consumption. They increase the volatility in energy consumption which 
causes a decline in households' welfare. On the other hand, energy price fluctuations have 
not a significant impact on the volatility of output, non-energy consumption and leisure. 
Consequently, in an economy in which energy is only used for production, the welfare loss 
caused by price fluctuations is much lower. 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) study output impulse response functions and show that 
under imperfect competition the effect of an energy price shock is stronger than under 
perfect competition. Finn (2000) shows that one can increase the economy's response to an 
energy price shock even under perfect competition when one models energy use as a 
function of capacity utilisation. However, both papers are silent on the business cycle 
properties of the model in response to energy price shocks. Specifically, they do not report 
the share of output fluctuations explained by energy price shocks and the other business 
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cycle facts such as volatility of key economic variables such as investment, consumption 
and output. Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter provides a synopsis of the energy 
augmented DSGE models. 
Another strand of the literature studies the interaction between energy (oil) price shocks 
and monetary policy. Among others, Hamilton (1983), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), 
Bernanke et al. (1997) and Barsky and Kilian (2002) examine this relationship 
numerically. Theoretical contributions are for example, Leduc and Sill (2004), Medina and 
Soto (2005), and Blanchard and Gali (2007). They seek to answer the question whether the 
recessionary consequences of oil price shocks are caused by the oil price hike or by the 
monetary response to the rise in oil prices. However, since this thesis does not concentrate 
on the monetary policy, we do not discuss them.  
Finally, primary commodity price stabilisation is another very important economic aspect 
as shocks to world commodity prices can have a profound impact on the economies of both 
exporting and importing countries (Cashin et al., 1999). To tackle the consequences of 
commodity price fluctuations, many countries across the world have resorted to 
stabilisation schemes. IMF (2012) categorise commodity products as energy, metals, food 
and agricultural raw materials. 
Most of the advocates of price stabilisation argue that reducing price variability is good 
itself (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979). Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) further argue that there 
are two strategies that economist can follow in addressing the appeal for commodity price 
stabilisation. Firstly, they say that one obvious objection to the competitive market 
equilibrium is that it is inequitable and then the government could offer lump sum transfer 
or subsidies to the domestic producers and alter the level of domestic prices relative to 
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rest-of-world prices. This method is known as first moment policies. The other approach 
(second moment policies) is to protect the domestic producers and consumers from world 
market by freezing domestic prices when rest of world prices swing about. Bellemare et al. 
(2013) also discuss that the urge toward state interventions to stabilise domestic 
commodity prices commonly arise because i) households are widely believed to value price 
stability and ii) the poor are widely perceived to suffer disproportionately from commodity 
price instability. 
Nash and Knudsen (1990) discuss the topic of domestic price stabilisation programmes in 
a comparative cross country context and argue that government  throughout the 
developing world have established mechanism to protect domestic commodity markets 
from the impulses of international price movements to promote macroeconomic stability. 
However, the desirability of price stabilisation from standpoint of welfare has long been 
debated in economic literature (Peng, 1992). If attention is focused on price stabilisation, 
then the welfare and income effects of price stabilisation on producers and consumers 
should be carefully considered. 
2.5 Macroeconomic Effects of Energy (Electricity) Market Reform 
Energy (Electricity) market reform continues to be one of the most important and 
challenging tasks facing policymakers in the energy sectors of different countries in the 
world. The existing reform studies mainly use both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
to assess the impact of reforms and found mixed results in terms of macroeconomic 
indicators. 
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2.5.1 Empirical Contributions on Macroeconomic Effects of Energy (Electricity) 
Market Reform 
It has been more than two decades since the extensive beginning of worldwide energy 
(electricity) sector reforms and restructuring. Energy (Electricity) sector reform has 
usually involved some combination of product market competition, privatisation and 
regulation (Zhang, et al., 2008). In developed countries, the process of reform in the 
electricity sector has been well documented and appears to have been reasonable 
successful (Pollitt, 2008). However, the empirical evidence on the macroeconomic 
performance of reforms across developing countries needs to be examined considering the 
sizable gap in the energy economics literature (Jamasb et al., 2014). Most of the empirical 
literatures on energy (electricity) reform are biased on micro level studies. For macro level 
studies, still the theoretical methodology (Social Cost Benefit (SCB) analysis, CGE model 
etc.) dominates over its empirical counterpart.   
Single or multi-country case studies are often preferable when in-depth examination or 
qualitative study is needed. This is because some reform factors are inherently difficult to 
capture through statistical methods (Jamasb et al., 2005). Case studies can examine the 
issues that do not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or could not be 
analysed due to lack of comprehensive data (Jamasb et al., 2005). Hence, analysis based on 
case studies can also overcome the issues related with model specification and accuracy of 
variables in representing the appropriate feature of reform. Case studies involving single or 
multiple countries have been a popular method to examine the process and outcomes of 
energy (electricity) sector reforms in many developing and developed countries. For 
example, Jamasb et al. (2005, 2014) provided a detailed literature survey of empirical 
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evidence on determinants and performance of electricity sector reform in developing 
countries by studying different studies based on econometric evidence, efficiency and 
productivity analysis, macro evidence and case studies. Since we do not stress on the 
empirical studies in this thesis, we suggest interested reader to read Jamasb et al. (2005, 
2014) who provide a detailed literature review of empirical evidence on the performance 
of energy sector reform in developing countries even though the dominant focus of the 
existing literature is on power sector reforms. Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005) review the 
main empirical evidence on the impact of privatisation as a reform instrument on economic 
performance in developing economies at firm and sectoral level. The evidence suggests that 
if privatisation is to improve performance over the longer term, it needs to be 
complemented by policies that promote competition and effective state regulation, and that 
privatisation works best in developing countries when it is integrated into a broader 
process of structural reform. 
Kessides (2012) also reports an empirical survey of country case studies (mostly for Latin 
American countries) of electricity sector reform and conclude that when well designed and 
implemented, a combination of institutional reforms-privatisation, unbundling and 
effective regulation can lead to significant improvements in several dimensions of 
operating performance and in a variety of country setting. However, he concerns about 
investment in transmission and generation capacity in liberalised electricity market. 
Using a cross-sectional survey conducted in 2005 of some 20,000 households in rural 
Bangladesh, Khandker et al. (2012) studies the welfare impacts of households’ grid 
connectivity. Based on rigorous econometric estimation techniques (Maximum Likelihood 
Probit Model, IV Estimation and Propensity Score Matching), they find that grid 
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electrification has significant positive impacts on households’ income, expenditure, and 
educational outcomes. For example, the gain in total income due to electrification can be as 
much as 30% and as low as 9%. Benefits go up steadily as household exposure to grid 
electrification (measured by duration) increases and eventually reach a plateau. They also 
find that rich households benefit more from electrification than poor households. Finally, 
estimates also show that income benefits of electrification on an average exceed cost by a 
wide margin.  
Zhang et al. (2008) provides an econometric assessment of the effects of privatisation, 
competition and regulation on the performance of the electricity generation industry using 
panel data for 36 developing and transitional countries, over the period 1985 to 2003. This 
study is based on a data base especially created from a range of international sources to 
measure the effects of privatisation, regulation and competition on performance in 
electricity generation in developing countries. The empirical results reveal that privatisation 
and regulation do not lead to obvious gains in economic performance. Additionally, 
competition in electricity generation is more important than privatisation or the 
establishment of independent regulation in bringing about performance improvements. 
This result complements earlier research into electricity generation like Pollitt (1997) who 
conclude that in the absence of competition, effective regulation is crucial to the success of 
privatisation. 
Nakano and Managi (2008) measures productivity in Japan’s steam power-generation 
sector and examines the effect of reforms on the productivity of this industry over the 
period 1978–2003. They estimate the Luenberger Productivity Indicator, which is a 
generalisation of the commonly used Malmquist Productivity Index, using a data 
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envelopment analysis approach. Factors associated with productivity change are 
investigated through dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of panel 
data. Their empirical analysis show that the regulatory reforms have contributed to 
productivity growth in the steam power generation sector in Japan. 
Du et al. (2009) estimate the impact of regulatory reforms on production efficiency of 
fossil-fired generation plants using the plant-level national survey data collected in 1995 
and 2004. Applying the econometric method of Differences-in-Differences, they estimate 
the effects of these reforms on the demand for inputs of employees, fuel and nonfuel 
materials. The results show that the net efficiency improvement in labour input associated 
with the regulatory reforms is roughly 29% and the gains in nonfuel materials are about 
35%, while there is no evidence of efficiency gains in fuel input associated with the 
electricity reforms. 
Andriamihaja and Vecchi (2007) employed Price Shifting Model to assess the distributional 
impact of higher energy price in Madagascar on households’ real expenditure. They showed 
that a 17% rise in the price of energy products leads to a 1.75% average decrease in real 
expenditure. This percentage is higher for low-income households (2.1%) than for high 
income households (1.5%). The study concludes that the benefit of introducing price 
subsidies would be progressive; that is, in percentage terms, subsidy would benefit poor 
households’ more than rich household. However, subsidising would involve substantial 
leakage in favour of high income households and there is an issue of identifying more cost-
effective policies to protect poorest households.  
Adagunodo (2013) examined petroleum products pricing reform and welfare in Nigeria 
and concluded that if implemented correctly, the removal of subsidy would save largest 
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amount from government budget and the subsidy funds could lead to major development 
gains for the country. Nwafor et al. (2006) investigated the impact of removal of petroleum 
products subsidies on poverty in Nigeria. The study concluded that subsidy removal, 
without spending of the associated savings, would increase the national poverty level. This 
is due to the consequent rise in inputs’ costs which is higher than the rise in selling prices 
of most firms. The key sectors which experience increased nominal output are the refined 
petroleum products which provide income for an extremely low number of households. 
Freund and Wallach (1995) examine the welfare effects of increasing energy prices in 
Poland and concluded that programmes that subsidising household energy prices in Poland 
as well as the other transition economies help the rich more than they help the poor. Not 
only do the wealthy consume more energy in absolute terms, but also spend a larger 
portion of their income on energy. Based on their results, they proposed that the first best 
policy would be to raise energy prices while targeting cash relied to the poor through a 
social assistance programme.  
Coady et al. (2006) simulated both direct and indirect effects of fossil-fuel subsidy reform 
in Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, Mali and Sri Lanka. They found that the direct effects of increased 
fossil fuel prices on aggregate real income ranged from 0.9% in Mali to 2.0% in Bolivia. 
However, in Ghana, Jordan and Sri Lanka they were regressive affecting the lowest income 
more than the highest. Indirect effect resulting from increases in the prices of other goods 
and services were higher, ranging from 1.1 to 6.7% but tended to be equally distributed 
across income quintiles. This reflects the higher proportion of their budgets that lower 
income quintiles must devote to energy as opposed to other goods and services.  
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Angel-Urdinola et al. (2006) examined the extent to which the poor did benefit from past 
subsidies in Rwanda, and to discover whether they would benefit from alternative implicit 
or explicit cross-subsidies. Because access rates to the network are very low among the 
poor, the share of the implicit subsidies that prevailed before the increase in tariff and that 
benefited the poor was also very low. They have concluded that previous subsidies were 
badly targeted. Another important result of their analysis was the finding that it would 
probably be better for poverty reduction to give priority to a subsidy mechanism for new 
connections to the network rather than a subsidy for consumption for those households 
that are already connected.  
2.5.2 Theoretical Contributions on Macroeconomic Effects of Energy 
(Electricity) Market Reform 
The literature based on Dynamic models for energy market, is more concentrated on 
energy (oil) price shocks rather than energy (electricity) market reform. Most of the 
dynamic models used to study the impact of energy (electricity) market reform on 
macroeconomy are CGE models or Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) models ignoring 
the stochastic shocks. Since the focus of this thesis is stochastic in nature, we will not 
explain the models in details; will just briefly mentions the overview of few selected models 
and highlight the effects of energy (electricity) market reforms.   
Oktaviani et al. (2007) used a CGE model to analyse the elimination of fuel subsidies in 
Indonesia, which occurred in three stages over the period 2000-2005 (prices were 
increased by 21% in 2000, 30% in 2001 and 29% in 2005). They concluded that the short 
to medium term macroeconomic performance of the economy was adversely affected by 
the removal of the subsidies, due to reduction in household incomes and increase in 
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domestic prices. Furthermore, the reduction of fuel subsidies increased overall impact of 
poverty in Indonesian economy from 8.9% to 12.9% of population, with rural areas worst 
affected. However, Gibson and Olivia (2008) used the Marginal Social Cost approach to 
evaluate the equity and efficiency of subsidy reform in Indonesia and concluded that large 
subsidies on kerosene should be reduced. 
Kpodar and Djiofack (2009) assessed the distributional effects of a rise in various 
petroleum product prices in Mali using a standard CGE model. Their results suggest that 
higher diesel prices primarily affect richer households, while the poorest ones tend to 
suffer more from higher kerosene and gasoline prices. Overall, the impact of fuel prices on 
household budgets shows a U-shaped relationship with expenditure per capita. Regardless 
of the oil product considered, high-income households benefit disproportionately from oil 
price subsidies. This suggests that petroleum price subsidies are ineffective in protecting 
the income of poor households compared with a targeted subsidy. 
Manzoor et al. (2012) study the impacts of reducing implicit and explicit energy 
subsidies(which entails a huge increase in domestic energy prices) in Iran as an oil 
producing countries where government supply energy at a very low price which is treated 
as an implicit subsidy on the oil and gas input to the economy’s production sectors. Their 
CGE model is based on a Modified Micro Consistent Matrix table which includes implicit 
subsidies and sector specific capital. The model consists of 36 commodity goods and 18 
production activities. Their findings suggest that, except for energy and services, overall 
economic activity declines and the consumer faces a lower level of welfare after subsidy 
reduction. Energy exports would increase and non-energy exports decline. Domestic 
energy demand by households and producers would decline as well. On the demand side, 
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the results show a crowding out effect on public goods and services. With sensitivity 
analysis, in which they consider different elasticity parameters in production, robust 
results are found. 
Bouakez et al. (2008) consider a small open economy, which consists of households, firms, 
a government, and a monetary authority. Each household supplies a differentiated labour 
supply for which it sets a nominal wage in a monopolistically competitive labour market. 
Wages are costly to change and are thus sticky. There are four types of goods: a final good, 
a composite non-oil good, oil, and intermediate goods. The final good, which serves 
consumption and investment purposes, is produced by perfectly competitive firms using oil 
and a non-oil composite good as inputs. The non-oil composite good is produced by mixing 
domestically produced and imported intermediate goods. Domestic intermediate goods are 
produced by monopolistically competitive firms that use domestic labour and capital as 
inputs. Domestically produced intermediate goods are also exported to the rest of the 
world. Export prices are determined at the world market and are exogenous to the 
economy. Foreign intermediate goods are imported by monopolistically competitive firms 
at the world price. These goods are then sold to local firms at domestic-currency prices. 
Prices set by monopolistic firms for the domestic market are subject to adjustment costs. 
Oil used to produce the final good is imported by the government, who plays the role of an 
intermediary, buying oil at the world price, and reselling it to domestic firms at the 
domestic price. These two prices need not be identical even after converting the world 
price to domestic currency. Depending on the way in which the government sets domestic 
price, pass-through from the world price to the local price of oil can be full or incomplete. 
In the model, the government follows a pricing rule that can yield any degree of pass-
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through between 0 and 100%. The monetary authority is assumed to set the nominal 
interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule, which nests strict CPI inflation targeting and 
fixed exchange rates as special cases. 
The objective of the paper is to determine whether, and to what extent, government 
intervention in the oil market is warranted in an economy characterised by nominal 
rigidities in the goods and labour markets. More specifically, they investigate whether 
limiting the degree of pass-through of oil prices in such an environment could be welfare 
improving relative to a full-pass-through policy. 
They compute the welfare-maximising level of pass-through of oil prices in an artificial oil 
importing economy characterised by nominal price rigidities. They also find that, to the 
extent that monetary policy is capable of stabilising the economy, government intervention 
in the oil market should be avoided. On the other hand, when complete stabilisation is not 
attainable, as is the case under CPI inflation targeting, the government can improve social 
welfare by limiting the degree of pass-through of oil prices. They find, however, that the 
welfare gain from pursuing such a policy is negligible.  
Plante (2011) develops a small open economy that produces a composite traded good and a 
non-traded good. Both goods are produced using labour and oil and one sector may be 
more or less oil-intensive than the other. The traded good is the numeraire and for 
convenience its price is fixed at unity. The traded good is either consumed by households 
or used to purchase oil from the rest of the world. The economy is small in that it has no 
effect on the world price of the traded good or the world price of oil. 
In the benchmark model, Plante (2011) assume that household activity is controlled by a 
representative agent who derives disutility from working and utility from consumption of a 
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traded good, consumption of fuel products, and from holdings of real money balances. Total 
labour supply is divided to traded and non-traded sector. The agent also derives utility 
from the use of fuel products. The representative households do not pay the world price 
Po; however, but instead face a subsidised price, Ps. As with traded goods, the economy is 
small and does not affect the world price of oil. 
Production of the traded good is done by a representative firm operating under perfect 
competition using the CES technology. The representative firm uses labour and oil to 
produce the final good; capital is not considered in the model. The government provides a 
subsidy on fuel products and earns revenue from levying lump sum taxes and from the 
inflation tax. He assume that the government purchases oil at the world price of Po and 
then sells it at the subsidised price Ps, with Ps ≤ Po.  The steady state government budget 
constraint is: 
T + χm = (Po- Ps) (OH+OT) 
Where the left hand side is the total revenue available is to the government (T, is the lump 
sum taxation and χm is the seigniorage revenue), while the right hand side is the total 
expenditures made by the government. This equation makes clear that lowering Ps 
requires government to increase revenue either increasing lump sum taxes, or by 
increasing seigniorage revenue through in the steady state rate of inflation, χ. In the above 
equation, m is the agent’s holding. Plante (2011) investigates the long run implications of 
subsidies of fuel products (by changing the value of Ps) on economy. He then extends the 
same model for non-traded goods. The main contribution of his paper to the literature is a 
set of analytical and numerical results that show how the economy's steady state is 
distorted when the domestic price of oil is permanently reduced below that of the world 
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price of oil. These results show that fuel subsidies have important effects on a number of 
macroeconomic variables above and beyond just promoting over-consumption of fuel 
products. 
For an economy that produces only traded goods, analytical results showed that the 
subsidy drives up wages in the economy, leads to inefficiently high labour supply, and 
increases production of the traded good to pay for the over consumed oil. There is also a 
distinct possibility that non-oil consumption could be crowded out depending upon how 
elastic labour is supplied. A number of similar results hold for an economy that also 
produces non-traded goods. As before, the subsidy drives up wages and leads to an 
oversupply of labour. In addition, it distorts the allocations between the traded and non-
traded sectors, generally leading to an overemphasis on producing traded goods to pay for 
the increased consumption of fuel products. This occurs regardless of whether or not the 
relative price of the non-traded good rises or falls in the economy. When the inflation tax is 
used to finance the subsidy, there are also significant impacts on monetary variables as 
well. All of these results highlight impacts of these subsidies that are usually ignored when 
considering the pros and cons of fuel subsidies in the countries used in this study. While 
households certainly benefit from extra consumption of fuel products, this comes at the 
indirect cost of working more, potentially reduced consumption of other goods, and 
inefficient allocation of resources towards the traded sector. 
Glomm and Jung (2013) construct a DGE model to analyse the effects of large energy 
subsidies in a small open economy. The model includes domestic energy production and 
consumption, trade in energy at world market prices, as well as private and public sector 
production. They consider an overlapping generation economy with heterogeneity 
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individuals. Within each period of their lives agents value a numeraire consumption good, 
energy and leisure. They divide the capital between physical capitals used in the 
production of final consumption goods and services and physical capital used in the 
production of energy. Final consumption and services are produced from four inputs: a 
public good, physical capital stock, effective labour in the private sector and energy. 
Government finances investment in public capital. The remainder of government 
expenditure is government consumption. The government uses public capital and hires 
labour to produce public goods. Government also runs two separate pension programmes. 
The government collects labour income taxes from all workers in the public and private 
sector as well as social security taxes. The government also taxes consumption, fuel 
consumed by households and fuel used in firm. In addition, government collects a tax on 
capital. 
The model is calibrated to Egypt (a net exporter of oil) and used to study reforms such as 
reductions in energy subsidies with corresponding reductions in various tax instruments, 
or increases in infrastructure investment. They calculate the new steady states, transition 
paths to the new steady state and the size of the associated welfare losses or gains. In 
response to a 15% cut in energy subsidies, GDP may fall as less energy is used in 
production. Excess energy is exported and capital imports fall. Welfare in consumption 
equivalent terms can rise by up to 0.6% of GDP. Gains in output can be realised only if the 
government reinvests into infrastructure. The overall findings that emerge from this 
analysis are: a 15% reduction of energy subsidies to households and firms can either lead 
to decreases of GDP by 3% or increases of GDP by a similar amount. The expansionary or 
contractionary effect is mainly determined by the government policy that reacts to the 
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subsidy cut and clears the government budget constraint. If infrastructure investments are 
increased after the subsidy cut, then growth effects can be realised. If subsidy cuts are 
handed back to households via lower taxes, no such growth effects will result as 
households simply consume the extra income and excess energy is exported at fixed world 
market prices. More severe cuts of energy subsidies amplify all effects monotonically. 
Overall, they find that welfare gains for most generations along the transition path can be 
realised. Only in the case with lower labour taxes in reaction to the subsidy cuts do we 
observe welfare losses by generations that are already retired when the reform takes place. 
These cohorts are not able to benefit from the lower taxes. They also find that energy cuts 
to producers lead to more direct growth effects. In addition, positive welfare effects are 
also larger as consumers do not suffer from higher (unsubsidised) energy prices and are 
therefore able to maintain their prior levels of energy consumption. 
Pereira and Pereira (2011) examines the environmental, economic and budgetary impacts 
of fuel prices using a DGE model of the Portuguese economy which highlights the 
mechanisms of endogenous growth and includes a detailed modelling of the public sector1. 
As to the budgetary impact, higher fuel prices lead to higher tax revenues, which, coupled 
with a reduction in public spending translates to lower public deficits. In addition, and from 
a methodological perspective, their results highlight the importance of endogenous growth 
mechanisms. A scenario of higher fuel prices would, under exogenous economic growth 
assumptions, result in larger baseline emissions growth scenarios, substantially smaller 
economic effects, and rather different budgetary effects. Finally, and from a policy 
perspective, their results highlight the impact of fossil fuel prices in defining the level of 
                                                             
1 For the model structure, please see Pereira and Pereira (2012), “DGEP-A Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model of the Portuguese Economy: Model Documentation”. 
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policy intervention required for compliance with international and domestic climate 
change legislation. As a corollary, they argue that it is critical for both international 
comparisons and international policy negotiations to define baseline emission targets in 
function of steady state economic projections under stable price assumptions. 
Mehran and Payam (2014) set up a DGE model to analyse the short-run effects of energy 
subsidy reform in Iran. The model consists of 3 sectors: Household, firm and government. 
There is one representative firm, which demands for energy, as well as capital and labour. 
The firm buys energy from the government, which sets the price of energy, of course below 
the price of foreign energy market. Households take utility from consuming energy. Like 
firms, households they take the price of energy as given. Household maximises the 
combination of consumption and money in infinitive period. In the model, government 
collects proportional taxes from consumption, wage, capital and profit of households, and 
transfers lump sum payment to the households. 
The non-energy supply side of economy has two sectors: final-goods and intermediate 
goods sector. Final good sector produces non-energy goods, using intermediate goods and 
sell it in a competitive market to the households, to be consume or transfer to capital 
without any cost. Intermediate sector firms, hire labour, rent capital and buy energy to 
produce continuum of intermediate goods and sell their output in a monopolistic 
competition market to the final sector firms. An intermediate sector firm hires labour and 
rents capital from households and buys energy from government to produce non-energy 
intermediate goods, given the demand function of final sector firms for his product. 
In this model they assume that government expenditures are assigned to providing public 
goods, public investment and transfer payments, and it does not contribute to making 
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output, i.e. GDP. Public good and investment is not introduced explicitly in the model. It is 
assumed that government consumption and investment are perfect substitute for private 
consumption and investment. So, they express government expenditures in term of lump-
sum transfers. In this framework, there is no difference between transferring the increased 
revenue of the government (as a consequence of removing energy subsidies), to the 
household and using them as new resources for government expenditures.  
Government has three kinds of revenue; the first is taxes on capital, labour, profits of the 
intermediate firms and consumption. The second, which is important in the model, is 
energy carrier resources. It is assumed that all of the resources like oil are owned by 
government. The government sells part of them in domestic market to households and 
firms in intermediate sector, of course with price that is less than foreign price. The 
remaining part is exported with exogenous foreign price of energy. The third source of 
government revenue is seigniorage. In this model, government sets energy prices for firms 
and households, so the amount of transfer payment (which contains government 
expenditures and lump-sum subsidies for compensating energy subsidies reforming) is 
obtained endogenously. 
The calibrated model shows surprising results. To decide whether to reform subsidy or 
postpone it to the near future, when the economy will recover after the recent inflationary 
recession, policy makers should be concerned about output losses, rather than about high 
inflation. It is found that a rise of domestic prices of energy up to 100% will not end at 
higher price levels if the increased revenue is repaid to households. In spite of that, during 
this period the policy has had a great impact on the level of total output, about -3% to -2% 
on average, both/equally in the case of sticky prices and flexible prices. It is shown that 
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after a quarter of reform, Calvo-type price stickiness has negligible effect on the macro 
variables.  
In the literature, IMF, define lots of researches on subsidies in energy market. For example, 
Anand et al. (2013) evaluates the fiscal and welfare implications of fuel subsidy reform in 
India. Their result show that these subsidies are inefficient and inequitable and subsidising 
will makes the ratio of energy consuming to GDP from 0.8 to 1.9% in less than 2 years. In 
other work, Coady et al. (2012) conduct a research on the world data to realise the 
increasing fuel subsidies in lots of country. They confirm that the best solution is liberating 
market. In addition they suggest, changing price setting regime, from fix prices to adjusting 
regularly. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The survey of the theoretical models on the relationship between energy (oil) price shocks 
and macroeconomy undertaken in Chapter 2 has shown that most of the DSGE models treat 
the developed countries in a much aggregated manner. There are also relatively few 
studies focusing on dynamic models to examine the macroeconomic consequences of 
energy (electricity) market reform. These consequences are complex and require an 
explicit DSGE modelling approach. Moreover, in many developing oil importing developing 
countries, government controls electricity and fuel prices and provides subsidies to the 
households and firms. However, to the best of our knowledge, this price controlling 
mechanism feature is not incorporated in the DSGE applications till now. Additionally, the 
feature of inter fuel substitution in electricity generation sector is also missing in most of 
the DSGE literature.  So, relatively little attention is given to developing a model for a mixed 
economy where government still control electricity and fuel prices and electricity is 
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produced using different fuels and supplied by both public and private companies. The 
absence of these features makes it difficult for the extension of energy related policy 
research for the developing and less developing countries. 
In light of these limitations, this thesis aims to contribute to the theoretical side of the 
energy research by developing a DSGE model for a mixed economy like Bangladesh where 
government still control electricity and fuel prices and electricity and fuel enters both in 
production and utility functions. The main goal is to develop a model for mixed economy 
where government still controls electricity and fuel price considering a detailed 
disaggregation of electricity sector as a further step forward in the theoretical efforts to 
model energy in the macroeconomy and try to examine i) how important aggregate energy 
price shocks are to explain business cycle fluctuations in Bangladesh economy (Chapter 4) 
since no such study is done for Bangladesh economy and RBC is the first step of developing 
a DSGE model, ii) how would oil price shocks affect the macroeconomy of Bangladesh 
economy in the presence of government price controlling mechanism (Chapter 5) and iii) 
the outcomes of liberal electricity price reforms policies at macro level as a move towards 
the free market economy (Chapter 6). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 2.1: A Synopsis of the Energy Augmented DSGE Models 
Model Country Utility 
Function 
 
Production 
Function 
Model Shocks Government 
Sector 
(Taxes/Subsidy) 
Foreign 
Sector 
Welfare 
Estimation 
Energy in the 
Model 
Main Findings 
Miguel, Manzano 
and Moreno 
(2003) 
Spain U=
 
   
[(      
 )    1] F=  
  (1   )  
      
    
   
  
(CES) 
Ln Pt = ṕ +ρPt-1+ϵt No YES Yes Technology 
and Shock 
High Oil Prices 
have a negative 
welfare effect on 
Spanish economy 
Miguel, Manzano 
and Moreno 
(2005) 
EU U=
 
   
[(      
 )    1] F=  
  (1   )  
      
    
   
  
(CES) 
Ln Pt = ṕ +ρPt-1+ϵt No YES Yes Technology 
and Shock 
High Oil Prices 
have a negative 
welfare effect in 
Southern European 
countries. 
Manzano and Rey 
(2012) 
Spain 
U=
(  
   
(    )
 ) 
 
 F=  
  (1   )  
      
    
   
  
(CES) 
Ln Pt = ṕ +ρPt-1+ϵt No YES Yes Technology 
and Shock 
High Energy Prices 
have a negative 
welfare effect on 
Spanish economy 
Kim and Loungani 
(1992) 
USA U= log c + A log (1-h) 
F= h  (1   )  
     
    
   
  
(CES) 
 
                
                      
No YES No Technology 
and Shock 
Support the views 
of macroeconomists 
who downplay the 
impact of energy 
shocks on the 
economy 
Tan (2012) USA 
U= log  (    )
   (1   )  
 
 
 
  
(1   ) log(1  h ) 
  ,  exp(  )  , 
    , 
   
  ,  exp(  )  , 
    , 
   
  ,  exp(  , )  , 
    , 
   
(CD) 
            ,  
  ,      ,      ,  
No No No Utility. 
Technology 
and Shock 
Emphasises the role 
of energy on 
economy as higher 
energy prices seem 
to have adverse 
consequences. 
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Dhawan and Jeske 
(2007) 
USA U= logN 
 
  (    
 
)
 
  (1  
 )  
 
 
   
  (1   ) log(1  h ) 
 
U= logC 
  (1   ) log(1  h ) 
 
C 
  N 
 
  (    
 
)
 
  (1   )  
 
 
   
  
 
F=Zt η    
 
 (1   )  
 
 
 
   
    
(CES) 
            ,  
            ,      ,    
 
No No No No Energy Price shocks 
are not a major 
factor for business 
cycle fluctuations 
 
 
 
 
 
Finn (2000) USA 
U=
   
 
(    )
    (   )  
(   )
    (    )
 (    )
(   ) 
(CD) 
 
- No YES No Production 
and Capital 
Utilisation 
Higher energy price 
works much like an 
adverse technology 
shock to induce 
contraction in 
economic activity 
when one models 
energy use as a 
function of capital 
utilisation. 
Schmidt and 
Tobias 
(2005) 
German U=
 
   
[(      
 )    1]  =  
  (1   )  
      
    
   
                       
 
 No YES No Technology 
and Shock 
German economy is 
vulnerable to 
energy price shocks 
Source: Compiled by Sakib B. Amin (2015) 
82 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Energy Scenario in Bangladesh 
3.1 Introduction 
Access to energy has become essential to the functioning of modern economies and the 
government of Bangladesh has been putting its best efforts to develop the indigenous 
energy resources, which ultimately plays a vital role in the socio-economic development of 
the country. Total energy consumption in Bangladesh in 2012 was 1.0937 Quadrillion BTU, 
which is only 0.20% of world consumption (US Energy Information Administration, USEIA, 
2015). Energy use in Bangladesh is quite low when compared to other peer developing 
countries (Table 3.1). According to World Bank definition, energy use refers to use of 
primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous 
production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and 
aircraft engaged in international transport. However, the annual growth rate of energy use 
was about 5% during 2000-2010, which is a lot faster than the other neighbouring 
countries in South Asia (Table 3.2). Domestic natural gas and solid biomass and waste 
account for the majority of Bangladesh's total primary energy consumption with the 
remainder being oil, coal, and hydropower. In 2015, Bangladesh’s primary energy 
consumption is estimated 62% natural gas, 12% traditional biomass and waste, 21% oil, 
2.5% coal, and 2.5% hydropower and solar (BPDB, 2015). 
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3.2 Different Types of Energy used in Bangladesh 
Fossil fuels and electricity are vital for economic development and a key ingredient to 
improving the socioeconomic condition of the population and reducing poverty. Fossil fuel 
comprises coal, oil, petroleum, and natural gas products represent more than 90% of total 
energy consumption in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, electricity is one of the most widely 
used forms of energy. The main energy resources of Bangladesh are non-commercial 
resources (Biomass etc.) and commercial energy resources (Gas, oil etc.). In the early 
1980’s biomass dominated energy requirement of the country. Although with the increase 
of commercial energy use, the contribution of biomass is decreased, still it is the principal 
source of energy for the rural population and comprise almost one-sixth of the total 
primary energy consumption.  
Natural gas has the largest share of primary energy consumption, which is possible because 
of its local availability. Imported petroleum constitutes almost one-fifth of the total 
consumption, whereas coal and hydro (and recently some solar PV) contribute 
approximately 5%. In 2013, Bangladesh produced almost 4500 barrels per day of total oil 
while consuming nearly 119000 barrels per day (USEIA, 2015). 
3.2.1 Natural Gas 
Bangladesh gas sector started its journey in the 1960s. However, following the sharp 
increase in oil prices in the early 1970’s, Bangladesh also started feeling the burden of 
increasing oil import bills and decided to switch fuel. The gas sector started its rapid 
expansion and gas becomes the energy of choice now and plays a key role to national 
development in Bangladesh. Electricity generation in Bangladesh is almost entirely 
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dependent on natural gas and the whole of the urea fertiliser manufacturing are based on 
natural gas. Power plants, fertiliser factories, other industries (e.g. brick factories, tea 
processing plants, steel mills and textile factories), commercial organisations (e.g., offices 
and business centres) and the domestic sector are the end users of natural gas in the 
country. Natural gas is also used as a feedstock for petrochemicals, as Compressed Natural 
Gas (CNG) for vehicles. The electricity sector and industry are the two biggest consumers of 
natural gas. 
Natural gas plays a vital role in the development of the economy in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh, the seventh largest natural gas producer in Asia in 2012, produced 772 billion 
cubic feet, all of which was domestically consumed. Natural gas production in Bangladesh 
has increased by an annual average of 7% over the past decade, from 2002 to 2012. 
However, Bangladesh is facing acute gas supply shortages especially in the electricity 
sector. These shortages, in turn, have led to rolling blackouts of electricity (USEIA, 2015). 
Bangladesh’s natural gas resources were first exploited by the national public energy 
company, PETROBANGLA. More recently, International Oil and Gas Companies (IOCs) have 
established exploration and production activities. Till now, only about 79 exploration wells 
have been drilled and 24 natural gas fields have been discovered in Bangladesh. Of the 
exploration wells, 18 are in the offshore with 2 discoveries and the rest 61 are onshore 
with 22 discoveries. It is also to be noted that all the major gas fields in the country were 
discovered by IOCs. 
The use of gas keeps increasing till 2008. However, Bangladesh lost the opportunity to 
raise the gas price to the level of price of the fuel it was replacing. For example, it supplied 
85 
 
 
it at one-sixth of the replaced fuel price (1985 oil price is the average for the decade) and 
hence the beginning of subsidy. The gas price has remained virtually constant since 
1990. So, the import bill was reduced at the expense of higher use of gas in the economy. It 
also may be noted that, like petroleum products and electricity, the government also 
subsidises natural gas, although indirectly. The fertilizer industry, household consumers 
and the electricity sector are the major beneficiary groups of these subsidies. The 
government offers natural gas to these sectors at a price lower than the supply cost. 
According to World Bank, the administrated price of domestically produced natural gas is 
fixed at a level considerably below that of the international market (PLATTS, 2014). This 
does not only cause government to incur losses, but also send wrong price signals which 
leads to inefficiencies in allocation and gas use. 
Bangladesh’s natural gas reserves are expected to last till 2031 at current production and 
extraction rate which would endanger the energy security of Bangladesh (Ministry of 
Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, 2015). Available evidence suggests that natural gas 
is very inefficiently allocated across the country (Gunatilake and Ronald-Holst, 2013). 
Billah and Khan (2001) mention that the current gas extraction rate of Bangladesh is very 
fast and signifying the unsustainability of the economy. Moreover, the growth in gas 
demand will exceed supply in future. Thus, it would not be optimal to keep the extraction 
rate unchanged, if the reserve remains same. This situation has forced the government to 
shorten the supply to prioritise the industrial sector. In order to counteract the problem, 
PETROBANGLA, the Oil, Gas and Mineral Company of Bangladesh, gave priority to the 
exploration and search for reserves of gas in the Bay of Bengal and reassessment of old 
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fields to attempt further extraction with newer technologies. According to PETROBANGLA 
(2015), recent reserve estimation, current gas production and consumption rates and 
future demand projections suggest that known recoverable reserves of gas will not be able 
to cater the growing energy needs of the country and Bangladesh is now on the threshold 
of a critical stage. Chevron’s already initiated the Bibiyana Expansion Project in the north-
eastern part of the country in 2014. The project includes an expansion of the existing gas 
plant to process increased natural gas volumes, additional development wells to boost 
natural gas production in future. 
3.2.2 Petroleum Products 
The use of petroleum products is varied; octane, petrol and diesel are the major fuels for 
transportation. Diesel is also widely used for irrigation and kerosene is mostly used for 
lighting, especially in rural households with no electricity. Kerosene and diesel has always 
been subsidised in Bangladesh like many other developing countries. In 1991, around 
84.73% of all households in Bangladesh used kerosene for lighting. However, in 2011, the 
number decreased to 39.5% (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, BBS, 2015). Although the 
percentage of kerosene uses has reduced during the last two decades, the absolute 
numbers of kerosene users remain same. The transport sector (both public and private) 
dominates in terms of petroleum product usage, consuming around 44.80% of total sales in 
2014. Most of the petroleum demand is met by imports in Bangladesh which is mainly used 
in the transportation sector although the importance of petroleum in this sector has been 
decreasing since the government policy of encouraging CNG as a transportation fuel. 
However, still a major share of all petroleum consumption in the country is by the 
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transport sector. Around 10% of the total energy in 2010 came from diesel and furnace oil 
(Bangladesh Power Development Board, BPDB, 2011). There have been some structural 
changes beginning in 2012. The electricity sector has been rapidly increasing its share of oil 
in total consumption, which increased from around 6 to 8% up to in 2011 but then rapidly 
to 19% in 2012 and 28.38% in 2015 (Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation, BPC, 2015). The 
use of furnace oil (as well as diesel) by the power sector, especially by the private rental 
power plants, is the major reason for this drastic upsurge in consumption. Lack of reliable 
gas supply recently has also forced some entrepreneurs to use diesel based generators for 
power. Agriculture is the third most dominant sector. Sales of petroleum by agricultural 
sector represent 18.09% of total petroleum sales in Bangladesh. The consumption trend of 
different petroleum products is given in Table 3.3. 
Bangladesh’s only oil deposits, discovered in 1986 and located at Haripur in the district of 
Sylhet, have an estimated reserve of 1.4 Mtonne of which 0.84 Mtonne are believed to be 
recoverable  In Bangladesh, oil is used mainly as a transport fuel, for electricity generation 
and for industrial heating. 
3.2.3 Biomass 
Biomass as a versatile source of energy is primarily used in rural areas to meet the energy 
needs for cooking. The traditional biomass sources include agricultural residue (rice husks, 
rice and jute stalks, sugarcane bagasse, etc.), animal waste (mainly dried form, but some 
biogas plants, too), scrub wood and fire wood (Miah et al., 2010). These renewable biomass 
resources are considered to have significant potential to meet the energy demand, 
especially in the rural areas (Hossain and Badr, 2007; Islam et al., 2006). In the early 
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eighties biomass contributed more than 55% of the entire energy requirement of the 
country. With the increase of commercial energy use that contribution has come down to 
15% now.  
3.2.4 Coal  
Although substantial amounts of coal reserves in seven fields have been discovered in the 
north-western part of the country, still the coal sector of Bangladesh is quite 
underdeveloped. The major coal deposits are at Jamalgonj (in the Jaipurhat district), 
Baropukuria (in the Dinajpur district) and Khalashpir (in the Rangpur district). The total 
amount of coal reserve is estimated at 1.756 Gtonne. Mining work has started only at 
Baropukuria. The Baropukuria coal mine was discovered in 1985 by the Bangladesh 
Geological Survey Department. This is the first and only operating coal mine in Bangladesh. 
The Government was in the process of reviewing the country’s coal policy, which would set 
the regulations for the development of the coal industry and help establish a reliable source 
of energy for the country through the use of coal as the primary fuel for power generation. 
In 2012, Bangladesh produces 1.1 MT coals/year and consumes some 2.2 MT coals/year. 
Thus, 1.1 MT coals/year is imported from Meghalaya, India in 2012. Indigenous coal, 
developed in a sustainable manner with social and environmental safeguards, can supply a 
vital part of the total energy and electricity demand in the mid to long term future as coal 
based power plant takes 3-5 years for installation. 
3.2.5 Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy helps in reducing poverty, aid in energy shortage and environmental 
degradation such as desertification, biodiversity depletion and climate change (Power 
89 
 
 
Division, 2015). At present, Bangladesh receives energy supply from both renewable and 
non-renewable sources. However, by using more renewable energy it is possible to ensure 
energy security, because there is a shortage of non-renewable energy as the source of fuel. 
At the same, as the renewable energy is environmental friendly, it is necessary to preserve 
the environmental balance by expanding the use of renewable energy and lessening the 
dependency on non-renewable energy. Over-exploitation of biomass in meeting the need of 
energy in the rural areas is causing environmental degradation. Renewable energy helps to 
solve those problems if it is widely used in the rural Bangladesh where people primarily 
depend on biomass energy. Moreover, the expansion of the use of renewable energy might 
reduce the import of energy and this may bring a positive impact on the reserve of foreign 
currency and the balance of payments. Considering these issues, the government has taken 
up some initiatives for the development of renewable energy. 
Renewable energy is energy, which comes from natural resources such as sunlight, wind, 
rain, tides and geo thermal heat which are renewable. Renewable energy generates 3.47% 
of total electricity demand globally (Tamim et al., 2013). However; it represents only 1.5% 
in Bangladesh. Electricity generation in Bangladesh was almost mono-fuel dependent, i.e. 
indigenous natural gas considering its apparent huge availability. About 87% of electricity 
comes from natural gas and the rest is from liquid fuel, coal and hydropower till 2008.  
Recently, the importance of renewable energy has gained momentum as the supply of 
natural gas has been at stake due to depleting existing gas reserves. The uncertainty has 
been constraining development of further gas based power generation expansion 
programme. Excessive use of oil also cause fiscal burden. Taking this into cognizance the 
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government has prepared “Power System Master Plan 2010” to develop energy balanced 
sustainable power system in the country. Development of renewable energy is one of the 
important strategies adopted as part of fuel diversification programme. According to the 
plan, 15% of total electricity generation will come from renewable and new energy sources 
in future. 
Commercial use of renewable energy in sustainable manner is still a great challenge for 
Bangladesh as in other part of the world. Government of Bangladesh has taken a systematic 
approach towards renewable energy development. The initiative includes development of 
awareness, legal and regulatory framework, institutional development and financing 
mechanism to drive the sector. The renewable energy policy passed in December 2008 
aims at exploring the country's electricity generating potential from renewable energy 
resources to meeting the nagging electricity crisis across the country. The policy 
encourages the private and public sectors to investment in renewable energy projects to 
substitute indigenous non-renewable energy supplies and scale up contributions of 
existing renewable energy based electricity productions. The policy envisions 5% of total 
generation from renewable sources by 2015 and 10% of the same by 2020. 
Regarding the institutional development, government power utilities like Bangladesh 
Power Development Board (BPDB), Rural Electrification Board (REB), Local Government 
Agency like Local Government Engineering Directorate (LGED) and a significant number of 
private sector agencies including NGOs are already involved in renewable energy 
development. Noted public universities and their affiliated Institutes are involved in 
research and development of renewable energy applications. A nodal agency, i.e. 
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Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA) as envisioned in the 
Renewable Energy Policy is established and in the process of manning this organisation so 
that it can work according to the desire of the people. This organisation will provide policy 
support to the government as well as work to promote, expand and develop the renewable 
energy and to enhance energy efficiency both in public and private sector. Moreover, this 
organisation facilitate private sector to get involve in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency business. 
Electrification of villages in remote areas generally requires huge investment and leads to 
power losses associated with transmission and distribution networks. Additionally, at the 
current annual rate of growth of consumption of 10% the natural proven reserve of natural 
gas may not last more than 15-20 years. One of the great promises offered by the 
renewable energy technologies is their potential to provide electricity in areas not served 
by national power grids. There is no doubt about the fact that renewable energy will take a 
crucial role not only for off grid electrification in the country but also for future electricity 
generation as a whole. 
Bangladesh is expected to have enormous potentiality in renewable energy development. 
Among the renewable energy sources, hydropower currently represents less than 5% of 
total installed electricity generation capacity. Since the country is a flat one, opportunities 
for installing further hydropower plants is negligible, although micro hydro and mini hydro 
have limited potential in Chittagong Hill Tracts.  
However, the country is blessed by considerable solar radiation. Bangladesh receives an 
average daily solar radiation of 4-6.5 kWh/m2. Solar photovoltaic (PV) are gaining 
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acceptance for providing electricity to households and small businesses in rural areas 
where electricity is not available from national grid.  
Despite their higher prices, solar PVs were made affordable by the micro credit 
opportunities. Bangladesh currently has 14 MW installed capacity in solar electricity, 
although it represents a negligible share of total primary energy consumption (Power 
Division, 2015). Solar power does have the potential to have a significant market share in 
the future because of the availability of sunlight and further reduction in costs.  
According to a survey, there is an existing market size of 6 million households for Solar 
Home Systems (SHS) on a fee-for-service basis in the off-grid areas of Bangladesh. At 
present, the national grid is serving 69% of our total population. Nearly 10,000 rural 
markets and commercial centers in the country are still out of grid which is excellent 
market for centralised solar photovoltaic plants. Throughout the country, different 
government administrative offices, NGO offices, health centers, schools, banks, police 
stations etc. are functioning. In the off-grid locations, these offices are either using 
traditional means (lantern, candles, kerosene wick lamps etc.) or operating their own 
diesel generator to cater there lighting needs. 
The first significant PV-based rural electrification programme was the Norshingdi project 
initiated with financial support from France. Since the introduction of SHS in 1996, it has 
become now the biggest renewable energy programme in Bangladesh so far installed 3 
million units and ever increasing due to an integrated programme undertaken by the 
government through its financial institution IDCOL. IDCOL's programme is considered as a 
successful model for installation of SHSs in the world. 
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However, potential of other renewable resources is still at the exploration stage. Potential 
of wind energy is mainly in coastal areas and offshore islands and to determine extent of 
potential wind resource mapping project is in process. Some of the development partners 
and companies come forward for wind mapping in different parts of the country.   
Bangladesh has strong potential for biomass gasification based electricity. More common 
biomass resources available in the country are rice husk, crop residue, wood, jute stick, 
animal waste, municipal waste, sugarcane bagasse etc. Exploration of these resources for 
electricity generation is still at preliminary stage. Potentials for utilising biogas 
technologies derived mainly from animal, kitchen and municipal wastes may be one of the 
promising renewable energy resources for Bangladesh. 
Other renewable energy sources include bio-fuels, gasohol, geothermal, river current, wave 
and tidal energy. Potentialities of these resources are yet to be explored. Government 
utilities are involved in large scale grid connected renewable energy based power project 
development. On the other hand, private sector is involved with off-grid home-based 
renewable energy solutions. 
According to the Renewable Energy Policy, the government aims to produce 500 MW of 
electricity from the renewable energy by 2015. Till now, national capacity of renewable 
energy based power is approximately 403 MW, as shown in Table 3.4. In a developing 
country like Bangladesh where meeting generation shortage is the primary priority, least 
cost generation technologies always rule the generation planning. Unfortunately, 
renewable energy cannot compete to achieve grid parity at the moment. Government 
incentives like Feed in Tariffs (FiT) can enhance the development process, but it is always 
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difficult to source fund for such incentives especially under present tariff rationalisation 
structure. Only a comprehensive large scale programme with support to buy-down the cost 
of intervention can pave the way for renewable energy development. Realising the future 
energy need and to ensure energy security, government put due emphasis to 
mainstreaming the renewable energy. In line with the development of solar and wind 
energy government also initiated a feasibility study on hydro potentiality. Initially few 
locations were identified where hydro potentialities exist. But it need further study to 
make it possible. Additionally, Government has given number of financial and fiscal 
incentives in renewable energy and energy efficiency investment. Government has 
exempted income tax for next 5 years from commercial production of renewable energy. 
Dedicated funding support has also been extended through government financial 
institutions like Bangladesh Bank and IDCOL as well as through private commercial banks. 
Moreover, government has extended fiscal incentives including duty exemption on certain 
renewable energy products, e.g. solar panel, solar panel manufacturing accessories, LED 
light, solar operated light and wind power plant. 
3.3 Environmental Impacts from Energy Systems 
Bangladesh is considered as a country at high risk from the negative impacts of global 
warming. In order to reduce dependency on fossil fuel and to explore renewable energy 
sources in addition to generating power from commercial sources, the Government has 
formulated ‘Renewable Energy Policy 2010’ for the generation of environment-friendly 
power from renewable energy sources. Like the other countries of the world, Bangladesh 
has also a number of environmental problems such as a reduction of agricultural land due 
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to soil erosion and land used for residential purpose, water pollution and salinity, loss of 
biodiversity and natural disasters. Additionally, negative environmental and social impacts 
associated with the large scale hydropower (>40 MW) generation have occurred as 
resettlements of a large numbers of people and loss of agricultural lands and habitats. 
Social acceptance of long-term environmental impacts from the planned 500 MW coal-fired 
power plant using coal obtained from open-cut mining at Phulbari (in northern-eastern 
part of Bangladesh) are yet to be confirmed. However, this project already received 
environmental clearance from the Government of Bangladesh notwithstanding emissions 
including those of greenhouse gases. However, Bangladesh’s contribution to global climate 
change via emissions of CO2 from energy systems is insignificant compared with many 
industrialised nations. Bangladesh shares around 0.19% of global emissions of CO2 
compared with 16.31% of the USA, 0.45% of Pakistan, 5.67% of India and emits about 
63.49 Million Metric Tons of CO2 in 2012 (USEIA, 2015). 
Due to lack of clean energy access for cooking and small industrial applications, traditional 
energy meets these important energy demand (Bhattacharya, 2006). However, burning of 
wood, dung and crop residues results in indoor air pollution and causes severe human 
health impacts directly to the users especially rural women (Sarkar et al., 2003). Most 
Bangladeshi households in rural areas (99%) as well as urban areas (60-66%) use biomass 
such as wood, cow dung, jute sticks or other agricultural wastes for cooking. Inefficient and 
poorly ventilated clay stoves produce fine particles, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 
carbon monoxide, dioxins and other carcinogens. Housewives are exposed to high levels of 
these toxins between three and seven hours a day. Research revealed that this Indoor Air 
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Pollution (IAP) occurs not only in the kitchen but only slightly lower in the living area 
therewith affecting also other family members such as children.  
Bangladesh is also known as a disaster prone country and likely to be one of the most 
vulnerable countries in the outcome of climate change. Ali (1999) discusses the possible 
impacts of climate change in Bangladesh through tropical coastal cyclones, storm surges, 
coastal erosion, floods and droughts and reveals that natural disasters cause heavy loos of 
life and property and threatening the development activities in Bangladesh. Brouwer et al. 
(2007) investigates the complex relationship between environmental risk in Bangladesh 
and show that households with lower income face higher exposure to risk of flooding. 
A number of studies examine the impact of global climate change towards world economy. 
Goulder and Pizer (2006) survey that the literatures on the economics of climate change 
and claim that global climate change poses a threat to the well-being of humans and other 
living things through impacts on ecosystem functioning, biodiversity, capital productivity 
and human health. Dell et al. (2014) discuss recent panel studies about climate-energy 
linkages and highlight that there is a wide range of channels through which whether shocks 
affect economic outcomes. For example, shocks, especially, temperatures affect agricultural 
output, industrial output, energy demand, labour productivity, health, conflict, political 
stability and economic growth. Desmet et al. (2015) study the relationship between 
geography and growth to evaluate the economic impact of coastal flooding due to climate 
change and show that a 6 meter rise in sea levels would flood 1% of land, home to 6.6% of 
the world’s population and cause welfare losses of around 8%. Moreover, Stern (2008) 
highlights that the economic costs of doing nothing to combat climate change could be up 
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to 20 times greater than taking action now to avoid catastrophic climate change in the 
future. If immediate action is taken, climate change will cost around 1% of global GDP per 
year on prevention and adaptation. Stern (2008) further claims that tackling climate 
change is the pro-growth strategy; ignoring it will ultimately undermine economic growth. 
Environmental considerations should also need to be considered in the energy policy; and 
energy development programmes should be so designed as to minimise the energy sector’s 
contribution to environmental pollution. Thus, energy security calls for a mix of diverse 
energy sources that balance costs, availability, and environmental impact, which may be 
ensured by a combination of domestic production and importation with due regard to in-
country options and economic considerations. 
3.4 Energy Security 
Energy services are fundamental to development and economic growth (UNDP, 2004) and 
at the level of the individual, modern services can transform people’s lives for the better 
(World Bank, 2000). Energy security is a part and parcel of sustainable development for 
both industrialised and developing nations. Energy security for a country may be 
conceptualised as the country’s access to energy sources of various types consistent with 
its energy needs for various purposes and for different segments of society at any point of 
time. Obviously, the total energy needs of a country are related to the level and structure of 
its economic and social development and the underlying technology regime. Energy 
security is indeed a dynamic concept; availability of energy of various types would increase 
overtime with reference to the pace, pattern and directions of development that the 
country is embarked upon. A poor country consumes a very low amount of energy per 
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capita, given its low level of socio-economic and technological development. Also, generally 
its dependence on biomass is very high and access to commercial energy (For example, 
electricity, petroleum, gas) is very low. The former is used by the mass of the people, while 
the latter by the richer minority. Equity would demand that adequate (depending on the 
particular socio-economic circumstances faced at a given time) access to quality energy is 
ensured for various segments of society (Ahmad et al., 2004). 
In Bangladesh, security of energy supply is threatened due to number of reasons including 
lack of domestic energy resources, high dependence on imported transportation fuels and 
poor energy infrastructure. Bangladesh has substantial natural gas reserves which provide 
more than two-thirds of the nation’s commercial fossil fuel supply. Even though 
Bangladesh has these natural gas reserves and recently discovered coal resources, efficient 
use of these resources is limited due to lack of exploitation and distribution facilities. Also, 
though its proven oil reserves are estimated to be 56.9 million barrels, Bangladesh meets 
over 90% of its oil demands through imports (Kumaraswamy and Datta, 2006). Due to the 
nation’s flat terrain and potentially large social and environmental impacts, further 
exploitation of hydropower is expected to be limited to small and mini-sized hydropower 
plants with an estimated potential of about 250 MW. 
Among others, the following steps should be considered for energy development and 
energy security are presented below: 
1. Political Consensus: Political consensus should be reached among the political parties on 
long term energy development programme so that the decisions are not frequently 
changed with the periodic change of political government through elections.  
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2. Energy Conservation: Although there is a good potential to reduce energy demand 
through energy conservation, serious actions have not been taken in the past to achieve 
success. It is cheaper to save one unit of energy than to supply an additional unit. In future, 
energy conservation measures should be considered as an integral part of national energy 
development programme (See Figure 3.1). 
3. Imported Energy Supplies: Possibility of natural gas import (via pipe line and or LNG) 
should be considered to ensure long-term energy security of country beyond 2020. 
4. Capacity Building: Adequate attention should be given to develop and strengthen 
national capabilities in the planning and management of energy sector programmes. This 
would involve initiation of appropriate educational programmes in universities, 
recruitment of qualified personnel and training of recruited personnel on a continuing 
basis. In certain cases it may be necessary to recruit expatriate Bangladeshis as well as 
foreign nationals to meet the need of competent experts in specialised fields. 
3.5 Electricity Sector in Bangladesh 
The market for electricity includes households, agriculture, industries, and transport. In 
Bangladesh, about 69% of the population currently has access to electricity. The remaining 
31% represents the market yet to be brought under the national grid. The present 
generation capacity of 10416 MW cannot be realised to its fullest due to forced outage, 
maintenance activities and particularly fuel constraints i.e. gas supply shortage. One-fourth 
of the generation plants of the power system are more than 20 years old, which causes 
higher maintenance costs and regular plant outages. In addition, gas supply shortfall forced 
the power plants to operate at a reduced capacity in recent years. Hence, even the demand 
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originating from within the grid remains unmet. Against the demand of 7518 MW in the 
year 2012, the actual generation capacity falls short by 1,000-1,200 MW, which reaches 
around 2,000 MW during the summer months. 
A Single Buyer System prevails in the power sector making. Most of the electricity 
generated is either produced or purchased by BPDB making it the sole customer of power 
generation companies. Nevertheless, a small portion of electricity produced by rather small 
IPPs are directly synchronised to the 33kV distribution line of selected Palli Biddyut Samity 
(PBS) of the Rural Electrification Board (REB). Unless a cost-based or economic tariff 
structure is operational in the country, an open market system or other improved methods 
for trading electricity is not likely to be introduced in Bangladesh anytime soon. As such, 
the buyer-seller dynamics is expected to remain the same. 
It is recognised that the pace of electricity sector development has to be accelerated in 
order to achieve overall economic development of the country. To upgrade the socio-
economic condition and to alleviate poverty, electricity sector has been prioritised by the 
government. Nearly 90% of the population is urban and only about 42% of the rural 
households have access to grid electricity (BBS, 2010). The current rate of expansion in 
electrification is only about 400,000 new households gaining access every year and at such 
rate it would take more than 40 years to reach all households. Providing access to 
affordable and reliable electricity to all citizens by 2020 is a befitting national goal of the 
Government of Bangladesh. Rural electricity access rates have to increase dramatically to 
accomplish the Government’s stated goal of providing universal electricity access by 2020. 
Government has encouraged implementing off-grid renewable energy technologies, such as 
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Solar Home Systems (SHS) and micro-wind power systems in coastal areas and mini-hydro 
projects in the mountainous regions as a priority. It has been estimated that power outage 
in Bangladesh results a loss of annual industrial output of $1 billion (Chowdhury et al., 
2014). Electricity is one of the major reasons of slow GDP growth and the government of 
Bangladesh has recognised the electricity sector as a priority sector. Government has 
decided to build more power projects through private sector and public private 
partnership. The electricity supply in terms of capacity has increased by 37% from 2010 to 
2014. The number of connections also increased by 1.5 million in that time frame. As a 
result, the access to electricity for the country increased from 48.4% in 2010 to 69% in 
2015. However demand and supply imbalance still remains. The generation capacity along 
with actual generation increased recently with the installation of rental power plants. 
In spite of financial constraints and gas supply shortages, the government designed a 
strategy to overcome the crisis and at the same time meet the ever increasing demand for 
electricity. It launched immediate, short, medium and long term programmes to increase 
electricity supply through introduction of fuel mix (gas, coal, liquid fuel, nuclear energy and 
renewable), demand side management, energy efficiency and conservation. The year-wise 
commissioned and planned of the additional electricity generation programmes, both in 
public and private are listed in Table 3.5. Table 3.6 represents the electricity sector in 
Bangladesh at a glance and also presents an update of comparative data from which steady 
development in the electricity sector can be easily understood. 
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3.5.1 Electricity Consumption in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, households and industry are the two biggest consumers of electricity. 
According to BPDB, the per capita electricity consumption of Bangladesh now is at 232 
KWH/capita as of December, 2014. Share of electricity consumed from the national grid by 
households has gone up from 40% in 2001 to 49.94% in 2013. On the contrary the share of 
electricity consumed from the grid by industries has gone down from 47% in 2001 to 35% 
in 2013. This is a cause for concern as new industries have been finding it harder to get 
new electricity connections while existing ones have found it difficult to increase their 
electricity supply. Though the number of connections for industries is lower but they 
consume a lot more on average and hence the average bill per user was the highest for 
Industrial connections. The consumption in commercial sector is relatively low in 
comparison to that in the industrial sector, i.e., only 10.48% of the total electricity 
consumption. In contrast, this sector has the largest GDP share, i.e., 53.9% in 2013.  
Agriculture is a seasonal industry and therefore the demand for energy fluctuates 
throughout the year. Agriculture sector consumes only 4.61% of overall electricity 
consumption in Bangladesh as of 2013. Diesel oil and electricity are two major sources of 
energy in this sector. The total demand of electricity for agriculture has increased over the 
years, but the relative percentage of consumption has changed little in the past years. Due 
to shortage of electricity, the government has recently stopped the extension of new 
electricity connection lines for the rural residential sector but continues to maintain the 
connections to irrigation pumps. 
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Electricity for other sectors consists of street lighting, water pumps for domestic water, 
mosques, etc., and plays only a minor role in the overall electricity consumption. Its share 
of total electricity consumption in 2005 was about 2%. The GDP share has hardly changed 
in recent years, although a slight decrease has been observed. 
Consumption of electricity and commercial energy as a whole is increasing in the 
residential sector for several reasons. There has been a steady shift from non-commercial 
to commercial energy use. Population increase and access to electricity coupled with higher 
income and increased numbers of electrified households are some of the reasons for this 
change. The government has undertaken a major programme to address electricity 
shortages and aimed to raise the electricity coverage in Bangladesh. According to annual 
report of BPDB (2007-2015), the population’s access to electricity was only 15% in 1996, 
but grew to 69% by 2014 (Table 3.7). Between 1995 and 2005, electricity consumption in 
this sector grew at an annual rate of 11.2%. It is worth noting that, in order to materialise 
the government vision of 100% electricity access by 2021, at the end of 2009, the 
government has changed its planning perspective and BPDB has started to revise the 
generation expansion plan by allowing QR firms. 
The lighting service demand in the urban and rural electrified residential sectors is 
satisfied solely by electricity. Consumption for lighting alone is around 40% of the total 
consumption in the residential sector in urban areas and 48.2% in rural areas in 2005 
(Islam, 2006). 
The tropical climate in Bangladesh requires cooling, which is satisfied mainly by cooling 
fans. Only few high-income urban households have air-conditioning systems. Electricity for 
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refrigeration also represents an important fraction (about 22% in 2005) of the urban 
residential load. In addition to refrigerators, households use miscellaneous electrical 
appliances namely irons, televisions, computers, etc. Consumption depends on how well 
equipped the household is with such appliances and also on the technical characteristics of 
the appliances.  
3.5.2 Electricity Generation in Bangladesh 
Generating and supplying enough electricity for demand remains an unresolved challenge 
for Bangladesh. Significant efforts aimed at adding new generation capacities characterised 
the electricity sector of Bangladesh in recent years. As a result, electricity generation have 
achieved some success. During 1992, the country’s total installed capacity of electricity 
generation was 2,350 million watts (MW), while the derated capacity was 1,719 MW. The 
installed capacity increased to 4,680 MW in 2002 and further to 10416 MW in 2014, with 
the corresponding derated capacities of 3,428 MW and 9821 MW respectively (Table 3.8). 
That means, the addition in installed capacity is not reflected in terms of proportional 
increase in electricity generation. There are many factors that contribute to the difference 
between the installed capacity and the maximum available generation (derated capacity). 
For example, some plants may remain out of operation for maintenance, rehabilitation and 
overhauling, and the capacity of some plants may be derated due to aging. However, the 
shortage of natural gas, which is the major fuel used for electricity generation, is the most 
important factor for low-capacity utilisation in Bangladesh.   
The electricity generation peak in 2014 increased to 7356 MW compared to 4,162 MW in 
2009, a 76% increase. The increase in production, however, was not enough to meet the 
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rapidly rising demand for electricity resulting in increased load shedding and adoption of 
other measures of demand management. The situation was further aggravated by the 
antiquation of a number of generation units and a shortage in gas supply, forcing them to 
operate at reduced capacity.  
The quick improvement in electricity generation came from quick rental power plants. 
Quick rental power plants are privately owned plants for electricity generation. The 
government has allowed the private sector to generate electricity for short-term contracts 
(three to five years) in order to mitigate the acute electricity crisis of 2009-2010. Most of 
these quick rental power plants were powered by liquid fuel (Diesel, High Speed Furnace 
Oil). With the increase in liquid fuel based power plants (the total contribution of liquid 
fuels in electricity generation to 21% cent in 2014, up from 12% in 2011 and only 5% in 
2010), the average fuel cost per KWH of electricity increased from BDT 2.53/KWH in 2009 
to BDT 5.88/KWH in 2014. Moreover, the addition in installed capacity has not been fully 
reflected in a proportional increase in electricity generation, since many older power plants 
have become non-operational in recent years. This underproduction has resulted in huge 
gap between derated capacity and evening peak generation, especially since 2006. Most of 
the liquid fuel-based electricity has come from rental, quick-rental and peaking plants that 
were fast-tracked to address the electricity crisis. 
The responsible authorities for generation of electricity in Bangladesh are Bangladesh 
Power Development Board (BPDB) along with its subsidiaries, Rural Power Company 
Limited (RPCL), Independent Power Producer (IPP) and Quick Rental (QR) companies 
(Table 3.9). Government power plants used to monopolise electricity production in 
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Bangladesh. In April 2010, about 60% of total electricity production used to be generated 
by the government power plants; of which, BPDB’s share was 76%. A competitive market 
environment has been created in electricity generation by reducing dependence on public 
sector power plants as well as BPDB. Recently, nearly 56% of total electricity production 
originates from public sector power plants, whereas the private sector provides the rest 
44%. By 2016, the private sector is expected to take the lead and generate nearly 58% of 
the total electricity produced. 
The fuel mix for electricity generation has reshaped since 2008. The share of furnace oil has 
significantly gone up from 4% in 2008 to almost 20% in 2013. The share of gas to generate 
electricity has brought down to 64.5% in 2013 from 87% in 2008 (Table 3.10). In 2010, 
due to shortage of gas supply approximately 500-800 MW electricity could not be 
produced. In this context, it has been planned to reduce over-dependence on natural gas 
and to increase use of diesel, furnace oil and coal for electricity generation. Besides, 
importance is also given to generate electricity from renewable energy.  
3.5.3 Cost and Tariff 
The change in the fuel mix of electricity generation has significant implications for the cost 
structure and total subsidy cost. The use of liquid fuel high speed diesel and furnace oil has 
increased significantly in the last two years, which has, in turn, increased the per-unit 
generation cost of electricity in 2011 and 2012 (Table 3.11). 
With furnace oil and diesel now accounting for around 21% of fuel mix for electricity 
generation, the average cost for bulk supply stands at BDT 5.88/KWH in 2014. This was 
BDT 5.36/KWH in 2012. The increase in generation cost is due to the increase in share of 
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liquid fuel based power plants and also the increase in prices of liquid fuel (Table 3.12). 
Bangladesh has adopted several tariff structures at various times to adjust its selling price 
with changes in the production cost of electricity. The tariff rates have been changed six 
times between 2007 and 2012 (Table 3.13). 
Cost to generate electricity with the use of High Speed Diesel (HSD) is BDT 18-20/ KWH 
and that with Furnace Oil (FO) is BDT 13-14/KWH. Generating electricity with coal now 
cost around BDT 5/KWH and that with hydro-power plant comes to around BDT 1/KWH. 
But the country can only generate up to 200 MW with the hydro plant. Generating 
electricity with gas is much cheaper and is around BDT 2.5-3.0/KWH. Hence gas based 
plants are used throughout the year to maintain base load, and fuel based plants are 
brought to operation to meet peak loads only. Consequently the average cost of generating 
electricity drops down to BDT 5/KWH in winter starting from November and goes up to 
BDT 6.5/KWH in the summer when fuel based power plants come into generation to meet 
peak demands. 
As the gas supply to the power plants is already not meeting up with the requirements for 
electricity generation, the dependence on fuel based power plants is increasing. This is 
increasing the cost of generating electricity. Take for example, the day on August 4, 2012, 
16% of the total day’s generation came from fuel oil but shared 74% of the total cost of fuel 
that day. As soon as the liquid fuel based quick rental power plants came into operation 
from the year 2010 the average cost of generating electricity started picking up. As a result 
the government was forced to increase electricity tariff. In six hikes the bulk tariff has gone 
up by 79% from February 2011 till September 2012.  
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3.5.4 Energy Utilities and Related Organisations in Bangladesh  
Electricity (Power) Sector Structure 
Power Division is responsible for formulating policy relating to electricity and supervises 
controls and monitors the developmental activities related to electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution of the country. The division is responsible to i) manage all 
matters and policies related to the electricity sector; ii) expand, rehabilitate and modernise 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution services in line with the increasing 
national demand and prepare action plans and programmes accordingly; iii) encourage 
private and joint venture investment in the electricity sector in addition to the government 
investment; iv) improve the standard of living of the rural poor through rural 
electrification and the introduction of renewable energy; v) monitor revenue earnings and 
commercial activities of the utilities and vi) to promote renewable energy and energy 
efficiency through formulation of policy/regulation, different incentive mechanism and 
R&D. 
To implement its mandate the Power Division is supported by a number of organisations, 
related with generation, transmission and distribution. The organisational linkage is as 
follows: 
Governmental Institution 
Office of the Electrical Advisor & Chief Electric Inspector and Energy Monitoring Unit 
The office of the Electrical Advisor and Chief Electrical Inspector (EA & CEI) emphasises on 
thrift, simplicity and safety. It has been established, in order to ensure proper control of life 
and property in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. Main responsibility 
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of this office is to inspect installations, substations and lines as well as to grant license for 
high tension and medium tension consumers. Besides, it issues license to electrical 
contractors, engineers and electricians. The Energy Monitoring Unit (EMU) is a sub-unit 
under this office. The objective of EMU is to ensure efficient use of energy in industries and 
to induce energy conservation. 
Power Cell 
The Power Cell was established in 1995 in order to assist the Power Division in developing 
design and strategies, facilitating and monitoring various reform measures so that the 
electricity sector can achieve desirable consumer satisfaction and reach optimum growth. 
It basically acts as a technical unit of the Power Division. Since inception, Power Cell has 
played a pivotal role in reforming the private electricity generation, electricity tariff 
evaluation and establishing regulatory commissions. Power Cell is headed by a Director 
General, appointed by the government and is assisted by a number of directors. In the 
recent past a number of generation and distribution companies have been created under its 
reform programmes. 
Electricity (Power) Generation Utilities and Related Organisations in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) 
Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) was established in 1972 as an integrated 
utility, responsible for electricity generation, transmission and distribution. The BPDB, 
which is a statutory body, is responsible for major portion of generation and distribution of 
electricity mainly in urban areas except Dhaka and West Zone of the country. The Board is 
110 
 
 
now under the Power Division of the ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. 
Today, BPDB consists of a Chairman and six members, all appointed by the government. 
BPDB incurs its own cost of production for electricity. It also purchases electricity as a 
single buyer from IPPs, RPCL, Rental power plants, EGCB and Ashuganj power station 
company limited. BPDB is selling electricity to the bulk consumers (DPDC, DESCO and REB) 
and retail consumers under its distribution area at the tariff rate fixed by the Government. 
Due to the increasing demand for electricity, BPDB has taken steps to install new power 
plants and to purchase electricity from Rental and IPP to meet up emergency demand. 
Ashuganj Power Station Company Ltd. (APSCL) is the second largest power station in 
Bangladesh. As a part of the electricity (power) sector development and reform 
programme of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), Ashuganj Power Station Company 
Ltd. (APSCL) has been incorporated under the Companies Act 1994 on 28 June 2000. All 
the activities of the company started formally on 01 June 2003. According to the Articles of 
Association of the Company, 51% of total shares are held by BPDB and the rest 49% is 
distributed among Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Power Division, MOPEMR & 
Energy Division, and MOPEMR of GOB. Electricity generated in this power station is 
supplied to the national grid and it is distributed to the consumers throughout the whole 
country through the national grid. This power station plays a significant role in the national 
economic development by generating more than 10% of total demand for electricity in the 
country. In this power station, natural gas from Titas Gas Transmission & Distribution 
Company Ltd. is used as fuel. (Subsidiaries of BPDB) 
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Electricity Generation Company of Bangladesh (EGCB) Ltd. (An Enterprise of Bangladesh 
Power Development Board) was incorporated with Registrar of joint stock companies on 
February 16, 2004 to produce and sale of Electricity. EGCB has a plan to become a leading 
electricity generation company across the country. Electricity generation related business 
services are among the fastest growing and key area of the economy, EGCB intends to 
capitalise on the opportunity in that area. The company's major share is currently held by 
BPDB. (Subsidiaries of BPDB) 
North West Power Generation Company Limited (NWPGCL) is an enterprise of BPDB. This 
company was created as a part of reform programme in order to meet the prevailing 
demand of electricity and to solve the low-voltage problem the in the North-West region of 
the country. In pursuance of the above, with a view to meeting the growing demand of 
electricity in the North-West region of the country, NWPGCL has been formed, 
incorporated and registered in August, 2007 under the framework of the Government 
Power Sector Reforms Policy and the provision of the Companies Act, 1994. (Subsidiaries 
of BPDB) 
Rural Power Company Limited (RPCL) is committed to reliable power generation for rural 
development and also to take part in social & economic development for rural people of the 
country. RPCL was the first IPP of Bangladesh and the first non-Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) entity to be licensed to take up power generation. Rural Power 
Company Limited is registered as a public limited company under company ACT 1913, was 
incorporated on 31st December, 1994 under the company laws to build, own and operate 
electricity generation projects with business philosophy and principles. Rural Power 
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Company Limited has opened a new dimension of electricity generation in private sector of 
Bangladesh, because the 100% equity investment is mobilised locally. This is absolutely a 
national company in the private sector. This will raise the confidence of investors in the 
private electricity generation sector. Rural Electrification Board (REB) owns 20% share 
and the rest 80% is owned by 9 Palli Biddyut Samity (PBS). 
Electricity (Power) Distribution Utilities and Related Organizations Bangladesh 
Because of major reforms, restructuring and corporatisation process of Bangladesh 
electricity sector, a number of distribution entities were formed with the objective of 
bringing commercial environment including increase of efficiency, accountability and 
dynamism with the aim of reaching electricity to all citizens by 2021. 
In order to increase and improve electricity generation and customer service with an aim 
to bring a greater mass under electrification, major integrated electricity distribution 
programmes have been undertaken. Presently the following five organisations are 
responsible for the distribution of electricity (Table 3.14): 
1. Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) 
2. Rural Electrification Board (REB) 
3. Dhaka Power Distribution Company (DPDC) 
4. Dhaka Electric Supply Company (DESCO) 
5. West Zone Power Distribution Company (WZPDC) 
BPDB is responsible for distribution of electricity in most of urban areas in Bangladesh 
except Dhaka Metropolitan City and its adjoining areas under DESA and DESCO, areas 
under West Zone Power Distribution Company Limited (WZPDCL) and some of the rural 
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areas under Rural Electrification Board (REB). Followings of the Distribution Zones of 
BPDB: Chittagong, Comilla, Sylhet, Mymenshing, and Rajshahi and Rangpur. 
Dhaka Power Distribution Company Limited (DPDC) is the largest electricity distribution 
company in Bangladesh. As a part of the Power Sector Development and Reform 
programme of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) Dhaka Power Distribution Company 
Limited (DPDC) had been incorporated on 25th October, 2005. DPDC started functioning 
from 14th May 2007 and later on 1st July 2008 taken over the distribution management 
system from the then DESA along with all the assets and liabilities of DESA. The company 
was created to provide electricity to the consumers of Dhaka city corporation area 
(excluding DESCO area) and also includes Narayanganj town, Siddirganj, Fatullah and 
Mokterpur under Narayanganj district. DPDC distribution area comprises 350 sq. kms of 
Dhaka and Narayanganj. DPDC Board of Directors consists of Chairman and 10 members. 
As a part of ongoing power sector reforms programme by the way of unbundling the 
electricity sector and increasing efficiency in the area of generation, transmission and 
distribution, West Zone Power Distribution Co. Ltd. (WZPDCL) was constituted as an 
electricity distribution company in November 2002 under the Companies Act 1994 as a 
Public Limited Company. The manpower of the Distribution Western Zone (Khulna 
Division, Barisal Division and Greater Faridpur comprising of 21 districts and 20 upazillas 
excluding REB area) of erstwhile Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), put 
under Lien being the employees of WZPDCL in October 1, 2003 (Subsidiaries of BPDB). In 
fact, WZPDCL is responsible for electricity distribution in 21 districts of Khulna and Barisal 
Division and greater Faridpur district. It had started its function from March, 2005. 
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Rural Electrification Board (REB) was established in 1977 as a semi-autonomous 
government organisation reporting to the Ministry of Power Energy and Minerals 
Resources and has been providing service to rural member consumers since then. It is 
responsible for electrification in rural areas. Since its inception, the purpose of the 
programme has been to use electricity as a means of creating opportunities for improving 
agricultural production and enhancing socio-economic development in rural areas, 
whereby there would be improvements in the standard of living and quality of life for the 
rural people. As of today, there are 70 operating rural electricity co-operatives called Palli 
Bidyuit Samity (PBS), which bring service to approximately 7,900,000 connections. REB 
has expanded its distribution networks significantly in past years and has thus made 
immense contribution in increasing agricultural products and rural development. REB 
consists of a Chairman, four full time members appointed by the government and four part 
time members nominated from relevant departments. Continued support from the 
government of Bangladesh, the donor community, consulting partners and the valuable 
consumer members will help this programme to continue and expand, providing electricity 
to millions of Bangladeshi households, businesses and industries. 
Dhaka Electric Supply Co. Ltd (DESCO) is the first electric distribution company which is 
registered under companies Act, 1994, and established on November, 1996 to provide 
uninterrupted & stable electricity supply, better consumer service, improve system loss. 
DESCO has started its operational activity since September 24, 1998 by taking over of 
Mirpur area from DESA. Its distribution comprises 220 sq. kms. of Dhaka Mega City area 
namely, Mirpur, Pallabi, Kafrul, Kalyanpur, Cantonment, Gulshan, Banani, Uttara, Uttarkhan, 
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Dakkhinkhan, Badda, Baridhara and Tangi. DESCO Board of Directors consists of Chairman 
and 9 members. 
North West Zone Power Distribution Company Ltd (NWZPDCL) 
North West Zone Power Distribution Company Ltd (NWZPDCL) was registered on August 
3, 2005. Its distribution area is entire Rajshahi Division.  
South Zone Power Distribution Company Ltd (SZPDCL) South Zone Power Distribution 
Company Ltd (SZPDCL) was established on 6 May, 2008.  
Electricity (Power) Transmission in Bangladesh 
Power Grid Company of Bangladesh (PGCB) is responsible for operation, maintenance and 
development of the transmission system of the country for distribution of generated 
electricity. PGCB was created in November, 1996 under the restructuring process of 
electricity sector in Bangladesh with the objective of bringing about commercial 
environment including increase in efficiency, establishment of accountability and 
dynamism in accomplishing its objectives. It was entrusted with the responsibility to own 
the national power grid to operate and expand the same with efficiency. Pursuant to 
Government decision to transfer transmission assets to PGCB from Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) and Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA), PGCB completed 
taking over of all the transmission assets on 31.12.2002. Since then, PGCB is operating 
those efficiently and effectively. It is a public limited company which is incorporated 
through sponsorship of chairman, BPDB and its six members where 76.25% ownership 
with BPDB & 23.75% with general public. 
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The main operating function of PGCB is wheeling of energy from BPDB power stations and 
generation companies to distribution entities utilising transmission network. PGCB gets its 
energy wheeling charge from its clients (distribution entities) at the rate fixed by 
Bangladesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (BERC). The company has taken 
infrastructure development projects for further development of its operation. After 
successful completion of the projects the capacity of PGCB transmission network will 
enhance significantly. 
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) 
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) was established on April, 2004 under 
an Act. BERC frames all rules and regulation to ensure transparency in the management, 
operation and tariff determination in the electricity, gas and petroleum sector. The 
commission protects consumers and promotes competitive market environment. The 
commission consists of a Chairman and 5 members. 
The key private companies, enterprises, NGOs involved in Bangladesh electricity sector are 
Summit Power Company, EnergyPac, Rahim Afrooz, Infrastructure Development Company 
Limited (IDCOL), Grameen Shakti (GS), Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee 
(BRAC), SZ Consultancy Services Ltd. (SZCSL), Rural Services Foundation (RSF), Palli 
Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), The Village Education Resource Centre (VERC) and 
The Bangladesh Solar Energy Society (BSES).  
Activities of other Donors 
Asian Development Bank (ADB): The ADB as the major donor took the coordinating role 
and acts as the chief negotiator with the Government of Bangladesh. All international donor 
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activities in the energy sector are coordinated by the local consultative group led by ADB. 
ADB is also providing funds to the Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy 
Development (RERED) programme implemented by IDCOL.  
The World Bank (WB): The World Bank is providing funds to the Government of 
Bangladesh to increase the electricity generation, transmission and distribution capacity. 
The WB initiated the SHS RERED programme. It recently announced that it will scale up its 
support for the Solar Home System (SHS) programme by adding US$ 78.4 million in IDA 
credits to the Bangladesh Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development II 
(RERED II). This funding shall help install an additional 480,000 solar home systems in 
areas without grid access to electricity.  
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): JICA is helping Bangladesh in the generation 
of electricity. Currently, JICA is also providing funds to RERED programme.  
Global Environment Facility (GEF): GEF has supported REREDP from the very beginning 
and plans to undertake projects in the areas energy efficiency and improved brick kilns.  
SNV: SNV is active in the field of biogas technology dissemination and is showing interest in 
improved cook stoves.  
Urban Partnership for Poverty Reduction (UPPR): Under UNDP initiated UPPR is 
collaborating with SED in the cook stove sector and is also open for cooperation in biogas 
plants in urban settings.  
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): USAID has been supporting rural 
electrification programme of Bangladesh for the last 35 years. Currently, USAID has 
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approved a 50 million USD programme for energy. 35 million are foreseen for energy 
efficiency measures and 15 million for improved cook stoves.  
Practical Action (PA): PA is mostly active in infrastructure and livelihood improvement in 
poor urban areas. As part of their efforts to provide energy access to the poor, they are 
interested to cooperate with SED in the promotion of improved cook stove as well as 
related monitoring and evaluation activities.  
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA): SIDA is involved in improved cook 
stove activities in Bangladesh. It is also working on renewable energies and energy 
efficiency in cooperation with GIZ.  
UK Department for International Development (DFID): DFID has made tremendous funds 
available for electrification projects. They have indicated strong interest in SHS/SSHS, 
PicoPV as well as improved cook stove activities. Also they will be active in the field of 
political advisory, e.g. they are working on the topic of reallocation of subsidies for energy 
services and fuels.  
Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC): CCAC is a new partnership represented by the USA, 
Canada, Sweden, Mexico, Ghana and Bangladesh. This group is focussing on the reduction 
of short lived pollutants such as black carbon and methane by promoting new 
environmentally friendly technologies and processes like improved cook stoves, brick kilns 
and rice parboiling system. Detailed discussions for cooperation have taken place in 
Toronto and Paris recently.  
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Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW): Besides their efforts in rehabilitation of old power 
plants and grid efficiency, KfW has been a strong promoter and supporter of the SHS and 
SSHS dissemination under IDCOL. Further cooperation can be envisaged also for PicoPV.  
Global Alliance for Clean Cook stove (GACC): GACC, an UN Foundation, is now start working 
in Bangladesh and developing a Country Action Plan (CAP) which will give the whole cook 
stove sector participants a common platform.  
3.6 Energy and Electricity Reform Policies in Bangladesh 
Energy is a strategic input for socio economic development. Energy has direct linkages with 
economic security, food security, and environment sustainability. However, energy security 
as well as economic stability in Bangladesh is threatened by spiralling population growth, 
scarcity of fossil fuel resources, high frequency of climatic events and decision making 
processes that often lack transparency (Uddin and Taplin, 2008). Bangladesh is currently 
unable to ensure necessary energy supplies to meet the energy demand of the country. In 
fact energy crisis is one of the major problems in Bangladesh since its independence which 
is becoming more acute now a day as the gap between demand and production is 
increasing. 
While demand is increasing as a result of economic, social and technological expansion, the 
supply remains sticky. It should be noted that energy crisis in Bangladesh has also 
exaggerated due to lack of attention of all previous governments because of i) Lack of 
experience, ii) Frequent changes of key policy makers and decision makers; iii) Lack of 
political commitment to maintain continuity of policy; iv) Lack of rational tariff policy; v) 
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Lack of trained manpower; vi) Lack of appropriate organisational structure & character; 
vii) Corruption; viii) Politicisation to the system. 
It is therefore, essential to take steps to ensure necessary energy supplies and their proper 
distribution to all uses and users throughout the country to support steady socio-economic 
development in the country. For a developing country like Bangladesh, the energy security 
issue needs to be considered in the context of sustainable human development under long 
term perspective to meet the energy needs of the future generations. 
The conceptual framework of National Energy Policy (NEP) is shown in Figure 3.1. The 
major objective of NEP is to ensure the equality between energy demand and energy 
supply for different zones of Bangladesh. Shortage of supply in comparison to demand 
causes energy crisis. There is certain degree of uncertainty to maintain reliable supply from 
imported sources. In order to ensure energy security, both developed and developing 
countries always give priority to meet the demand by indigenous energy sources. 
Additionally, development of the energy sector has been prioritised via the Five-Year 
Development Plans of Bangladesh. The objectives and targets set out for the energy sector 
for the Sixth Five Year Plan (SFYP) 2011-2015, in line with the Vision 2021 a national 
development plan, are as follows: 
1. Accelerated exploration, appraisal and development of existing and new gas fields, 
the upgrade of possible gas resources into proven reserves, and balanced expansion 
of the transmission and distribution network; 
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2. Integrated reservoir management in both public and private gas companies, and 
where possible, the provision of standby wells for supply security and reservoir 
data collection; 
3. Institute administrative, financial and legal reform in Petro Bangla and companies; 
4. Reduce system losses and improve energy use efficiency; 
5. Encourage public-private partnerships for LNG import and marketing; 
6. Encourage public-private partnerships in the exploration and distribution of 
indigenous oil and gas; 
7. Expand LPG use for domestic consumption to discourage piped gas.  
To set out the overall framework for the improved performance of this sector, the NEP was 
prepared and adopted by the government in 1996, followed by a revised version in 2004. 
The fundamental objectives are as follows: 
a. To provide energy for sustainable economic growth so that the economic 
development activities of different sector are not constrained due to shortage of 
energy- Development of Energy Infrastructures. 
b. To meet the energy needs of different zones of the country and socio-economic 
groups- Development of Energy Infrastructures. 
c. To ensure optimum development of all the indigenous energy sources (e.g. 
commercial fuels, biomass fuels and other renewable energy sources)-Increase 
Indigenous Energy Supply. 
d. To ensure sustainable operation of the energy utilities-Institutional and policy 
reforms. 
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e. To ensure rational use of total energy sources-Energy conservation and efficient use. 
f. To ensure environmentally sound sustainable energy development programmes 
causing minimum damage to environment-Protection and improvement of 
environment. 
g. To encourage public and private sector participation in the development and 
management of the energy sector-Implementation strategies. 
h. Electricity to all by 2020-Development of power infrastructure. 
i. Rational energy tariff-Policy reform. 
j. Regional energy market - Policy reform and energy infrastructure development. 
However, the government has adopted the following policy measures: 
 Private Sector Power Generation Policy of Bangladesh, adopted in 1996, 
 Policy Guidelines for Small Power Plants (SPP) in the Private Sector in 1998, 
 Guidelines for Remote Area Power Supply Systems (RAPSS) in July 2007, 
 Policy Guidelines for Enhancement of Private Participation in the Power Sector in 
2008, 
 Renewable Energy Policy of Bangladesh, adopted in January 2009. This policy has 
the following objectives: 
i. to harness the potential of renewable energy resources and the dissemination of 
RETs in rural and urban areas; 
ii. to enable, encourage and facilitate public and private sector investment in RE 
projects; 
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iii. to develop sustainable energy supplies to substitute indigenous non-renewable 
energy supplies; 
iv. to scale up the contribution of RE to electricity production; 
v. to facilitate the use of renewable energy at every level of energy usage; 
vi. to promote development of local technology in the field of RE; 
vii. to promote clean energy for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
3.6.1 Achievements of National Energy Policy of Bangladesh till 2014 
Along with the other policies in 1998, Bangladesh also experienced institutional reforms in 
the energy sector by dividing MOPEMR in to two divisions a) Energy and Mineral 
Resources (EMR) Division and b) Power Division and so far has the following 
achievements: 
1. International Oil Companies (IOC) operates Production Sharing Contract (PSC) in 11 
blocks out of 23 blocks. 
2. IOC discovered three gas fields. 
3. Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration and Production Company Limited (BAPEX) 
transformed to an Exploration and Production (E & P) company. 
4. Independent Power Producers (IPP) involved in electricity generation. 
5. Separate companies of Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) for power 
generation, transmission and distribution. 
6. Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC) ensures petroleum supply during 
irrigation. 
7. Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) was established in 2004.  
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8. BERC has started making decisions on energy (petroleum, gas, electricity) tariffs 
from 2008 in place of Government administered tariffs. However, originally the 
prices are still determined by government and BERC acts as a government agent to 
make it public. 
9. Access to electricity has been raised from 47% to 69% (including RE) and per capita 
electricity generation improved dramatically (from 220 kWh to 321 kWh) between 
2009 and 2014. 3.45 million people have newly been connected and system loss 
(distribution) reduced from 15.67% to 12.03% between the same years. 
10. Government has already initiated different energy saving measures and demand-
side management programme to save power and energy. One such programme is 
the distribution of energy efficient CFL at free of cost. 10.5 million have already been 
distributed through this programme. Mass awareness raising programmes have 
been undertaken. Inclusion of energy efficiency in the school curricula, essay 
competition amongst the school students on energy efficiency issues, use of 
electronic and print media are some of them. 
11. Considering the country’s future energy security and low-carbon emission strategy, 
programmes have been undertaken to promote use of renewable energy. 
Government has formulated pro-investment policy to encourage private sector 
investment in Renewable Energy (RE) Sector. 
12. Sustainable & Renewable Energy Development Authority Act-2012 has been 
enacted to set up nodal organisation for renewable and energy efficiency issues. 
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13. Customers can now pay utility bills on-line and through mobile phones which have 
been hailed by the public. 
The electricity sector in Bangladesh has been undergoing a process of significant 
institutional change. Since 1972 the operation of the electricity sector has been the 
responsibility of the BPDB, reporting to the MPEMR. This responsibility has been 
subdivided over the years, initially with the setting up of the REB in 1978, and the 
subsequent creation of a co-operative based model for expansion of access, the 
cooperatives being known as PBS. Under the reform programme, Dhaka Electric Supply 
Authority (DESA) was created for the better management and efficient electricity supply in 
Dhaka city and its adjoining districts in 1990 and after that, DESA was reformed as Dhaka 
Power Distribution Company Ltd. (DPDC) in 2008. Dhaka Electric Supply Company Ltd. 
(DESCO) was created in 1997 as a part of DESA. Since the mid-1990s, the Government of 
Bangladesh has continued with the vertical unbundling of the sector, through the creation 
of separate publicly owned entities for generation, transmission and distribution, and the 
development of a Single Buyer Market (SBM) model. This has led to the entry of a number 
of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) into the market. The unbundling has led to the 
creation of a number of independently managed entities which are gradually taking over 
the operational responsibility previously vested with BPDB, thereby changing its status to 
that of a holding company, with management control being decentralised into the business 
unit. As part of the ongoing programme of electricity sector reform, a regulatory body, the 
BERC (Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission) has been set up, and a unit called 
Power Cell has been set up within the MPEMR to drive the reform process forward. Under 
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the Companies Act of 1994, Power Grid Company of Bangladesh (PGCB) was created in 
1996 to oversee the transmission system. In the recent past, a number of generation 
companies have been created under the reforms programme. Following the reform activity, 
Ashuganj Power Station Complex has been converted into Ashuganj Power Station 
Company Ltd (APSCL) in 1996. Additionally, as a part of reform activities, Electricity 
Generation Company of Bangladesh (EGCB) was formed in 2004 and the North West Zone 
Power Generation Company Limited (NWZPGCL) was also formed in 2007. 
Under the Companies Act of 1994, Power Grid Company of Bangladesh (PGCB) was created 
in 1996 to oversee the transmission system (See Table 3.15 for Detailed of Reform Policy in 
Bangladesh). 
In fact, Bangladesh government has adopted a comprehensive electricity development 
strategy for exploring supply side options along with demand management that conserves 
electricity and discourages its inefficient use. The thrust of the government’s policy is to 
treat electricity as a private good such that its price reflects the cost of production and a 
fair return is generated on the electricity investment. The policy maintains that “social 
objectives like reaching out to the poor and rural community could be achieved through 
cross-subsidisation as well as explicit budget subsidies” (Planning Commission, 2011). As 
such, a key policy reform for the government is to ensure proper pricing of electricity and 
power based on international best practices. 
3.6.2 Main Reasons behind Electricity Sector Reform in Bangladesh 
Based on different literature (Mujeri et al., 2013, Tamim et al., 2013 and BPDB, 2014), the 
main reasons behind electricity sector reform in Bangladesh can be listed as follows: 
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i. A poor performance of the electricity sector such as poor conditions of generation 
and distribution equipment 
ii. Inadequate operational and maintenance performance 
iii. High level of technical and non-technical losses 
iv. A rapidly growing demand for electricity with the expansion of agricultural and 
industrial activities 
v. A low number of electricity plants 
vi. Technical constraints and organisational problems 
vii. Poor sector financing with low electricity tariff which is below the long run marginal 
costs of production or even below average operating costs 
viii. Only 15% of households had access to Grid electricity in 1996 
ix. Inadequate planning and investment decisions 
x. Misuse of subsidies 
3.6.3 Future programmes 
With new generation addition, the total generation capacity would be 17,000 MW by 2016. 
By that time some power plants will be derated, contracts of some rental power plants will 
be over and the dependable capacity would be around 13,000 MW. A long term 
comprehensive and integrated energy (electricity) policy along with appropriate strategies 
should be formulated to ensure energy security over short, medium, and long terms of the 
country. The policy should ensure tapping of all possible sources of energy, adequate 
supplies of energy to its various uses and equitable access of energy to all segments of the 
society. 
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Use of renewable energy should be given due importance and extensive R&D on 
technologies for commercialisation of renewable energy should be conducted. Energy 
sector must be made efficient through the improvement of management and operational 
aspects relating to generation, transmission, and distribution. In this context it is essential 
to curb the system loss and pilferage, improve transparency and accountability, remove 
financial constraints, and introduce proper billing system and collection procedures.  
Coal will be the dominating fuel in the future generation. Two big coal fire plants with 
capacity of 1320 MW each will be set up, one in Khulna and other in Chittagong. The Khulna 
plant will be set up in joint venture with BPDB of Bangladesh and NTPC of India. Besides, 
other coal fired plants will be set up in different locations of Khulna, Chittagong, Matarbari 
and Moheshkhali. 
Transmission and distribution system will be improved accordingly in line with generation 
increase. The old plants will be rehabilitated phase-wise into combined cycle plants for 
energy efficiency and reduction of emissions.  
Sustainable & Renewable Energy Development Authority (SREDA), as a nodal agency for 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and energy conservation, will be set up. The act has 
already been passed by the Parliament and have made effective from 22nd May, 2014. Steps 
are going on to operationalise SREDA. Another organisation in the name of Bangladesh 
Energy Research Council will be formed for R&D in power and energy sector. In order to 
promote solar energy, recently government has initiated 500 MW Solar Power 
Development Programmes. The plan envisages with the provision of solar power in the 
remote and hard to serve areas, community clinics, rural schools, union-information 
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centers and irrigation pumps which would not only enhance quality of life and productivity 
in the rural areas but also contribute to reduction of infant and child mortality, 
improvement of maternal health, reduction of malnutrition and empowerment of women. 
In order to explore the wind potentials in Bangladesh, a number of wind mapping 
programmes has been initiated all over the country. Along with wind mapping, a flag ship 
wind power project with capacity of 15 MW will be implemented within 2 years. 
Cross-border electricity trading is going on with India which will carry forward further. 
Possibilities of trading of hydro power from Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar are being 
explored. Human Resource Planning in line with Power Sector Master Plan 2010 is being 
designed; Extensive use of ICT will be made to improve the institutional capacity of the 
electricity sector and service delivery to the customers. 
3.7 Energy and Electricity Subsidy in Bangladesh 
Following the internationally accepted definition of “subsidy,” one can identify two major 
types of subsidies that are provided by the government: i) subsidies designed to reduce the 
cost of consuming energy (electricity) and ii) fuel subsidies aimed at supporting domestic 
production (Ellis, 2010). Similarly, subsidies in the energy sector may encompass various 
forms, such as direct financial transfers; retail prices set at below-market prices; providing 
credit at below-market interest rates; government loan guarantees; preferential tax 
treatments; accelerated depreciation on energy machineries and equipment; provision of 
energy-related services at less than full cost; imposing trade restrictions (e.g., tariff and 
nontariff barriers); and imposing regulatory regimes on the energy sector, such as price 
controls, purchase guarantees and preferential market access. 
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There are two types of electricity subsidies. The first type of subsidy lowers the production 
cost through subsidised fuel (e.g., natural gas, coal, diesel, furnace oil, etc.) in electricity 
generation. The second type offers electricity tariffs for groups of consumers (including 
residential customers and farmers) that are lower than the production costs. As a result, 
the BPDB, which generates around 60% of the country’s total electricity, has persistently 
incurred losses due to selling electricity at prices lower than the break-even point. These 
losses are adjusted mainly through budgetary transfers by the government every year. 
Bangladesh’s total on-budget subsidies between the years of 2009 and 2013 are given in 
Table 3.16. This table shows a substantial shift in the sectoral composition of subsidies. In 
2010, agriculture accounted for 54% of the total subsidy, while the shares of fossil fuels 
and electricity were 14% cent and 9% respectively. The share of agriculture declined to 
22% of the total in 2013, while the shares of fossil fuels and electricity rose to 30% and 
22% respectively. Thus, the energy sector as a whole now accounts for 52% of the total 
budgetary subsidy of the government compared with only 23% three years ago. These 
figures indicate how fast energy subsidies are rising and the urgent need for energy 
subsidy reform in Bangladesh. 
A summary of the estimates of overall energy subsidies (including both on-budget and off-
budget subsidies) by different energy products is given in Table 3.17. It shows that total 
energy subsidies increased sharply to BDT 126 billion in 2011 from BDT 9.8 billion in 2010 
and further increased to BDT 149 billion in 2012. Total subsidies have escalated due to a 
rapid increase in energy consumption levels and rising import prices for energy products, 
especially in 2012. 
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In Bangladesh, the government imports most of the fossil fuels and petroleum products. 
The BERC periodically fixes the prices of these products in the market. Thus, all petroleum 
products, including electricity, are sold under an administered price regime, which is 
controlled by the government. As such, energy subsidies in Bangladesh mostly result from 
setting retail prices for fuel and electricity at lower than their “true market prices.” 
Although the government periodically adjusts energy prices to bring them closer to world 
market prices, subsidies remain substantial due to the government’s policy of subsidising 
energy to support access for the poor. Energy subsidies are also considered important for 
several key production sectors of the economy, including agriculture (e.g., using subsidised 
diesel for irrigation by small and marginal farmers). 
Bangladesh is fully dependent on imported crude oil and also imports refined petroleum 
products. Furnace oil, lubricant oil (lube), high-speed diesel, kerosene and petrol are some 
of the imported refined products. 
Although the domestic prices of petroleum products follow the general trend of world 
prices, prices in the domestic market are much less volatile than those in the world market. 
The government absorbs significant portions of the price volatility by providing subsidies 
on petroleum products. As expected, rising trends in international prices result in a higher 
import cost for petroleum products in Bangladesh. The world financial crisis in 2008 led to 
a sharp fall in petroleum prices in FY2009. Since then, petroleum prices have risen 
continuously in the world market, leading to an increasing import cost for Bangladesh. 
(Table 3.18) 
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The subsidy on petroleum products can be residually estimated by the difference between 
the import price and the administrative price of different petroleum products in the 
domestic market (Mujeri et al., 2013). The subsidisation of petroleum prices has resulted in 
significant losses for the BPC (the public sector oil company with a monopoly on imports). 
The BPC’s operational losses are covered by loans from state-owned commercial banks, 
direct budgetary transfers and net lending by the government. These loans are provided 
with an interest rate that is lower than the market rate. 
The difference between the import costs and selling revenues of imported petroleum 
products-namely, diesel, kerosene and furnace oil-has given rise to huge subsidies over the 
last three years. The subsidies on these three petroleum products were estimated at BDT 
1.84 billion in 2010, which then increased sharply to BDT 73.28 billion in 2011, and 
decreased to BDT 68.71 billion in 2012 (Table 3.19). Two factors have contributed to the 
jump in subsidy in 2011. First, unit costs were higher due to the higher import prices of 
different petroleum products in the world market; second, consumption of diesel and 
furnace oil rose rapidly, particularly for liquid fuel-based electricity generation from 
rental/quick rental power plants to meet the ongoing electricity crisis. 
The electricity tariff structures differ across sectors and levels of consumption. Industrial 
and commercial sectors pay higher tariffs while domestic and agriculture sectors pay low, 
subsidised tariffs. Thus, the domestic and agriculture sectors are partially cross-subsidised 
by the industrial and commercial sectors. Bangladesh imposes one of the lowest electricity 
tariffs of many of its neighbors when both domestic and agricultural usages are considered 
(Table 3.20). 
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Estimates of Electricity Subsidies 
BPDB is responsible for generating electricity and selling it to different distribution 
companies, such as Dhaka Power Distribution Company Limited (DPDC), West Zone Power 
Distribution Company Limited (WZPDCL), Rural Electrification Board (REB) and Dhaka 
Electric Supply Company Limited (DESCO). BPDB sells electricity to these distribution 
companies at a rate that is lower than the generation cost, leading to huge losses for BPDB. 
The government provides loans to BPDB at interest rates lower than market interest rates 
to mitigate these losses. As these loans are provided at subsidised interest rates, the 
process involves the provision of implicit subsidies. The low selling price of BPDB to the 
distribution companies’ results in losses per unit of electricity generated. These estimated 
costs are shown in Table 3.21. 
Despite the lower price paid to BPDB, the distribution companies also incur losses because 
electricity is provided to final consumers at subsidised rates. This per-unit subsidy can be 
estimated by calculating the difference between the per-unit supply cost of the distribution 
companies and the per-unit selling price to final consumers (Table 3.22). 
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Appendix 3 
Table 3.1: Per Capita Energy Use in Different Region in 2009 
Region Per Capita Energy Use (Kilograms of Oil Equivalent) 
Bangladesh 205 
India 615 
Nepal 381 
Pakistan 487 
Srilanka 477 
South Asia 555 
World 1890 
Source: World Development Indicator (WDI), 2015 
 
 
Table 3.2: Energy Growth Rate of Bangladesh and Neighbouring Countries 
Growth Rate 1980-2010 2000-2010 
Bangladesh 4.3% 4.8% 
Srilanka 2.5% 1.6% 
Pakistan 4.0% 2.6% 
Myanmar 1.3% 0.8% 
Nepal 2.6% 2.1% 
India 4.0% 3.8% 
Source:  World Development Indicator (WDI), 2015 and Tamim et al., 2013 
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Table 3.3: Consumption of Petroleum Products (In Million Litres) 
Product 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Octane 90.02 78.26 85.54 97.26 107.15 110.85 117.45 
Petrol 124.82 115.38 127.25 141.49 158.71 169.71 178.67 
Kerosene 405.10 342.70 376.65 397.21 358.44 314.87 289.87 
Diesel 2333.6 2301.3 2568.2 3239.3 3240.4 2964.60 3242.55 
Furnace Oil 289.60 164.47 194.17 544.62 883.74 1076.42 1202.50 
Lube 17.29 15.02 15.92 17.95 17.52 15.90 17.82 
Others 366 310 390 430 448 443.65 435.09 
Total 3626 3327 3257 4868 5214 5086 5484 
Source: Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC), 2015 
 
 
Table 3.4: Achievement of  Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy till 2014 
Classification Generation (MW) 
Solar Home Systems (SHS) 150 
Solar Irrigation 1 
Roof Top solar PV at Government, Power sector 
office buildings and at newly constructed 
buildings 
14 
Wind Energy 2 
Biomass based Electricity <1 MW 
Biogas based Electricity 5 MW 
Hydro Power 230 MW 
Total 403 MW 
Source: Power Division, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015 
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Table 3.5: Year wise Additional Electricity Generation in Bangladesh 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Public 255 800 607 587 225 1293 1475 2131 1320 
Private 520 963 344 76 1024 1218 1014 640 630 
Total 775 1763 951 663 1249 2511 2489 2771 1950 
Source: Power Division, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015 
 
Table 3.6: Updated Comparative Data of Bangladesh Electricity Scenario 
Subject 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Installed generation 
capacity 
5719 5823 7264 8716 9151 10416 
Derated generation 
capacity 
5166 5271 6639 8100 8537 9821 
Generation (MW) 3589 3883 3962 4805 5010 5320 
Highest generation 4162 4606 4890 6066 6434 7356 
Electricity Demand 
(peak demand) 
6066 6454 6765 7518 8349 9268 
Access to Electricity 47 48.5 49 53 62 69 
Per capita electricity 
Generation 
183.26 200.32 211.86 231.65 248.89 270.83 
Per capita electricity 
Consumption 
165.32 170.27 180.08 197.72 213.15 232.56 
Transmission 
Lines(km) 
8305 8500 8600 8949 9328 9500 
Distribution 
Lines(km) 
256143 266460 270000 281123 301654 303000 
Load Shedding 1269 1459 1355 1058 1048 932 
System Loss 13.57 13.10 13.06 12.15 11.95 11.89 
Source: Power Division, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015 
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Table 3.7: Access to Electricity (% of Population) between 1996-2014 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Access to 
Electricity 
15% 17% 19% 20% 23% 25% 30% 32% 35% 38% 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
(June) 
Access to 
Electricity 
40% 42% 45% 47% 48.5% 49% 53% 62% 69% 74% 
Source: Power Division, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2007-2015 
 
 
Table 3.8: Electricity Generation in Bangladesh 
Year Capacity(MW) 
Installed Derated 
2006 5245 3782 
2007 5202 3717 
2008 5201 4130 
2009 5719 5166 
2010 5823 5271 
2011 7264 6639 
2012 8819 8149 
2013 9151 8537 
2014 10416 9821 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
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Table 3.9: The Responsible Authorities for Generation of Electricity in Bangladesh 
(as of Jan,2015) 
Public Sector (54%) 
Companies Generation Share 
BPDB 38.14% 
APSCL 6.35% 
EGCB 5.75% 
NWPGCL 3.40% 
RPCL 0.71% 
Private Sector (46%) 
IPP 18.17% 
SIPP 3.23% 
Quick Rental 18.06% 
15 Year Rental 1.54% 
Power Import 4.62% 
Total 100 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
 
Table 3.10: Electricity Generation by Fuel Type in Terms of Percentage 
Generation Source 2008 2010 2012 2013 2014 
Natural Gas 87% 84.02% 79% 64.50% 61.76% 
Diesel 1% 5.15% 4% 6.69% 7.89% 
Furnace Oil 4% 4.42% 12% 19.22% 21.28% 
Coal 4% 2.19% 3% 2.45% 2.31% 
Hydro 4% 4.23% 2% 2.25% 2.13% 
Power Import    4.90% 4.62% 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
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Table 3.11: Per Unit Average Cost of Electricity Generation in Bangladesh 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Per Unit Cost (BDT/kWh) 2.33 2.53 2.58 4.20 5.36 5.73 5.88 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
 
 
Table 3.12: Historical Fuel Prices for Bangladesh 
 Gas 
(BDT/1000 Cft) 
Furnace Oil 
(BDT/Liter) 
Diesel 
(BDT/Liter) 
Coal 
(USD/Ton) 
2009 79.82 26 43 71.5 
2010 79.82 26 43 84 
2011 79.82 60 61 84 
2012 79.82 60 61 105 
2013 79.82 60 68 105 
2014 79.82 60 68 105 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
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 Table 3.13a: Bangladesh Electricity Tariff from 2007-2012(Retail) 
Consumer Category Range Rate/Kwh 
  Mar, 2007 Mar, 2010 Feb, 2011 Dec, 2011 Feb, 2012 Mar, 2012 Sep, 2012 
A: Residential Light 
and Power(Domestic) 
000-100 kwh 
101-400 kwh 
400 and above 
Taka 2.50 
Taka 3.25 
Taka 5.25 
Taka 2.60 
Taka 3.30 
Taka 5.65 
Taka 2.60 
Taka 3.46 
Taka 5.93 
Taka 2.73 
Taka 3.81 
Taka 6.88 
Taka 2.87 
Taka 4.04 
Taka 7.43 
Taka 3.05 
Taka 4.29 
Taka 7.89 
00-75 kwh-3.33 Tk 
76-200 kwh-4.73 Tk 
201-300 kwh-4.83 Tk 
301-400 kwh-4.93 Tk 
401-600 kwh-7.93 Tk 
600 above-9.38 Tk 
B: Agricultural 
Pumping 
Flat Taka 1.93 Unchanged Unchanged Taka 2.03 Taka 2.13 Taka 2.26 Taka 2.51 
C: Small Industry Flat 
Pick 
Off-Pick 
Taka 4.02 
Taka 5.62 
Taka 3.20 
Taka 4.35 
Taka 5.95 
Taka 3.50 
Taka 4.56 
Taka 6.24 
Taka 3.67 
Taka 5.27 
Taka 6.75 
Taka 4.41 
Taka 5.67 
Taka 6.90 
Taka 4.86 
Taka 6.02 
Taka 7.33 
Taka 5.16 
Taka 6.95 
Taka 8.47 
Taka 5.96 
D: Non Residential 
Light and Power 
Flat Taka 3.35 Unchanged Unchanged Taka 3.52 Taka 3.69 Taka 3.92 Taka 4.53 
E: Commercial Flat 
Pick 
Off-Pick 
Taka 5.30 
Taka 8.20 
Taka 3.80 
Taka 5.58 
Taka 8.45 
Taka 4.05 
Taka 5.85 
Taka 8.87 
Taka 4.25 
Taka 6.80 
Taka 9.31 
Taka 5.23 
Taka 7.33 
Taka 9.66 
Taka 5.88 
Taka 7.79 
Taka 10.26 
Taka 6.25 
Taka 9.00 
Taka 11.85 
Taka 7.22 
F: Medium Voltage 
General 
(11 KV) 
Flat 
Pick 
Off-Pick 
Taka 3.80 
Taka 6.73 
Taka 3.14 
Taka 4.17 
Taka 7.12 
Taka 3.43 
Taka 4.17 
Taka 7.12 
Taka 3.43 
Taka 5.14 
Taka 7.55 
Taka 4.40 
Taka 5.55 
Taka 7.60 
Taka 4.86 
Taka 5.90 
Taka 8.08 
Taka 5.16 
Taka 6.81 
Taka 9.33 
Taka 5.96 
G 2:Extra High 
Voltage(132 KV) 
Flat 
23.00-6.00 
6.00-13.00 
13.00-17.00 
17.00-23.00 
Taka 2.82 
Taka 1.49 
Taka 2.48 
Taka 1.66 
Taka 5.52 
Taka 3.10 
Taka 1.63 
Taka 2.72 
Taka 1.82 
Taka 5.94 
Taka 3.25 
Taka 1.71 
Taka 2.85 
Taka 1.91 
Taka 6.23 
Flat-4.59 Tk 
Pick-6.90 Tk 
Off-Pick-
4.04 Tk 
Flat-5.02 Tk 
Pick-7.07 Tk 
Off-Pick-
4.54 Tk 
Flat-5.33 Tk 
Pick-7.51 Tk 
Off-Pick-
4.82 Tk 
Flat-6.16 Tk 
Pick-8.67 Tk 
Off-Pick-5.57 Tk 
H: High Voltage 
General(32 KV) 
Flat 
Pick 
Off-Pick 
Taka 3.58 
Taka 6.45 
Taka 3.03 
Taka 3.92 
Taka 6.82 
Taka 3.33 
Taka 4.11 
Taka 7.16 
Taka 3.49 
Taka 4.88 
Taka 7.34 
Taka 4.30 
Taka 5.28 
Taka 7.44 
Taka 4.78 
Taka 5.61 
Taka 7.91 
Taka 5.08 
Taka 6.48 
Taka 9.14 
Taka 5.87 
J: Street Lights and  
Water Pumps 
Flat 
 
Taka 3.86 Taka 3.98 Taka 4.17 Taka 4.90 Taka 5.28 Taka 5.61 Taka 6.48 
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 Table 3.13b: Bangladesh Electricity Tariff from 2007-2012(Bulk) 
Consumer Category Range Rate/Kwh 
  Mar, 2007 Feb, 2011 Aug, 2011 Dec, 2011 Feb, 2012 Mar, 2012 Sep, 2012 
G-1: DESA/DPDC 132 KV 
33 KV 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.75 
Taka 2.78 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.96 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 3.60 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 4.24 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 4.57 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 5.40 
I-1: REB/PBS 132 KV 
33 KV 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.75 
Taka 2.78 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.63 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 2.91 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 3.17 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 3.42 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 4.03 
I-2: DESCO 132 KV 
33 KV 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.96 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 3.60 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 4.24 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 4.57 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 5.40 
I-3: WZPDCL 132 KV 
33 KV 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.81 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 3.15 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 3.47 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 3.74 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 4.43 
I-4: BPDB 132 KV 
33 KV 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.84 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 3.42 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 3.98 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 4.25 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 4.97 
I-5: NWZPDCL 132 KV 
33 KV 
N/A Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.84 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 3.42 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 3.98 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 4.25 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 4.97 
I-6: Future 
Distribution Company  
132 KV 
33 KV 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.34 
Taka 2.39 
Taka 2.94 
Taka 2.84 
Taka 3.56 
Taka 3.42 
Taka 4.20 
Taka 3.98 
Taka 4.53 
Taka 4.25 
Taka 5.32 
Taka 4.97 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
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Table 3.14: Power Distribution Company in Bangladesh (Areas Wise Distribution) 
1. BPDB Most of Urban Areas(like Chittagong, Comilla, Sylhet, 
Mymenshing, Rajshahi, Rangpur) in Bangladesh except 
Dhaka city and its adjoining areas under DESCO, DPDC, 
WZPDCL and some of the rural areas under REB. 
2. DPDC Dhaka city corporation area (excluding DESCO area) and 
some towns (Siddirgonj, Fatullah and Mokterpur) under 
Narayanganj district. 
3. WZPDCL Khulna Division, Barisal Division and Greater Faridpur 
comprising of 21 districts. 
4. REB Rural areas of Bangladesh 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2015 
 
Table 3.15: History of Energy and Electricity Sector Reforms in Bangladesh 
Year Reform 
1972 Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) was established in 1972 as a public 
sector organisation with the responsibility for power generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity throughout the country. The BPDB (now under the power 
Division of the ministry of power, Energy and Mineral Resources) is responsible for 
major portion of generation and distribution of electricity mainly in urban areas of 
the country except Dhaka and West Zone of the country. 
1978 Creation of Bangladesh Rural Electrification Board (REB) from Bangladesh Power 
Development Board (BPDB) to fulfill the power demand for village people. REB was 
mainly responsible for electrifying rural Bangladesh. After the establishment of REB 
now all most 50% of the villages are being electrified. REB is a semi-autonomous 
government agency.  
1985 Liberalisation of Government policy with more private opportunities. 
1991 New Public Sector Utility Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA) was created to 
operate and develop the distribution system in and around Dhaka and bring about 
improvements in customer service, collection of revenue and lessen the 
administrative burden on BPDB. (Unbundling the Electricity Sector). 
1993 Power Sector Reform in Bangladesh (PSRB) was constituted recommending 
unbundling of the sector according to functional lines, corporatisation of sector 
entities and establishment of an Independent Regulatory Commission. 
1995 Legalisation of Private Participation under a new Energy Policy which aims vertical 
separation of existing utility in functional line i.e. Generation, Transmission 
Distribution and Commercialisation 
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1996 1) Creation of Power Grid Company of Bangladesh (PGCB) for operation, 
maintenance and development of transmission system in the country. A separate 
Electricity Transmission Utility under Public Sector. (Unbundling from BPDB) 
2) Dhaka Electric Supply Company Limited (DESCO) was established. As part of 
reform programmes, the distribution area of DESA has been re-defined, with some 
area being allocated to DESCO for better management (1 and 2 is the outcome of the 
implementation of PSRB). 
3) “Private Sector Power Generation Policy of Bangladesh” was adopted and power 
generation and distribution were opened to both national and foreign private 
investments. The involvement of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) was made 
effective after October 1996. 
4) The National Energy Policy was adopted in 1996 which recommended among 
others i) Sector unbundling ii) Private sector participation and iii) Establishment of 
an Energy Regulatory Commission. 
1998 1) Policy Guidelines for Small Power Plants (SPP) in the private sector adopted. 
2) The country’s first private power plant (with an 110MW installed capacity) started 
feeding power to the national grid in October 1998. 
3) Along with the other policies in 1998, Bangladesh also experienced institutional 
reforms in the energy sector by dividing MOPEMR in to two divisions a) Energy and 
Mineral Resources (EMR) Division and b) Power Division 
2001 Corporatisation of BPDB owned Ashuganj Power Station as a public limited company 
(APSCL). 
2003 1) Corporatisation of Distribution system of 19 administrative District of 
Western areas named “West Zone Power Distribution Company Limited”. 
2) The Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission was established on March 13, 
2003 through a legislative Act of the Government of Bangladesh. 
2007 Guidelines for Remote Area Power Supply Systems (RAPSS) adopted. 
2008 1) DESA converted into new company: Dhaka Power Distribution Company(DPDC) 
and 
2) Policy Guidelines for Enhancement of Private Participation in the Power Sector. 
3) BERC has started making decisions on Energy (Petroleum, Gas and Electricity) 
Tariffs in place of Government Administrative Tariffs. 
2009 Renewable Energy Policy of Bangladesh, adopted a) to harness the potential of 
Renewable Energy resources and the dissemination of Renewable Energy 
Technologies (RETs) in rural and urban areas, b) to enable, encourage and facilitate 
public and private sector investment in Renewable Energy (RE) projects, c) to 
develop sustainable energy supplies to substitute indigenous non-renewable energy 
supplies, d) to scale up the contribution of RE to electricity production, e) to facilitate 
the use of RE at every level of energy usage, f) to promote development of local 
technology in the field of RE and  g) to promote clean energy for the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Source: Compiled by Sakib B. Amin from different Literature 
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Table 3.16: Subsidies in the Government Budget, 2010-2013 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Subsidy, billion BDT 107.7 95.3 162.9 298.1 
By broad sector, billion BDT 
Agriculture 58.2 41.9 50.5 65.6 
Fossil Fuels 15.1 8.6 40.7 89.4 
Electricity 9.7 12.4 40.7 65.6 
Others 24.7 32.4 31.0 77.5 
Total Subsidy as % of GDP 1.8 1.4 2.0 3.3 
Total Subsidy as % of  Total Tax 
Revenue 
20.5 15.4 20.6 30.9 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015 
 
 
Table 3.17: Energy Subsidies in Bangladesh 
Energy Products  2010 2011 2012 
Subsidies on Electricity 
(Million BDT) 
Generation Level 5952 47187 64108 
Distribution Level 2056 5488 16032 
Total 8008 52675 80140 
Subsidies on Petroleum 
Products(Million BDT) 
Total 1839 73277 68714 
Total Energy Subsidies 
(Million BDT) 
Total 9847 125952 148854 
Energy Subsidies as a percentage 
of GDP 
Total 0.14182 1.58091 1.627208 
Source: Mujeri et al., 2013 
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Table 3.18: Total Import and Import Cost of Petroleum Products in Bangladesh 
 Crude Oil Refined Products Lube-Based Oil Furnace Oil 
Year Import 
in (MT) 
Value 
(Crore Tk) 
Import 
in (MT) 
Value 
(Crore Tk) 
Import 
in (MT) 
Value 
(Crore Tk) 
Import 
in (MT) 
Value 
(Crore Tk) 
2009 860.88 3431.4 2507.82 10945.24 4.83 23.63 29.92 60.38 
2010 1136.57 4701.54 2634.21 12028.18 7.26 52.03 - - 
2011 1409.30 7037.00 3259.34 20280.52 4.75 43.75 230.43 1123.17 
2012 1083.47 7053.51 3409.93 27111.24 4.98 53.11 680.98 3819.07 
2013 1292.10 8536.70 2827.16 219493.10 4.85 38.56 803.60 4367.26 
2014 1176.70 7957.29 3158.34 23485.56 - - 1016.10 5144.68 
Source: Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC), 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
 
Table 3.19: Subsidies For Refined Imported Petroleum Products 
 Sales 
(Million Litres) 
Per Unit Supply 
Cost(BDT/Liter) 
Selling Price 
(BDT/Litre) 
Per Unit Subsidy 
(BDT/Litre) 
Total Subsidy 
(Million BDT) 
2009-2010 
Diesel 3045.89 45.22 44 1.22 3715.99 
Kerosene 477.58 46.95 44 2.95 1408.87 
Petrol 181.07 50.53 74 -23.47 -4249.77 
Octane 117.02 51.53 77 -25.47 -2980.5 
JET-1 363.83 51.22 45 6.22 2263.06 
Furnace Oil 210.08 38.00 30 8.00 1681.23 
Total     1838.9 
2010-2011 
Diesel 3481.78 62 46 16 61468.56 
Kerosene 503.66 62.74 46 16.74 8431.28 
Petrol 201.34 64.33 76 -11.67 -2349.66 
Octane 133.05 65.33 79 -13.67 -1818.89 
JET-1 425.70 62.12 67 -4.88 -2077.46 
Furnace Oil 589.27 58.33 42 16.33 9622.87 
Total     73276.71 
2011-2012 
Diesel 3843.05 77.45 61 16.45 63218.24 
Kerosene 454.49 74.65 61 13.65 6203.88 
Petrol 225.84 79 91 -12 -2710.08 
Octane 146.58 79 94 -15 -2198.72 
JET-1 395.47 73.13 87 -13.87 -5485.26 
Furnace Oil 956.20 65.13 55 10.13 9686.31 
Total     68714.38 
Source: Power Division, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2015 
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Table 3.20: Tariff Rates in Bangladesh and its Neighbours 
Country/Region 0-100 Unit Residential 
(BDT/KWH) 
Agriculture 
(BDT/KWH) 
Bangladesh 3.68 (up to 75 unit: 3.33) 2.51 
West Bengal, India 3.88(Rural);3.90(Urban) Off Peak:2.34; Peak:9.06 
Karachi, Pakistan 5.90 Flat: 11.00 
Nepal 6.79 - 
Srilanka 3.88 - 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2012 
 
 
 
Table 3.21: Estimated Electricity Subsidies at Generation 
 Total Bulk 
Sales 
(MKWH)(A) 
Per Unit Supply 
Cost 
(BDT/KWH)(B) 
Per Unit Selling 
Price to 
Distribution 
Companies 
(BDT/KWH)(C) 
Per 
Unit 
Subsidy 
(D=B-
C) 
Total Subsidies 
(Million BDT) 
(E=D*A) 
2010 28341 2.58 2.37 0.21 5952 
2011 30443 4.2 2.65 1.55 47187 
2012 34100 5.35 3.47 1.88 64108 
Source: Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), 2012 
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Table 3.22: Estimated Subsidies in the Electricity Sector at the Distribution Level, 2010-2012  
 Total Sales 
(MWKH)(A) 
Per Unit Supply Cost(BDT/KWH)(Per 
Unit Price Paid by Distribution 
Companies to 
BPDB+TransmissionCharge+Distribution 
Cost=Total Supply Cost Per Unit)(B) 
Per Unit Selling 
Price 
(BDT/KWH)(C) 
Per Unit 
Subsidy 
(BDT/KWH) 
(D=B-C) 
Total 
Subsidies 
(Million 
BDT) 
(E=A*D) 
Total 
Subsidies in 
Electricity 
(Sum of 
Generation 
and 
Distribution 
Subsidies) 
(Million 
BDT) 
2010 
Domestic 11623 3.93 3.19 0.74 8601  
Agriculture 1229 3.93 2.9 1.03 1266  
Industry 9002 3.93 4.35 -0.42 -3781  
Commercial 2336 3.93 5.61 -1.68 -3925  
Others 406 3.93 4.19 -0.26 -106  
Total 24596 3.93 -  2056 8008 
2011 
Domestic 12757 4.24 3.39 0.85 10843  
Agriculture 1269 4.24 2.88 1.36 1725  
Industry 7713 4.24 4.41 -0.17 -1311  
Commercial 2574 4.24 5.96 -1.72 -4427  
Others 2276 4.24 4.83 -0.59 -1343  
Total 26587 4.24 -  5488 52675 
2012 
Domestic 14678 5.15 3.9 1.25 18348  
Agriculture 1492 5.15 3.18 1.97 2939  
Industry 10579 5.15 5.11 0.04 423  
Commercial 2751 5.15 7.14 -1.99 -5474  
Others 473 5.15 5.58 -0.43 -203  
Total 29973 5.15   16032 80140 
Source: Mujeri et al., 2013 
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Figure 3.1: The Framework of National Energy Policy 
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Chapter 4 
Energy Price Shocks and the Real Business Cycle Model: 
The Case of Bangladesh 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Energy is considered to be one of the key elements in the socio-economic development of a 
country. It helps to improve the living standards of the society through an increase in 
economic output. Energy plays a vital role not only on the demand side but also on the 
supply side of the economy. On the demand side, energy is one of the goods a consumer 
decides to buy in order to maximise his utility. Conversely, on the supply side, energy is a 
key factor of production in addition to labour, capital, and other raw materials. Therefore, 
understanding the linkage between energy and economic development is extremely 
significant because energy policy implications mostly depend upon what kind of 
relationship exists between them. The importance of energy in the economy became 
prominent after the oil crisis of the 1970s which provides one major example of the 
consequences of oil price turbulences on the macroeconomy. 
The measure of growth in the developing countries like Bangladesh is synonymous with 
the level of energy use. Bangladesh also considers energy as a pre requisite for its 
technological, societal and economic growth as the country has lot of potentials in terms of 
energy specifically natural gas and coal because of its local availability. In terms of 
renewable energy, solar power does have the potential to have a significant market share 
in the future because of the availability of sunlight. However, Bangladesh is currently 
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unable to ensure necessary energy supplies to meet the energy demand of the country. In 
fact, energy crisis is one of the major problems in Bangladesh since its independence which 
is becoming more acute as the gap between demand and production is increasing. It is 
therefore, essential to take steps ensuring necessary energy supplies and their proper 
distribution to all uses and users throughout the country to support steady socio-economic 
development in Bangladesh. Additionally, the energy related constraints like energy price 
shocks needs to be considered in the context of business cycle fluctuations to examine the 
importance of energy for development process and advocate policy suggestions. 
In light of the limitations, this chapter presents a standard RBC model with energy in the 
spirit of a DSGE model for the Bangladesh economy which has become a standard tool in 
quantitative economics. DSGE modelling mainly began with work in RBC analysis (Kydland 
and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983). Therefore, we focus on the RBC model in this 
chapter (Chapter 4) because it constitutes a useful benchmark framework as a vehicle for 
developing DSGE model to address the source of fluctuations and the behaviour of different 
macroeconomic variables for policy analysis (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). The basic building 
blocks of the model are standard in the literature. The main goals of this chapter are about 
the examination and validation of the basic RBC model with regard to its performance in 
terms of the common RBC properties and to see how important productivity shocks are to 
the basic RBC model, once the model is extended to allow for energy price shocks. Put in 
different words, we would like to explore the extent to which aggregate energy price 
shocks can help explain business cycle fluctuations in Bangladesh. We attempt to calibrate 
the RBC model to explain the quantitative business cycle properties of macroeconomic 
variables in Bangladesh economy. Then we examine how the fluctuations of key economic 
153 
 
variables such as consumption and output are explained by the exogenous shocks. The 
model’s ability to describe the dynamic structure of the Bangladesh economy is analysed by 
means of Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) which yield useful qualitative and 
quantitative information.  
Energy is explicitly modelled in the household’s utility function where the representative 
household derives utility from the consumption of energy oriented goods, non-energy 
oriented goods and from their leisure. The model also considers energy as an additional 
productive input along with labour and capital. That means, all economic agents in the 
economy rely on energy either for household’s consumption or for production of various 
goods. Aggregate energy price is modelled as an exogenous random process in addition to 
productivity shocks. The model is calibrated based on microeconomic evidence and also on 
long run considerations and try to examine the strength of the model to replicate the 
quantitative business cycle properties. Before the statistics were calculated, all the data 
were log-differenced and detrended using the HP filter so that the actual growth rates are 
displayed (Prescott and Hodrick, 1997; Uhlig and Morten, 2002). 
Our result shows that the basic RBC model does a modest job of replicating some of the 
broad features of annual data of 1990-2010 in Bangladesh. We show that energy price 
shock does not explain the business cycle fluctuations in Bangladesh. Consequently, output 
fluctuations in Bangladesh are mainly driven by productivity shock. Our results further 
reveal that exogenous shock’s impact on endogenous system variables are in the right 
direction.  
However, the model is still rather stylised. It abstracts from many of the channels through 
which energy prices may affect the macro economy. First, many of the studies that derive 
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strong impacts of energy on real variables do so by assuming some rigidity in the response 
of wages and (non-energy) prices to the energy price shocks [Gordon(1975), 
Phelps(1978), Mork and Hall(1980), and Black(1985)]. Second, it abstracts from the 
presence of government sector as well as taxes, subsidy etc.  Finally, the model represents a 
centralised economy where a representative economic agent (Household) makes every 
economic decision regarding consumption, savings, leisure, investment and capital 
instrument. Put in different words, the model presented in this chapter can be defined as a 
representative agent model where both firms and households are identical.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 focuses on the literature review. The model 
is presented in section 4.3; calibration and estimation of the parameters are discussed in 
section 4.4. The results are analysed in the section 4.5 and finally, in the last section, we 
present the conclusions. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Economic theory has long struggled in attempting to explain the energy-macroeconomic 
relationship (Finn, 2000). Researchers investigated the theoretical relationship between 
the use of energy (electricity, natural gas and petroleum products) and macroeconomy 
through different possible channels. However, the earlier macroeconomic models did not 
consider energy as an essential input in the production process. For example, Tsani (2010) 
mentions that energy is simply considered as an intermediate input of production. Bartleet 
and Gounder (2010) argue the presence of certain mechanisms by which economic growth 
could exist in spite of a limited source of energy resources. Proponents of this view focus on 
the possibility of technological change and substitution of other physical inputs for energy 
to use existing energy resources efficiently, and to generate renewable energy resources 
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that are not subject to binding supply constraints (Solow, 1974, 1997; Stiglitz, 1974). The 
advocates of this theory support the ‘neutrality hypothesis’ and the ‘conservation 
hypothesis’. These hypotheses imply that energy would not have any negative effect on 
economy. Thus, the government can simultaneously adopt energy conservation and 
macroeconomic policies (Bartleet and Gounder, 2010). 
The classical economists assume the limits which land (nature) impose on economic 
activities, especially in agriculture in three steps (Alam, 2006). First, they broke down the 
economy into two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. Second, they defined the 
distinctness of agriculture by recognising that labour and capital in this sector worked with 
land, a third factor of production. Third, they assumed that land was available in fixed 
quantities, and, in some formulations, its quality was variable. The fixed supply of land 
produced a tendency towards diminishing returns to capital and labour in agriculture. The 
presence of diminishing returns to labour and capital in agriculture sums up the 
constraints that nature imposes upon the organic economy. 
In contrast, the ecological economic theory states that energy consumption is a limiting 
factor to economic growth. Ecological economists judge that technological progress and 
other physical inputs could not possibly substitute the vital role of energy in the production 
process (Stern, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2010). They even consider energy as the prime source of 
value because other factors of production such as labour and capital cannot perform 
without energy (Belloumi, 2009). The advocates of this theory highlights the so-called 
‘growth hypothesis’. They advise that any shock to energy supply will ultimately have an 
adverse effect on economic growth. Consequently, they stand against the energy 
conservation policies. 
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In modern macroeconomics, the economy is described as a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) system that reflects the collective decisions of rational individuals over 
a range of variables that relate to both the present and the future (Wickens, 2008). A 
fundamental point of departure of a dynamic CGE model from a static one is the 
incorporation of intertemporal structure of consumption and investment decision in the 
dynamic model. A standard static CGE model examines one period sectoral reallocation of 
resources, while, in contrast, a dynamic CGE model allows us to analyse the path of a 
transitional dynamics toward a new steady state after an initial shock. Moreover, in 
contrast to a static CGE model, a dynamic counterpart is characterised by the inclusion of a 
driving force to move the economy from period to period. This driving force may be the 
growth in the underlying labour force and/or a change in the level of productivity in one or 
more sectors of the economy. DSGE models have been around for a long time, beginning 
with the planning models of the 1970s (Blitzer et al., 1975), through the energy and natural 
resource oriented models of the 1980s (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1983; Martin and Van 
Wijnbergen, 1988), to optimal borrowing models (e.g., Kharas and Shishido, 1987). 
However, recently these models have earned a great deal of attention from researchers and 
policy makers. During the last decade, a few energy augmented DSGE models was 
developed. 
Apart from the extensive empirical literature examining energy-economic activity, there is 
another kind of literature, which has analysed the energy price shocks on economic 
variables using Real Business Cycle (RBC) models. McCallum (1989) was responsible for 
carrying out the incorporation of energy price shocks into the RBC models with concrete 
credibility. The RBC model is considered as a simple neo-classical growth model which is 
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the building block of almost all modern DSGE models. The RBC theory also assumes that 
exogenous technological shocks identified through Solow residual, are the main sources of 
aggregate fluctuations in the economy which has often been criticised (De Miguel et al., 
2003). They argue that there is a lack of discussion on the nature of technological shocks, 
which are unobservable, and based on the idea that they are just the result of the 
convergence of other kinds of factors that are not specified in the model. However, one of 
the identifiable sources of shocks that have claimed the attention of many economists is 
energy price shocks which, according to some researchers, is equivalent to adverse 
productivity shocks and thus, induce significant contractions in economic activity. In fact, 
using US data, Hall (1988) finds that a standard measure of technology, the Solow residual, 
systematically tends to fall whenever energy price increases. 
There are two main branches in RBC/DSGE research. On one side, empirical research 
concentrates mainly on getting the appropriate measures of energy (oil) price increases 
and quantifying the real impact of energy (oil) price increases on GDP. In this area most 
prominent are works by Hamilton (1996, 2003, 2009), Bernanke et al. (1997) and Kilian 
(2008).  
On the other side, theoretical research tries to keep up with its empirical counterpart by 
devising theoretical models with energy to replicate empirical findings and finalise the role 
of energy in a theoretical economic model. Authors such as Kim and Loungani (1992), Finn 
(2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Dhawan and Jeske (2007), De Miguel et al. 
(2003, 2005), Tan (2012) investigates the effect of energy (energy price) shocks on the 
variation of output in RBC framework. But, most of the authors find that such energy 
(energy price) shocks offer very little help in explaining the US business cycle which in fact 
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support to the views of macroeconomists who downplay the impact of energy shocks on 
the economy. For instance, Tobin (1980) has argued that the share of energy in US GDP is 
so small that it would require implausible parameter values to generate strong aggregate 
impacts from energy price shocks.   
However, De Miguel et al. (2003, 2005) mentions that the case of the US economy does not 
seem to be applicable to the rest of the oil importing countries whose economies depend 
heavily on energy especially, oil. They show that the ability of the RBC model to reproduce 
the cyclical path of the Spanish economy, especially in those periods when oil price shocks 
were most dramatic. They further mention that oil shocks can account for a significant 
percentage of GDP fluctuations in many of the European countries, but the explanatory 
power is quite smaller for others which can be explained by differences in the strength of 
monetary policies. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) showed that effect of an energy (oil) 
price is stronger in imperfect competition than perfect competition. Finn (2000) further 
reveals that one can increase the economy’s response to an energy price shock even under 
perfect competition when one models energy use as a function of capital utilisation. 
The common features in most of the aforementioned models are that energy (oil) prices 
are taken as exogenous stochastic process and energy (oil) is considered mainly in the 
production function. However, the importance of energy (oil) in the household’s utility 
function remains less focused. As far as we have been concerned, most of those models are 
calibrated for the developed countries perspective and no researcher has calibrated an 
energy augmented RBC model for Bangladesh economy (as an example of a developing 
country) to investigate the interactions between energy and the overall economy. 
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4.3 The Model 
Our research attempts to construct a simple DSGE model by extending Kydland and 
Prescott’s (1982) analysis of an RBC model to understand the business cycle fluctuations in 
Bangladesh caused by energy price shocks in addition to productivity shocks. The main 
motivation of considering an RBC model in this chapter is that it is considered as a simple 
neo-classical growth model which is the building block of almost all modern DSGE models 
and functional to study how real shocks to the economy might cause business cycle 
fluctuations and allow for welfare analysis. Additionally, one of the novelties of the RBC 
approach is that it takes a model that is (a) designed to explain the long run; (b) picked 
parameters designed to explain the long run but then, (c) used that model and those 
parameters to explain the short run (Sims, 2012).  
We have initially considered a stylised model (The Benchmark Model) of the economy in 
which a single economic agent makes every decision: consumption, saving, leisure, work, 
investment and capital accumulation. An alternative interpretation is that a central planner 
is making all of these decisions for each person in the economy in the light of individual 
preferences and is taking the same decision for everyone so that we have a single 
household or, more generally, representative economic agent. It is also called a 
representative agent model when all economic agents are identical and act as both a 
household and a firm. Aggregate energy enters into our production function as other 
physical inputs could not possibly substitute the vital role of energy in production process. 
Output is produced according to Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) production function that 
is subject to productivity and energy price shocks. The final good is consumed, invested 
and used to purchase energy related products for household and production purposes. The 
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typical RBC model is based upon an economy populated by identical infinitely lived 
households and firms, so that economic choices are reflected in the decisions made by a 
single representative agent.  
The present model may be described as follows. Today’s output can either be consumed or 
invested and the existing capital stock can be consumed today or used to produce output 
tomorrow. Today’s investment will add to the capital stock and increase tomorrow’s 
output. The problem to be addressed is how best to allocate output between consumption 
of energy and non-energy goods today and investment (accumulating capital) so that there 
is more output and consumption tomorrow. These choices are made in order to maximise 
the expected value of lifetime utility. 
We can also generalise this model into a decentralised model by introducing a distinction 
between households and firms. It is assumed that all markets are characterised by perfect 
competition. In order to coordinate the separate decisions of households and firms, we also 
need to introduce product, labour, and capital markets. Households take consumption 
decisions, they own firms (and will therefore receive dividend income from firms), and 
they save in the form of financial assets. Households also sell capital to firms at the rental 
rate of capital and sell labour at the real wage rate. Firms act as the agents of households.  
In each period, firms choose capital, labour and aggregate energy following a production 
function to maximise profits. They make output, investment, and employment decisions, 
determine the size of the capital stock, borrow from households to finance investment, pay 
wages to households, and distribute their profits to households in the form of dividends. In 
separating the decisions of households and firms, one can introduce a number of additional 
economic variables. However, Wickens (2008) mentions that the behaviour of the 
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decentralised economy when in general equilibrium is remarkably similar to that of the 
centralised economy. Additionally, the basic RBC model assume perfectly functioning 
competitive markets, so outcomes generated by decentralised decisions by firms and 
households can be replicated as the solution to a social planner problem. 
Energy is explicitly modelled in the household’s utility function where the representative 
household derives utility from the consumption of energy oriented goods, non-energy 
oriented goods and from their leisure. Following Finn (2000), we measure energy oriented 
goods as the sum of electricity, coal, natural gas and petroleum. Non-energy oriented goods 
include all the durable and non-durable goods excluding energy goods. Each household’s 
endowment of time is normalised to 1 so that leisure is equal to (1-l) where l represents 
the number of working hours.  
Household consumes a CES aggregation of energy consumption and non-energy 
consumption, and also derives utility from leisure. Thus for the household, in each period it 
decides on how much energy goods to consume (  ), how much non-energy goods to 
consume (  ) and how much time to devote to labour (  ) in order to maximise its lifetime 
expected utility. 
Max Et (∑         ) 
With a utility function of the following form: 
(1)     log      
 
  (1   )  
 
 
 
  (1   )log (1    ) 
Utility function exhibits the commonly assumed properties like   >0,    <0,  lim    
  and lim    0. That means, additional consumption and leisure increases utility but 
does so at a diminishing rate. 
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Here,  represents the share of consumption in the household’s utility where   (0, 1). θ is 
the share of non-energy consumption in the household’s aggregator where θ   (0, 1). With 
this aggregation function, the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy 
goods is σ   1/1-ρ. When ρ   0 and σ   1, the CES function becomes Cobb Douglas (CD) 
function. It is rational to choose ρ < 0, which implies that the goods are somewhat 
complementary. 
Following Kim and Loungani (1992), the production technology of firm is described by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function with CRS by combining energy as an additional input 
along with capital and labour.2 
(2)        
   
 
  
     
 
Where α and γ is the fraction of aggregate output that goes to the capital input (  ) and 
labour input (  ) respectively, and 1-α- γ is the fraction that goes to the energy input (  ). 
That means all the economic agents rely on energy either for household’s consumption or 
for production of various goods. Additionally, energy price is modelled as an exogenous 
random process in addition to productivity shock. 
Just as Cooley and Prescott (1995), the stochastic productivity shock A is assumed to be:  
       ω        ; where  ut ~N (0, σ2). 
As in a neoclassical growth model, capital stock depreciates at the rate δ and households 
invest a fraction of income in capital stock in each period. So, capital accumulates according 
to law of motion: 
(3)       (1   )         with 0< δ <1 
                                                             
2 One could model technology using CES production function as in Kim and Loungani, 1992. However, in this 
benchmark model, for computational purposes, we have used Cobb Douglas Production function.  
 
 
163 
 
The price of energy used in the economy, p, is exogenously given and follows AR (1) 
process: 
                ; where vt  is normally distributed with standard deviation   and zero 
mean. As energy is consumed both by the consumers and the producers in this model, the 
economy’s resource constraint for period t is given by: 
(4)                (     ) 
So, the objective of the social planner is to maximise the utility of the representative 
households subject to feasibility, i.e. 
Max Et (∑         ) 
s.t. 
               (     ) 
      (1   )       
       ω         
                 
The Lagrangian constrained for the household can be defined as follows: 
(5)    ∑   
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Where     is the Lagrange multiplier and the function is maximised with respect to    ,      , 
  ,    ,     and    .  
The subsequent Euler equations are as follows: 
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The Euler equation interprets that the marginal disutility of reducing consumption in 
current period should be equal to the discounted utility from future consumption. The 
Euler equation in relation to leisure interprets that the disutility from additional working 
hour should be compensated by an increase in utility due to producing extra output. 
Additionally, after eliminating the Lagrange multiplier, the equilibrium condition is 
described by the following system of differenced equations that fully characterises the 
cyclical properties of the model economies. 
(8) 
    
  
 (  .
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(9)       
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(10)              (     )=     
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(11)         
   
 
  
     
 
(12)        ω         
(13)                  
4.4 Calibration 
Before examining the model’s performance to evaluate the empirical data, model 
calibration is required. In this section, we use the term calibration for the process by which 
researchers choose the parameters of their DSGE model from various sources. For example, 
Cooley and Prescott (1995) calibrate their model by choosing parameter values that are 
consistent with long run historical averages and microeconomic evidence. So, calibration 
means choosing “suitable” or “empirically relevant” parameter values. However, there is 
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also a substantial body of more recent work, that employs econometric techniques-such as 
moment and likelihood based methods to estimate DSGE models. Since our focus is on 
numerical solutions, we refer the interested reader to the books by Jong and Dave (2007) 
and Canova (2007) that cover the application of econometric techniques to the estimation 
of DSGE models. 
In fact, calibration has proven to be highly controversial within the field as it involves 
picking the model’s parameters to match long run properties of the data. But calibrated 
models have become an important tool for economic research and policy analysis and 
researchers need to calibrate model because in some cases, there is no available data to 
estimate model’s parameter (Canova, 2007). Dhawan and Jeske (2007) calibrate 
parameters to produce theoretical moments of model aggregates that reproduce as best 
possible the empirical moments obtained from the empirical data.  
However, we have generally adopted three approaches in terms of calibrating parameters 
for our RBC model. Some of the parameters, for which estimation remained an issue due to 
lack of reliable and detailed data, are picked from existing RBC/DSGE literature for 
developing and developed countries (Choudhary and Pasha, 2013). Some of the parameter 
values are chosen by using steady state conditions of the model. Rest of the parameter 
values are directly considered from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2015) and Bangladesh 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2015). Due to data constraints, all parameters 
in our model are calibrated for annual frequency. 
There are 11 parameters in total with 7 structural and 4 shock related parameters in the 
model. Structural parameters can be categorised into utility and production function 
related parameters. It is important to have a good understanding of rationale behind 
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picking different parameter values in order to properly evaluate the fit of the model. Let us 
briefly describe our procedure for selecting parameter values listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Parameters of the Economy 
β, discount factor 0.88 
α, capital share of output  in the production function 0.31 
γ, labour share of output  in the production function 0.65 
δ, depreciation rate 0.025 
 , the share of consumption in the household’s utility 0.41 
θ, the share of non-energy consumption 0.8 
σ, the CES parameter of household’s utility function -0.11 
ω, persistence coefficient of productivity shock 0.95 
 , persistence coefficient of energy shock 0.95 
ζ, standard error of productivity shock 0.01 
 , standard error of energy shock 0.01 
Source: Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2015), Bangladesh Bureau 
of Statistics (BBS, 2015) 
 
First of all, we discuss parameters related to production. Alpha (α), Gama (γ) and 
Depreciation (δ) are the main parameters related to production. Following Rahman and 
Yusuf (2010), we set alpha equals to 0.31 which implies capital’s share of national income 
in Bangladesh is slightly less than a third. This is fairly close to the computed aggregate 
capital share which is 0.36 as calculated by Tan (2012). However, the average of capital 
shares of other developing countries is around 0.45 as reported by Liu (2008). According 
to Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2010), the labour share of 
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output in Bangladesh varies from 0.65 to 0.70. We decided to use a value of 0.65 to make it 
consistent with the Cobb-Douglas production function used in our model. Finn (2000) also 
mentions that the measures of labour’s output share range from 0.64 (Prescott, 1986) to 
0.76 (Lucas, 1990). 
Depreciation rate is usually very low in the developing countries. Thus, depreciation rate, 
delta has been set at 0.025 implying that the overall depreciation rate in Bangladesh is 
2.5% annually. This value is equally realistic from the perspective of the developing 
countries economic condition (IMF, 2001 and Bu Yisheng, 2006). The capital output ratio in 
Bangladesh is borrowed from Rahman and Rahman (2002) who estimated that the trends 
in capital output ratio in Bangladesh over the period of 1980/81 to 2000/01 is equal to 2. 
Now, we discuss parameters related to household utility. Given, α, δ, capital-output ratio 
and considering the value of steady state level of price is P=1 (Mean zero in the log implies 
a mean of utility in the level), the value of discount factor beta,  , is obtained from 
equations 6 and 11 calculated in steady state in the following ways: 
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Our estimated value 0.88 is less compatible with the value of discount factor used in other 
existing literature for developing countries at annual frequency. Ahmad et al. (2012) 
estimate the long run discount factor for a group of developed and developing countries 
and find that the discount factor of most of the developing countries is relatively similar to 
that of developed countries. For example, they calculate the discount factor, β, equals to 
0.94 for Philippines. As a robustness check, we have performed sensitivity analysis along 
three different discount parameters (β 0.88, β 0.96 and β 0.99) and confirm that our 
results are robust to a wide range of possible β values (see table 4.2). It is worth noting 
from table 4.2 that the steady state value of c shows odd pattern with low β values. In 
principle, lower β value should cause a reduction in consumption and vice versa. However, 
in this sensitivity analysis, we have also changed the value of δ which offset the changes 
observed in c for different β values. Thus, lower β value yields a higher value for c in our 
analysis. However, we have also run another sensitivity analysis keeping the value of δ to 
0.025. Our results show that c is now smaller for lower β values.  Due to unavailability of 
the data of working hours, we set l=0.33 with an assumption that people work about one-
third of their time endowment which is a widely accepted value for RBC/DSGE analysis. For 
example, l is set equal to 0.30, consistent with the time-allocation measurements of Ghez 
and Becker (1975) for the US economy. 
Certain standard parameters are calibrated following standard literature. The share of non-
energy oriented consumption, θ, is set at 0.8. In this chapter, the household’s utility 
function follows a general CES form, meaning that it cannot be used to model an elasticity 
of substitution of exactly 1. Here, it is set at 0.9 for the main analyses, and the CES 
parameter of the household’s utility function, ρ, is therefore -0.11(1-(1/0.9)), which is 
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negative and indicates that energy and non-energy consumption are somewhat 
complementary. 
Table 4.2: Sensitivity Analysis for β (Benchmark Model) 
Variables β 0.88 and δ 0.025 β 0.96 and δ 0.12 β 0.99 and δ 0.14 
k 0.712689 0.820228 0.963403 
y 0.370975 0.427755 0.466477 
 a 1 1 1 
c 0.262911 0.242628 0.24319 
l 0.331236 0.382276 0.402381 
p 1 1 1 
i 0.0178172 0.0984273 0.134876 
e 0.0754072 0.0695897 0.069751 
g 0.014839 0.0171102 0.0186591 
 
  reflects the share of energy consumption and non-energy consumption goods in the 
household’s utility function and its value is calculated 0.41 as follows: 
The intra-temporal efficiency condition (the labour-leisure) trade off implies that the 
marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption must equal the marginal 
product of labour. That means, 
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By using equation 8, we can calculate the steady state ratio of energy to consumption which 
yields a value of 0.28. Now, given the value of l, γ, θ and the ratio of  
 
 
 and  
 
 
 , we can find 
the value of  equals to 0.41. 
Owing to the unavailability of data, following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), we set the 
persistence of our two exogenous shocks to 0.95 and standard deviation of the shocks to 
0.01. Using different series, empirical literature get a range of estimates for persistence 
0.85-0.95 and standard deviation 0.0095-0.01. 
Although some DSGE literature calibrates not only the parameter values but also the 
fundamental steady state variables, we do not follow that procedure. The reason is that the 
software Dynare can solve models without setting up the steady state and by guessing 
initial values for the endogenous variables3. In the same fashion, the RBC model can be 
solved recursively by using initial value and given the Steady State (SS) results (Levine and 
Yang, 2012).  
In context with the aforementioned discussions and following the initial steady state values 
used by Sims(2012), together with the normalisation of P and A, table 4.3 reports the initial 
steady values in comparison to the computed steady state values by Dynare. All the Dynare 
codes are given in Appendix 3. 
                                                             
3 Dynare, a preprocessor and a collection of MATLAB routines is used in this chapter to solve for the steady 
states, linearise the necessary conditions around steady states, compute the moments and calculate the 
impulse response paths once the necessary equations are transformed into Dynare codes (Griffoli, 2011).  
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Table 4.3 : Steady State Values of the Variables 
Variables Initial SS value (by guess) Dynare computed SS Values 
K 1.5 0.712689 
Y 0.8 0.370975 
A 1 1 
c 0.6 0.262911 
l 0.4 0.331236 
P 1 1 
i 0.3 0.0178172 
e 0.2 0.0754072 
g 0.01 0.014839 
 
We assume that productivity and energy price shocks follow a mean zero AR (1) process in 
its natural log, with an iid disturbance with some variance σu2  and σv2  . Mean zero in the log 
implies a mean of utility in the level, so, steady state level of productivity is A=1 and P=1. 
4.5 Results 
After calibration, to evaluate the performance of our model, we will compare steady state 
ratios from the models with their empirical counterpart. Furthermore, second order 
moments (such as standard deviation, contemporaneous correlation with output etc.) 
obtained from simulations will also be evaluated from our models and their fit with the 
actual data. 
Our model shows that the relevant capital output ratio is equal to 1.92 which is fairly close 
to the actual data of 2 as explained in the previous section. Another important ratio of our 
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model is the consumption-output ratio. The model does a good job at matching the model 
generated ratio of 0.70 to the actual consumption output ratio of 0.65-0.70 as showed in 
data. However, our model undershoots the value of investment output ratio (in percentage 
form) by a large extent. The model generated result 4.8% is far away from the average long 
run investment output ratio of 20%. 
We would also like to verify the ability of the model to reproduce other empirical 
regularities of the Bangladesh business cycle. In order to do so, we proceed to the 
stochastic simulation of the model with the parameters obtained in the calibration section, 
where the source of fluctuations comes from the productivity and energy price shocks. 
Table 4.4 reports a selection of second moment properties for the HP filtered series 
corresponding to the Bangladesh data and the simulated economy respectively4. In other 
words, we would like to evaluate our model’s performance by comparing the results with 
data. For this purpose, the following table reports some selected historical moments from 
data and their counterparts predicted by our models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 We have used HP filtering data to make it consistent with Dynare generated data as it gives HP filtering data. 
However, considering the fact that HP filtering data might give rise to spurious cycles as criticised in some 
literature, we have also checked with Baxter and King (BK) filtering process but that does not make any 
significant differences. 
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Table 4.4: Actual and Predicted Moments 
 Data1 RBC Model 
Statistics Estimate Model 1 
Productivity and Energy 
Price Shocks 
Model 2 
Productivity 
Shocks 
Model 3 
Energy Price 
Shocks 
Standard Deviation 
Y 0.005488 0.004321 0.004335 0.000172 
I 0.003155 0.002264 0.002270 0.000088 
c 0.007593 0.001629 0.001637 0.000115 
e 0.002546 0.000784 0.000470 0.000624 
Standard Deviation Relative to Output 
I 0.57 0.49 0.52 0.51 
c 1.38 0.38 0.38 0.67 
e 0.46 0.18 0.11 3.62 
Autocorrelation 
Y 0.823 0.4815 0.4845 0.4841 
I 0.824 0.4406 0.4437 0.4437 
c 0.821 0.5777 0.5811 0.5230 
e 0.821 0.4879 0.5811 0.4731 
Correlation with Output (Y) 
I 0.9965 0.9545 0.9545 0.9550 
c 0.9938 0.9457 0.9470 0.9890 
e 0.9967 0.5238 0.9470 0.9986 
1 The statistics are based on log-differenced and HP filtered for the period 1990-2010 to reflect the 
actual growth rates. 
 
Our model performs well to capture the actual volatility of output and investment when we 
consider both the productivity and energy price shocks together as well as when we take 
into account the productivity shock alone. However, considering only energy price shocks, 
we observe a very gloomy picture. A shock to the energy sector or a policy pertaining to 
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that sector would have significant impact on the rest of the economy. However, energy 
price shocks can account for only 3.29% of output volatility whereas productivity shocks 
can account for almost 83.52% of output volatility in our model. Investment also follows 
more or less the same pattern as output. However, the model does a poor job in replicating 
the variation of consumption of energy and non-energy goods. The situation is more severe 
in the consumption of non-energy goods when we just consider energy price shocks. 
Therefore, energy price shocks are a less important source of aggregate fluctuations in 
Bangladesh economy. Our results reveal from the long run data that energy input is well 
substituted by other inputs (capital and labour) in the production function when there is 
any shock in energy price. In fact, the results indicate that there are some mechanisms by 
which macroeconomic variables could be stable in spite of a limited source of energy inputs 
as argued by Bartleet and Goulder (2010). Additionally, our RBC model shows that the 
series are not strongly persistent and robust in the sense of having a large first order 
autocorrelation coefficient and matching the historical data. The highest persistent series is 
capital which is 0.74 whereas the autocorrelation of the remaining series are typically in 
the neighborhood of 0.45 compared to their empirical counterpart of a range around 0.82.5 
The policy and transition function reveals that the exogenous shock’s impacts on 
endogenous variables are in the right direction. Lastly, the model captures the fact that 
most of the series are quite pro-cyclical with output. 
After considering the steady state ratios and second order moments for our model with 
their empirical counterparts, finally we take a brief look at the impulse response functions 
generated in response to the productivity and energy price shocks. 
                                                             
5 The persistent of capital is not reported in the table as we mainly focus on consumption, investment and 
output in this table.  
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4.5.1 Transmission Mechanisms of Energy Price Shocks 
In this section, we describe the dynamic mechanism in which energy price shock is 
propagated. The shock is equal in size to the standard deviation of the normalised price. 
Figure 4.1 shows the response of the different endogenous variables of the model in 
presence to such a shock. When there is an increase in relative energy price (p), both the 
amount of energy consumption (e) and the amount of energy used (g) in the production 
decreases by 8% and 1.5% respectively. Because of the complementarity effects, the 
reduction in the use of energy in production decreases the amount of capital (k) by 1% and 
the amount of labour (l) by 0.5% approximately. The decrease in the productive inputs is 
translated into an output (y) decrease of 2% which would imply a negative association 
between output (y) and energy prices (p). Finally, consumption (c) exhibits a similar 
response to the output (y). 
Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses to an Energy Price Shock 
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4.5.2 Transmission Mechanisms of Productivity Shocks 
Although the focus of this thesis is not on the effects of productivity shocks, a productivity 
shock is still considered in our model as it would be of interest to compare the results of 
productivity shocks with those reported in the literature (Pesaran and Xu, 2011). 
Moreover, Dedola and Neri (2006) argue that in the standard RBC/DSGE model, 
productivity shocks play an important role in accounting for output fluctuations. Our 
results reveal that the productivity shock has more strong impact on the variables than the 
energy price shocks.  
An increase in productivity (a) makes capital more productive in the future. Since future 
productivity is expected to be higher (as omega is close to 1), the social planner responds 
optimally by immediately building up the capital stock (k) by 40%. As a result of a positive 
productivity shock, investment (i) rises by 25% and output (y) by 50%. The IRF of 
consumption (c, e) displays a hump shape as is already documented in the literature. 
Investment (i) reverts back to original pre-shock levels just after a few periods compared 
to other endogenous variables.  
It is worth noting that the behaviour of IRF for the endogenous variables are opposite in 
directions to their response to an exogenous productivity and energy price shock as the 
later shock acts as a negative productivity shock. Finn (2000) also finds that an energy 
price shock can be considered as an adverse productivity shock, since it causes capital 
(which embodies the technology) to produce at below capacity levels. 
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
In the introduction to this chapter we referred to McCallum’s suggestion that RBC theory 
should explicitly model exogenous energy price changes. We made an attempt to 
implement this suggestion in the simplest possible way where energy is included both in 
the utility and production functions. Energy price shock is explicitly introduced in our 
model in addition to the productivity shocks. The model used in this chapter is based on the 
standard DSGE analysis which is a small first step in modelling energy price shocks in a 
RBC framework for Bangladesh economy.  
Here it needs to be mentioned that, both the productivity and energy price shocks in this 
chapter are assumed to be exogenous. Contrary to the literature on endogenous growth, 
the idea that productivity and other shocks could be endogenous has recently been 
introduced to DSGE analysis (Baron and Schmidt, 2013). Acemoglu et al. (2012) introduces 
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a two sector model of endogenous and directed technological changes to study the 
response of different types of technologies to environmental policies. They highlight the 
importance of endogenous shock process and show that when inputs are strong 
substitutes, under free market economy, a disaster will occur sooner with directed 
technological change than without. Popp (2004) also introduces directed innovation in the 
energy sector and presents a calibration exercise suggesting that models that ignore 
directed technological change might overstate the costs of environmental regulation. 
Moreover, early work by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996) and Goulder and 
Schneider (1999) study endogenous innovations in abatement technologies. 
However, since the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986), 
RBC/DSGE models typically assume an exogenous shock process (mostly productivity 
shock). Gali (1999) argues that the exogenous variations in productivity is often justified 
by the ability of RBC/DSGE models to generate unconditional moments for a number of 
macroeconomic variables that display patterns similar to their empirical counterparts and 
to capture the economic fluctuations. These fluctuations have been interpreted by the DSGE 
economists as the equilibrium response to exogenous variations in productivity and energy 
price shocks, in an environment with perfect competition and intertemporal optimising 
agents, and in which the role of nominal frictions and monetary policy are secondary. 
The main conclusion from our chapter is that energy price shocks are not a major factor for 
business cycle fluctuation in Bangladesh economy. This might be the case of the 
substitution possibility of energy with labour in the production function because of the 
cheap labour availability in the country. Kemfert and Welsch (2000) argue that labour is 
better substitutes for energy than capital. In practice, there may be a number of reasonable 
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explanations for energy-labour substitutability. One possibility is that with higher energy 
prices more engineers are engaged, which search for and implement energy saving 
technologies (Koschel, 2000). Besides, different measures of underground economy of 
Bangladesh has pointed out that the informal economy had the size of 35% of the total 
official GDP which is a large value and sufficient enough to distort any macroeconomic 
outcomes (Schneider, 2004). However the impulse response function shows that energy 
price shocks have a negative impact on macroeconomic variables in the Bangladesh 
economy. 
Therefore, it would require implausible parameter values to generate strong aggregate 
impacts from energy price shocks. Additionally, variance decomposition analysis shows 
that energy price shocks contribute a very small percentage to variations in overall output, 
similar to results obtained in Tan (2012), Dhawan and Jeske (2007) and Kim and 
Loungani(1992).  It is also not surprising that a choice of functional forms and 
parameterisation may affect model dynamics and also changes the model’s amplification 
and propagation mechanism (Kormilitsina, 2011). In fact, our results offer some support to 
the views of macroeconomists who downplay the impact of energy (energy price) shocks 
on the business cycle fluctuations. Overall, the RBC model developed in this chapter does a 
reasonable job to capture the qualitative changes of selected endogenous variable like 
consumption, output, investment etc. when the economy faces the exogenous shocks.  
For further research, it would be interesting to generalise the model into decentralised 
economy by introducing a distinction between households and firms. We would also like to 
consider the involvement of government sector to perform the different fiscal policies like 
taxation, subsidies etc. Finally, we would also intend to extend the model by explicitly 
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modelling the energy market for a mixed economy where government still controls energy 
prices so that energy policy reforms and their impact on the overall economy can be 
accurately analysed. We would also like to include the industrial and service sector in the 
model as these sectors represent major share of energy (electricity) consumption in the 
developing countries like Bangladesh. 
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Appendix 4A 
Technical Appendix 
Utility Function:    log      
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Multiplying equation 1 with ct , we have: 
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Similarly, we can write 
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From equation 7, we get, 
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Multiplying Equation 6 with Ct, we obtain 
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Appendix 4B 
Dynare Codes for Model 1 
 
var p a  e g k l y i c; 
varexo u v; 
 
parameters alpha  gama  beta delta phi theta rho omega sigmae psi tau ; 
 
alpha = 0.31; 
gama = 0.65; 
beta = 0.88; 
delta = 0.025; 
phi = 0.41; 
theta = 0.8; 
rho =-0.11; 
omega = 0.95; 
sigmae = 0.01; 
psi = 0.95; 
tau = 0.01; 
 
model; 
 
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*(a*alpha*k^(alpha-1)*l(+1)^gama*g(+1)^(1-alpha-gama)+1-
delta)* (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* p^(rho/(rho-1)))/(1+(theta/(1-
theta))^(1/(rho-1))*p(+1)^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
c = (1-l)* (phi/(1-phi))*(a*k(-1)^alpha*gama*l^(gama-1)*g^(1-alpha-
gama))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))*p^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
e = c*(p*theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1)); 
 
p=a*k(-1)^alpha*l^gama*(1-alpha-gama)*g^-(alpha+gama); 
 
y = a*k(-1)^(alpha)*l^gama*g^(1-alpha-gama); 
 
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1); 
 
y = c + i+p*g+p*e; 
 
a = a (-1) ^omega*exp (u); 
 
p = p (-1) ^psi*exp (v); 
 
end; 
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initval; 
 
k = 1.5; 
y = 0.8; 
a=1; 
c = 0.6; 
l = 0.4; 
p=1; 
i = 0.3; 
e=0.33; 
g=0.01; 
 
end; 
 
shocks; 
var u = sigmae^2; 
var v = tau^2; 
end; 
 
steady; 
check; 
 
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=1, irf=100, relative_irf, periods=200); 
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Dynare Codes for Model 2 
 
var p a  e g k l y i c; 
varexo u v; 
 
parameters alpha  gama  beta delta phi theta rho omega sigmae psi tau ; 
 
alpha = 0.31; 
gama = 0.65; 
beta = 0.88; 
delta = 0.025; 
phi = 0.41; 
theta = 0.8; 
rho =-0.11; 
omega = 0.95; 
sigmae = 0.01; 
psi = 0.95; 
tau = 0; 
 
model; 
 
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*(a*alpha*k^(alpha-1)*l(+1)^gama*g(+1)^(1-alpha-gama)+1-
delta)* (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* p^(rho/(rho-1)))/(1+(theta/(1-
theta))^(1/(rho-1))*p(+1)^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
c = (1-l)* (phi/(1-phi))*(a*k(-1)^alpha*gama*l^(gama-1)*g^(1-alpha-
gama))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))*p^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
e = c*(p*theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1)); 
 
p=a*k(-1)^alpha*l^gama*(1-alpha-gama)*g^-(alpha+gama); 
 
y = a*k(-1)^(alpha)*l^gama*g^(1-alpha-gama); 
 
k = i + (1-delta)*k(-1); 
 
y = c + i+p*g+p*e; 
 
a = a (-1) ^omega*exp (u); 
 
p = p (-1) ^psi*exp (v); 
 
end; 
 
 
initval; 
187 
 
k = 1.5; 
y = 0.8; 
a=1; 
c = 0.6; 
l = 0.4; 
p=1; 
i = 0.3; 
e=0.33; 
g=0.01; 
 
end; 
 
shocks; 
var u = sigmae^2; 
var v = tau^2; 
end; 
 
steady; 
check; 
 
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=1, irf=100, relative_irf, periods=200); 
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Dynare Codes for Model 3 
 
var p a  e g k l y i c; 
varexo u v; 
 
parameters alpha  gama  beta delta phi theta rho omega sigmae psi tau ; 
 
alpha = 0.31; 
gama = 0.65; 
beta = 0.88; 
delta = 0.025; 
phi = 0.41; 
theta = 0.8; 
rho =-0.11; 
omega = 0.95; 
sigmae = 0; 
psi = 0.95; 
tau = 0.01; 
 
model; 
 
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*(a*alpha*k^(alpha-1)*l(+1)^gama*g(+1)^(1-alpha-gama)+1-
delta)* (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* p^(rho/(rho-1)))/(1+(theta/(1-
theta))^(1/(rho-1))*p(+1)^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
c = (1-l)* (phi/(1-phi))*(a*k(-1)^alpha*gama*l^(gama-1)*g^(1-alpha-
gama))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))*p^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
e = c*(p*theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
 
p=a*k(-1)^alpha*l^gama*(1-alpha-gama)*g^-(alpha+gama); 
 
y = a*k (-1) ^ (alpha)*l^gama*g^ (1-alpha-gama); 
 
k = i + (1-delta)*k (-1); 
 
y = c + i+p*g+p*e; 
 
a = a (-1) ^omega*exp (u); 
 
p = p (-1) ^psi*exp (v); 
 
end; 
 
 
initval; 
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k = 1.5; 
y = 0.8; 
a=1; 
c = 0.6; 
l = 0.4; 
p=1; 
i = 0.3; 
e=0.33; 
g=0.01; 
 
end; 
 
shocks; 
var u = sigmae^2; 
var v = tau^2; 
end; 
 
steady; 
check; 
 
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=1, irf=100, relative_irf, periods=200); 
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Chapter 5 
A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Analysis of 
Oil Price Shocks: The Case of Bangladesh 
5.1 Introduction 
Energy is a vital instrument for economy as it is used in some form almost in every activity. 
Consequently, analysing interactions of the energy sector and the overall economy has 
been the subject of much interest among the researchers. The conventional wisdom is that 
even though energy does not make up a major fraction of GDP, it plays a crucial role in 
economy since without energy nothing would be produced. The role of energy is important 
too on the consumer’s side since many types of household products, especially durables are 
energy dependent (Tan, 2012). Thus, energy is a strategic determinant of economic 
progress. For example, the importance of oil in any economy, developed or 
underdeveloped, also became clear after the first oil shocks in 1973 which would have 
significant impact on the rest of the economy. Those oil shocks questioned the belief of 
having oil abundances across the world which would not affect the economy. In fact, given 
the pace of economic development in many countries and the increasing world population, 
the concern about oil keeps growing. Thus, since the beginning of the 80s, numerous 
researchers have tried to identify the channels through which such shocks impact 
economies. 
Bangladesh has shown significant economic performances in recent past maintaining an 
average of 6.01% GDP growth rate since 2010. This strong performance mainly comes from 
rapid urbanisation, increased industrialisation, and development of microcredit, higher 
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public investment and strong exports. Although the country has made remarkable progress 
achieving macroeconomic stability, Bangladesh continue to face challenges such as 
infrastructure deficits and energy (electricity) shortages. It is widely believed that the 
country could achieve even higher growth if it could provide better infrastructure including 
electricity. Energy is vital for economic growth in Bangladesh and also considered a key 
ingredient in improving the socioeconomic conditions. In Bangladesh, electricity is the 
most widely used form of energy and is the major source of power for most of the country’s 
economic activities. However, since independence from Pakistan in 1971; the country has 
struggled to generate adequate electricity to meet demand. Generating and supplying 
electricity for the mass people remains and unresolved challenge for Bangladesh and 
government has implemented significant efforts to increase the electricity generation 
capacities. This is in line with government’s commitment to provide reliable electricity for 
all citizens by 2021. As a result, electricity generation has increased some success over the 
last few years. The installed electricity generation capacity has increased to 11294 MW in 
2015 compared to 5719 MW in 2009.  
The recent improvement in power generation comes largely from the privately owned QR 
power plants. The government has allowed the QR power plants to generate electricity for 
short term contracts in order to mitigate the acute power crisis of 2009-2010. Most of 
these QR power plants were powered by imported oil. The other responsible authorities 
for generating electricity in Bangladesh are BPDB along with its subsidiaries and privately 
owned IPP companies. Both BPDB and IPP use natural gas to generate electricity. A 
competitive market environment has been created in Bangladesh for electricity generation 
and recently, nearly 54% of total electricity production originates from public sector power 
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plants, whereas the private sector provides the rest of 46% as of January 2015 (BPDB, 
2015). BERC is the responsible authority to fix the electricity prices for all the economic 
agents in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh is partly dependent on imported oil to generate electricity and international oil 
price has some effects on the QR power plants and rest of the economy through income and 
substitution effect. Any change in world oil market price is primarily faced by the 
government as the electricity generating firms enjoy a subsidised oil price. The domestic oil 
price follows the general trend of world prices after a while; however, prices in the 
domestic market are much less volatile than those in the world market. The government 
absorbs significant portions of the price volatility by providing subsidies on petroleum 
products. As expected, rising trends in international prices result in a higher import cost for 
petroleum products in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the quantity of imports has continued to 
rise because of the QR firms’ higher demand to generate electricity.  
Moreover, private-public partnership is considered as a key instrument for the 
infrastructural development. The last 20 years have seen the rise to power of Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a means of crowding in investment and expertise from the 
private sector to the delivery of public goods and services. PPPs are a mechanism that the 
governments regularly turn to in order to fulfil their responsibilities on public 
infrastructure and services (Colverson and Perera, 2012). According to World Bank 
(2007), private sector investment in infrastructure in developing economies grew steadily 
over the past decade. Energy, telecommunication and transport have mainly attracted 
larger share of investment. For example, Kenya’s government has agreed to work with 
private investors to increase overall domestic electricity generating capacity by 5,000 MW 
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by 2016. It is envisaged that this capacity will be made up of natural gas-fired plants (1,050 
MW), geothermal (1,646 MW), wind (630 MW) and coal (1,920 MW). 
In order to obtain quantitative results the usual practice is to calibrate models to a 
particular economy and we simulate the model for Bangladesh economy to analyse the 
impulse response functions to productivity and oil price shocks pertinent in Bangladesh 
economy. In particular, our model examines the macroeconomic impacts of international 
oil price shocks and higher productivity shocks in Bangladesh economy in a DSGE 
framework. Our results show that higher oil price have a negative effect on the economy 
through reducing all types of consumption and GDP. IRF from productivity shocks in 
different model variables shows that positive productivity shocks make the factors of 
production more productive and accordingly output, household welfare increases due to 
income effect. 
In summary, the contribution of this chapter is the development of an energy augmented 
DSGE model for the oil importing developing countries that can be used to conduct 
different electricity policy related analyses. The main difference of this model and other 
energy models is the presence of government price setting mechanism, three different 
electricity generating sectors in addition to two production sectors which have not been 
experimented in energy literature till now. Our model further allows for fuel diversification 
which is highly realistic for a developing country’s perspective and somehow overlooked in 
the literature. The inclusion of three electricity generating firms coupled with fuel mix 
options will help policymakers to distinguish between the role of private and public sector 
in the electricity generating firms.  The model offer richness focusing on the fact that all the 
economic agents in the economy rely on energy either for household energy consumption 
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or for firm’s production. The model follows in the footsteps of computable general 
equilibrium modelling. It also serves as the groundwork for further research. Because the 
model enable deeper research into energy related matters such as electricity policy 
experiments and the role the macroeconomy of a developing country like Bangladesh. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 focuses on the literature review. The DSGE 
model is presented in section 5.3; calibration and estimation of the parameters are 
discussed in section 5.4. Section 5.5 describes the solution algorithms. The results are 
analysed in the section 5.6. Finally, in the last section, we present the conclusions. 
5.2 Literature Review 
The effects of energy (oil) price changes on economic activity have been widely studied in 
economic literature. Although the term “energy” covers a wide range of products such as 
electricity, oil, natural gas, coal, biomass and other renewable sources, literature mainly 
focuses either on aggregate energy or oil (which is known as one of the most widely forms 
of energy) in investigating the energy macroeconomic relationship. Evidence from 
literature suggests that there exist multiple channels of transmission through which oil 
price shocks can affect the macroeconomy (Kilian, 2009). Sudden and prolonged oil price 
increases are generally accompanied by economic contractions and high inflation, as 
documented in Hamilton (1983, 1996, and 2003). Higher oil price generates income and 
substitution effect if oil is included in the consumption bundle of a typical household. This 
implies that an increase in oil prices slows economic development primarily through its 
effects on consumer spending. It is expected that higher oil prices reduce discretionary 
income, since consumers are left with less money to spend after having to pay for escalated 
energy bills. Higher oil prices are primarily driven by higher prices for imported energy 
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goods. Changing oil prices may create uncertainty about the future path of the price of oil, 
causing consumers to postpone irreversible purchases of consumer durables (Bernanke, 
2004 and 2006). Even when purchase decisions are reversible, consumption may fall in 
response to oil price shocks, as consumers increase their precautionary savings. This 
response may arise if consumers smooth their consumption because they perceive a 
greater likelihood of future unemployment and hence future income losses. 
An oil price shock also affects a firm’s decision regarding substitution of oil as an input to 
production with capital and labour hiring. The marginal costs of production faced by firms 
and their pricing decisions are affected because of higher oil price. In addition, substitution 
of oil with capital in the production process might influence decisions on capital 
accumulation, which may eventually lead to long run consequences. Shifts in expenditure 
patterns driven by the uncertainty effect and operating cost effect amount to allocative 
disturbances that are likely to cause sectoral shifts throughout the economy. Thus, an 
increase of oil price in world market tends to reduce the level of economic activity and if 
the economy is dependent on imported oil to generate electricity, it has several adverse 
consequences. 
In the short run, higher oil price reduce country’s economic output and increase inflation 
rate. In the medium and long run, industrial production is affected, consumption decreases 
due to the fall of purchasing power and investment also falls, affecting the cyclical position 
of the economy and household’s welfare. Under these circumstances, negative world oil 
price shocks become one of the most important external uncertain sources of shocks which 
have intensive impact on the macroeconomy of a small developing oil importing country 
like Bangladesh. 
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There are some literature that focuses on the dynamic relationship between aggregate 
energy (oil), aggregate energy (oil) price and economic development. Since 1990, DGE 
models have been used to study the influence of fuel price on capital accumulation, 
economic development and welfare. Examples of this literature include Jorgenson (1998), 
He et al. (2010), Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010), Tang et al. (2010), Backus and Crucini 
(2000), Brown and Yücel (2002), Medina and Soto (2005), Leduc and Sill (2004), Barsky 
and Kilian (2002), Blanchard and Gali (2007), Hamilton and Herrera (2004) and many 
others. Calibrated versions of these types of models have been used to assess the 
quantitative effects of energy (oil) price shocks on economic growth in different developed 
and developing countries. Alves and Pereira (2006) survey the literature on dynamic 
computational models with a focus on energy studies and reports their special features to 
identify and analyse the main areas of investigation in general equilibrium models applied 
to the environment and energy and to systematise and classify the existing bibliography in 
2000s in a survey (between 1996 and 2006), since there are many surveys on previous 
literature already listed in Bhattacharya (1996). 
Recent advances in the energy-macroeconomy literature show that the effects of higher oil 
price depend critically on the source of disturbance and the underlying cause of that 
disturbance. Following Cashin et al. (2014), one can identify two groups of explanatory 
factors as the main drivers of the evolution of oil prices: i) fast growing demand due to high 
global economic growth (Demand Shock); and ii) declining supply or expected production 
shortfalls in the future (Supply Shock). Each oil demand and oil supply shock has its own 
unique set of effects (Kilian, 2009). In the case of pure supply shocks, macroeconomic 
variables are affected by the oil supply disruption through higher oil prices. Hamilton 
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(1983) argues that exogenous oil price shocks were responsible for the post-war US 
recessions. However, if an increase in oil price is triggered by a demand shock, there might 
be additional transmission channels that affect the macroeconomic variables. For example, 
Unalmis et al. (2008) argue that the faster economic growth coming from higher 
productivity growth in developing countries ultimately raised oil demand of these 
countries, fostering the prices of oil in the world market which in fact, increased the import 
bills of the countries. Jang and Okano (2013) discuss how productivity shock in one 
country can affect another country (the shock transmission between two countries). They 
argue that in RBC/DSGE models, a foreign productivity can cause marginal cost to fall and 
natural level of output to increase in foreign country. This would reduce the price level in 
the short run and monetary authority would lower the nominal interest rate. Because of 
the cost channel, through which firms borrow money from financial intermediaries, a fall in 
the foreign interest rate increases domestic demand. It is also common to assume that the 
relationship between economic activity and oil prices is asymmetric (Herrera et al., 2015). 
Hamilton (1983) first finds that most of US recessions were preceded by the increasing oil 
prices and accordingly he recommends that oil price shocks is the primary cause for 
recession. Kim and Loungani (1992) show that energy price shocks could explain about 
20% of the output fluctuations in US economy. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) argues 
that resultant large fall in output could be explained by an endogenous rise in the price 
mark up. Jian et al. (2010) reveal that the impact of oil price shocks in China’s economy is 
one of the main sources of economic fluctuations and stronger than other economic shocks 
like monetary policy shocks, government spending shocks, tax rate shocks, consumer 
demand shocks and productivity shocks. De Miguel et al. (2003, 2005) show that the effect 
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of oil price shocks can account for a significant percentage of GDP in most of the European 
countries where oil is included as an imported productive input. They further reveal that 
the increase in the relative price of oil has a negative effect on welfare, particularly in 
Southern European countries, which are historically associated with a lax monetary policy 
during oil crisis. Cuche-Curti et al. (2009) present a DSGE model of the Swiss economy. 
Negative of oil price shocks of 1% are found to create an immediate rise in quarterly 
inflation of 0.012%.  
Finn (2000) shows that an increase in the price of energy works much like an adverse 
technology shock to induce contraction in economic activity. But the power and persistency 
of the force exerted by energy price shocks derives from the novel relationship between 
energy usage and capital services-energy is essential to obtaining the service flow from 
capital, and capital services play an important role in the economy. Pereira and Pereira 
(2011) find that increasing fuel prices lead to an increase in firm’s operating costs in 
Portuguese economy which reduces energy consumption, employment and private 
investment and their results further indicate that higher fuel prices have a negative effect 
on long term growth. Tan (2012) observes significant effects of a supply-side shock to 
energy prices on the overall US economy confirming the important role of energy on both 
household side and producer side. However, Dhawan and Jeske (2007), Hooker (1996) and 
Schmidt and Zimmermann (2005) conclude that the modern economy, represented by the 
period after 1985, is very resilient to energy (oil) price increase. That means the actual hike 
in energy price has smaller impacts on inflation and economic activity than the oil price 
shocks of the 1970s. 
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Unalmis et al. (2008) argue that, among other reasons, one reason for the decline in the 
responsiveness of the economies of the oil price hikes could be offsetting positive effects of 
productivity increases on the negative effects of the rising oil price. Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) propose explanations for the observed change in the effects of the oil price shocks. 
First, they argue that labour markets are more flexible now than in the past, and hence 
some of the negative effects of the oil price shocks can be observed in the labour market. 
Second, more credible and stronger anti-inflationary stance of monetary policies may have 
kept inflation relatively stable. 
One of the advantages of DSGE model is that one could isolate impacts of different 
exogenous shocks and answer some policy questions and accordingly these models have 
become more popular tool for macroeconomic analysis in recent years to evaluate 
economic fluctuations. Henceforth, this chapter presents a new energy augmented DSGE 
model, a complete structural analytical framework, to shed light on impacts of oil price 
shocks and sectoral productivity shocks on the developing economies like Bangladesh 
economy. A vast of energy literature shows that developing countries are facing more 
economic crisis than the industrialised countries because of higher oil price (Abeysinghe, 
2011 and Anciaes et al., 2012). In many developing and emerging market economies, 
governments control electricity, oil and fuel prices and intervene to limit the degree to 
which oil-price increases are passed through to domestic fuel prices. Many of these policies 
sought to avoid the full pass-through of oil-price increases to domestic consumers by 
controlling retail fuel prices, providing explicit fuel subsidies, lowering fuel taxes, and 
reducing the profit margins of state-owned oil companies. According to World Bank (2007) 
and Baig et al. (2007), roughly half of the developing and emerging market economies 
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surveyed have not fully passed through the increase in international fuel prices between 
the ends of 2003 and mid-2006. In contrast, in most industrialised countries, governments 
have abstained from intervening in the oil market, opting to maintain a full-pass-through 
policy. 
Sectoral productivity has been included in our model since fluctuations in aggregate 
economic activity result from a wide variety of disaggregated phenomena such as process 
innovation, product innovation, and fundamental productivity changes etc. (Caliendo et al., 
2014). Productivity changes are actually specific to a sector and a location. The 
heterogeneity of these potential productivity changes at the electricity firms implies that 
the particular sectoral and regional composition of an economy is essential in determining 
their aggregate impact. 
Our DSGE model incorporates households, production sector, government sector and an 
energy sector. The model assumes a mixed economy where government controls the 
electricity and fuel prices. In addition, we distinguish between industrial and service 
production sector; household consumption in between electricity consumption, non-
electricity consumption and service consumption. The model also considers public and 
private electricity generating firms in energy sector depending on their usage of fuel to 
produce electricity as we allow for fuel diversification in electricity generating firms.  
These features are mainly significant for developing countries perspective as electricity 
supply in these countries comes from both private and public electricity generating 
companies and most of the developing countries now opt for fuel-mix options to reduce 
dependency on mono fuel to generate electricity. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
DSGE literature has considered the feature of electricity and fuel price controlling 
201 
 
mechanism (even in the case of USA). Furthermore, oil imports are explicitly modelled in 
the economy wide resource constraint and the domestic electricity production functions. 
5.3 The Model 
The model considered in this chapter is a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
model of a small economy populated by a large number of infinite lived households and 
firms that need to import oil to generate electricity. Electricity is also generated by locally 
produced natural gas. There are four sectors in the economy- the production sector, the 
household sector, the energy sector and the government sector. All four sectors are 
interconnected through market equilibrium conditions. However, government needs to 
intervene in the market and fix the electricity and fuel price faced by the electricity 
generating firms and electricity consumers to clear the electricity market. Economic agents 
are price takers in all markets and are assumed to have perfect foresight. The economy is 
open and small in the sense that its behaviour does not affect the rest of the world. This 
implies that international price, the foreign interest rate and foreign demand are not 
affected by domestic agents’ decisions. Considering the oil price as exogenous is the most 
sensible hypothesis in this context. Shocks in the price of oil and productivity across the 
sectors are main sources of fluctuation in the economy. The basic structure of the model in 
terms of technology is similar in its set up to Kim and Loungani (1992). Energy (electricity) 
enters in the model as consumption good for households and as a productive input for 
firms in the form of oil and natural gas. 
Various well known functional forms, such as the Cobb Douglas (CD) function, the Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function, are used frequently in economic modelling. 
Traditionally, these functional forms have been used to model the production side or 
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consumption side of macroeconomic models. All of the estimated parameters in the CES 
and CD models have a behavioural interpretation. This means that if the model is not 
internally consistent, then these parameters are not describing a meaningful economic 
relationship. CD is widely used in economic literature as it gives simple closed form 
solutions to many economic problems. However, some economists believe that CES may be 
a more appropriate choice since empirical and theoretical work has often questioned the 
validity of the CD in a model (Miller, 2008). Additionally, the flexibility of the CES function 
to choose the value of the elasticity of substitution over the unitary has contributed to its 
popularity in DSGE modelling. We also assume a CES function to describe our utility and 
production function in this chapter. 
We now turn to the discussion of the details of the model which are presented in Table 5.1. 
5.3.1 The Production Sector 
There are three production sectors in the model: a service sector and an industrial sector 
where final goods are being produced using electricity as an additional productive input 
which is produced in the third sector, the energy sector. Final output in each sector is 
produced with a CES technology, exhibiting Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) in the 
inputs-labour, capital and electricity in the industry and service sector. Since the firms face 
fixed fuel prices controlled by the government, DRS is more rational in this framework. 
Some DSGE studies also assume DRS in their production function (Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1996 and Jaaskela and Nimral, 2011). 
The representative firm uses labour (l), capital (k) and electricity (j) to produce the final 
good of the respective sector. The production function of the firms combines capital, 
electricity and labour. It is defined as: F (G (Kt, jt) lt) where G (.) is a CES function and F (.) a 
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Cobb Douglas production function, Kt the capital input, jt the energy input, electricity, lt the 
labour input. It is noteworthy that we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and do not 
allow the multiplier effect transiting through variable capital utilisation as explained by 
Finn (2000). 
The production technology of the firms is described by a CES function with DRS: 
F (l , , k , , j , )= A 
 . l , 
   (1    )k , 
      j , 
    
 
(  )
    
Where  A 
   is the stochastic productivity shock, i= respective sectors (Y or X), j= electricity 
used by the respective sectors (g or s). αi is the labour share, ψi represents the importance 
of electricity with respect to capital,     implies the degree of homogeneity in the CES 
production function and 
 
    
 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and electricity 
which determines the degree of substitutability of capital and electricity. In order to hold 
the DRS assumption, following two conditions need to be met6: 
1. ϑ<1-α 
2. 
 
 
<1 
Following Kim and Loungani (1992), we specify the production function in industry and 
service sector as follows: 
Y=  
   , 
   (1    )  , 
        
     
  
       [Industrial Sector] 
X=  , 
   (1    )  , 
        
     
  
        [Service Sector] 
All the firms except for the government operate under perfect competition and maximises 
profits as following: 
                                                             
6 See Technical Appendix 5B for the derivation. 
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Where w is the wage rate, r is the capital interest rate and v is the market price of 
electricity. Wage and capital interest rate are assumed to be equalised across all the 
sectors. The price of the final good is normalised to 1, thus   can be considered as the 
relative electricity price. 
From firm’s maximisation problem, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions which 
state that the marginal productivity of labour, capital and electricity are equal to the wage, 
the interest rate and the electricity price respectively. 
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On the other hand, Government faces the following cost minimisation function: 
            
 .   ,   
 .   
   
   (1    )  , 
   ,      , 
   ,  
 
  
  ,   
5.3.2 The Energy Sector 
Energy enters in the model as electricity consumption for households and as a productive 
input for firms in the form of oil and natural gas. Additionally, three different electricity 
generating firms have been considered in the model for the case of Bangladesh. This 
represents 89% of the total electricity generated in Bangladesh. The three electricity 
generating companies are i) Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) which 
represents government sector and mainly use natural gas to produce electricity, ii) 
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Independent Power Producer (IPP) which represents private sector and uses natural gas in 
electricity production and finally, iii) Quick Rentals (QR) which represents private sector 
and uses oil to produce electricity. 
Similar to the production function used by Kim and Loungani (1992), we employ a CES 
production function for different electricity generating firms in this model. Each electricity 
generating firms transform the three factor inputs- labour, capital and energy (gas, m or oil, 
h) into electricity according to the following specification: 
BPDB: G=  
   
   (1    )  , 
   ,      , 
   ,  
 
  
  ,   
IPP: I=  
   , 
   (1    )  , 
   ,      , 
   ,  
 
  
  ,   
QR: H=   
   , 
   (1    )  , 
        
    
 
  
    
The parameter    (i=m, h) depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
energy (gas or oil). Labour’s distributive share is given by the parameter   (i=G, I, H) and 
  (i=G, I, H) is the share of oil/gas in production aggregation where   (0, 1). A certain 
amount of electricity ( ) is lost while transmitting by the distribution companies to the end 
consumers. So, equilibrium in electricity market: 
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5.3.3 The Household 
In the model economy there are an infinite number of identical households and the 
representative household maximises the expected value of future utility. The household 
gets utility from consuming three types of consumption goods: electricity oriented goods 
(e), non-electricity oriented goods (c) and service goods(x) and all three types of goods are 
imperfect substitutes in the consumption basket. Electricity oriented goods, e, can be 
considered as the consumption of electricity which enhances other consumption in a non-
perfect substitutable manner. Another way of thinking behind the rationality of introducing 
electricity oriented goods is to assume implicitly the presence of durable goods as 
household requires electricity to operate many durable goods. The household uses the 
following aggregator function to combine these three types of consumption into 
consumption aggregator: 
c 
  X 
 (θc 
 
 (1  θ)e 
 )
   
  
Where    (0, 1) and  ≤ 1. With this aggregation function, the elasticity of substitution 
between c and e is 
 
    
 and   is the share of non-electricity oriented consumption in the 
household aggregator. The elasticity of substitution between services and the composite of 
electricity and non-electricity consumption is 1 in our model. The parameter    represents 
the share of service consumption in the consumption aggregator. This is similar to the 
aggregator function used by Dhawan and Jeske (2007), who include consumption of 
nondurables and services excluding energy, the flow of services from the stock of durables 
goods and energy goods. So, we write the period t utility function as follows: 
U(c 
 , l )   log c 
  (1   )log (1  l ) 
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Where    (0, 1). This log-utility specification is the same as in Kim and Loungani (1992). 
Notice that household’s endowment of time is normalised to 1 so that leisure is equal to 1-l.  
The momentary utility function is assumed to have the usual properties of monotonicity 
and quasi concavity. The household has four primary sources of income: 1) the income 
derived from selling capital stock, 2) labour income, 3) The lump sum transfer payment ъ, 
it receives from the government and 4) dividends. Capital and labour income are taxed at 
the rates           respectively. The price of service goods and electricity are n and qe 
respectively. 
So, the household resource constraint is defined as follows: 
         .     
 .    (1   
 )    ъ  (1   
 )    (1   )  +   
Where   is the depreciate rate. 
Thus, the representative household maximises expected utility subject to the following 
resource constraint: 
Max E ∑β  log [X 
 (θc 
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 ]  (1   )log (1  l )
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Where    is the discount factor. 
The Lagrangian constrained for the household can be defined as follows: 
L  ∑ β  ( log [X 
 (θc 
 
 (1  θ)e 
 )
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Where  t is the Lagrange multiplier and the function is maximised with respect to ct, kt+1, et,  
lt,  Xt and  t.  
The subsequent Euler equations are as follows7: 
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The Euler equation interprets that the marginal disutility of reducing consumption in 
current period should be equal to the discounted utility from future consumption. The 
Euler equation in relation to leisure interprets that the disutility from additional working 
hour should be compensated by an increase in utility due to producing extra output. 
5.3.4 The Government 
The government earns revenue from taxing labour income, capital income, selling natural 
gas to other electricity generating firms and selling electricity to the national grid. On the 
expenditure sides, the government purchases labour, capital and gas for its own electricity 
production and makes a lump sum transfer to households. Capital taxes in the model are 
raised on asset returns of household and not on capital stock in the production sector as 
mentioned by Glomm and Jung (2013). Government provides subsidy to the electricity 
producer to fill the gap between the world oil price (  ) and domestic oil price(  ) faced 
by the producer. Additionally, there is also an extraction cost of gas (  ) which is the actual 
cost of true gas price to control the use of free resource (Natural Gas). The government, like 
any other entity in the economy, must satisfy a resource constraint. 
                                                             
7 The derivation is included in Technical Appendix 5B. 
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Following the internationally accepted definition of subsidy, one can identify two major 
types of subsidies that are provided by government: subsidies designed to reduce the cost 
of consuming energy (electricity) and fuel subsidies aimed at supporting domestic 
production (Ellis, 2000). The IEA defines subsidy that lower the price consumers pay for oil 
products, natural gas, coal or electricity generated with one of those fuels. In this chapter, 
we assume that government has to provide subsidy as it purchases electricity from the 
electricity producers at a high price and distributes it at a low price among the consumers. 
So, the negative of total subsidy is: 
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Finally, combining household resource constraint, government resource constraint and the 
subsidy equation, the economy wide resource constraint can also be derived. (For more 
details of the derivation, please see Technical Appendix 5B) 
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5.3.5 Model Shocks 
The basic model is driven by five different shocks: an oil price shock and productivity 
shocks affects the industrial and three electricity generating firms. 
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Just as Cooley and Prescott (1995), the stochastic productivity shock Ai across sectors is 
assumed to be:  
ln A 
       lnA   
  η 
 
  (Productivity Shocks in Industrial Sector) 
ln A 
       lnA   
  η 
   (Productivity Shocks in Government Sector) 
ln A 
       lnA   
  η 
       (Productivity Shocks in IPP) 
ln A 
       lnA   
  η 
   (Productivity Shocks in QR) 
In all the cases, the residuals are normally distributed with standard deviation of one and 
zero mean. 
The world price of oil imported in the economy, ve, is exogenously given and follows AR (1) 
process: 
ln v 
     ωlnv   
     ; where    is normally distributed with standard deviation one 
and zero mean. 
5.4 Dataset, Parameter Specification and Calibration 
In order to obtain a numerical solution, model calibration is necessary. Hence, the model is 
calibrated following Kydland and Prescott (1982). The model is implemented numerically 
using detailed data and parameter sets. The dataset is reported in Table 5.2 and reflects the 
variable values for 2011-2012. The data needed to calibrate the model for Bangladesh 
economy comes from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Bangladesh Economics 
Review (BER), World Development Indicator (WDI), Bangladesh Labour Force Survey 
(BLFS), Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation (BPC), Summit Power Limited, Dutch Bangla Power and Associates Limited 
and Bangladesh Tax Handbook. 
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Parameter values are reported in Table 5.3 and are specified in different ways. Wherever 
possible, parameter values are taken from the available data sources. This is the case, for 
example, consumer prices of electricity, producer prices of electricity, world and domestic 
market price of oil, domestic price of natural gas, extraction cost of natural gas, fraction of 
system loss in electricity and the different effective tax rates. 
In some cases, the parameters are chosen freely from the literature and thus are not 
implied by the steady state restrictions. This is the case, for example, the discount rate, the 
elasticity of substitution and the persistent coefficient of the different shocks. Although 
free, these parameters have to be carefully chosen since their values could not affect the 
values of the remaining calibration parameters. Accordingly, they were chosen either using 
central values or using available data as guidance. The remaining parameters are obtained 
by calibration in a way that the real picture of the economy is extrapolated as the steady 
state trajectory. 
There are 58 parameters in total with 32 structural parameters, 15 shock related 
parameters and 11 policy related parameters in our model. Structural parameters can be 
categorised into utility and production function related parameters. It is important to have 
a good understanding of the rationale behind picking different parameter values in order to 
properly evaluate the fit of the model. Let us briefly describe our procedure for selecting 
parameter values used in the chapter. 
First of all, we discuss parameters related to production. Alpha (α), Psi (ψ), nu (ν) and 
depreciation (δ) are the main parameters related to production (See Table 5.3). Since the 
model has two different sectors namely industry and service sector and three different 
electricity generating firms, we need to calculate different alpha for each sector. The labour 
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share is defined as the share of value added which is paid to workers (Schneider, 2011). 
Following Roberts and Fagernas (2004), we set the labour distributive share of industrial 
sector, αY equals to 0.2 using the following first order condition: w  α .
 
  , 
. The labour 
distributive share in the service sector, αX-can be calculated using the first order conditions; 
considering share of labour in service sector from data and calculating the ratios of  
  
 
 and 
   
  
 as follows: 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 .α . 
 
  
 
 
Given  
  
 
  
 = 0.719460; 
  
  
 = 1.658839 and  
  
 
 = 0.722841, we can estimate αX equals to 
0.313505. 
Given the value of total labour cost (wli) and total revenue in the IPP and QR, the labour 
distributive share of different electricity sector can be calculated as follows: 
α  
   , 
   
 =0.036183 
α  
   , 
   
 =0.004125 
Here it is worth noting that, in chapter 4, we have considered a highly aggregated economy 
where labour share was considered 0.65 as observed in Bangladesh Household Labour 
Force Survey, 2015. However, in this chapter, we have focused on a multi sector economy 
and calibrated labour shares are significantly different from what we observed in previous 
chapter. Sonja and Roberts (2004) show that labour costs per employee in industry in 
Bangladesh are remarkably low. Moreover, energy sector in Bangladesh is less labour 
intensive as observed in Ahmed et al. (2009). Since the labour share calibration in this 
chapter is based on the sectoral employment data, these are dramatically different from 
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chapter 4. Guerriero (2012) estimate the labour share of income around the world within a 
range of 0.035 and 0.9. 
We estimate   ,   . ,  , ,   and    equals to 0.1 from Thompson and Taylor (1995). Here, 
  = (1-1/η) where η is the elasticity of substitution between capital and electricity in the 
production function. Additionally, we also assume that    ,    .  ,   ,  ,     and    equals 
to 0.2 to fulfill DRS.     implies the degree of homogeneity in the CES production function. 
Thus if     <1, we have DRS. 
Calculation of ψ involves two different approaches for production sectors and the energy 
(electricity) sectors. The main variance of the approaches is due to differences in data in 
the calculation process. For example, the share of electricity used in industrial production, 
 Y, can be calculated by employing the first order conditions and DRS assumptions. 
Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) in industrial production implies: Y > rk +wl + qg.g. 
This can be rewritten as  
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Now, given the value of     ,  ,
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,   ,  
  and    , we can calculate the value of   Y  
equals to 0.073398. In the similar fashion we can also find X=0.079017. 
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Then, let us move on to the calculation of share electricity used in energy (electricity) 
sector which have three different electricity generating firms. Here, we require the value of 
total revenue, total labour cost and total cost of sales to estimate  I, H and  G.  Using the 
first order condition and holding DRS assumptions, we obtain: 
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Given the value of  
    
   . 
 , 
  . 
  . 
 , v , r,  α , and ν
 , ,   ,   we can calculate  I equals to 
0.309381. Similarly we can also find H=0.596484.  
Finally, given the value of different ratios and using the following two first order 
conditions, we can estimate G equals to 0.302053 and    equals to 0.042063. 
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Depreciation rate is usually very low in the developing countries. Thus, depreciation rate, δ 
has been set at 0.025 implying that the overall depreciation rate in Bangladesh is 2.5% 
annually. This value is equally realistic from the perspective of the developing countries. 
Prescott (1986) and Kydland and Prescott (1991) also measure the value of δ to be 0.025.  
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Now, we discuss parameters related to household utility. Given the value of qe, ρ, and the 
ratio of  
 
 
  calculated from data, we can obtain θ (equals to 0.911090), the share of non-
electricity consumption in household aggregator using the following Euler equation: 
e 
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 (q 
 .
θ
1  θ
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Given the ratio 
  
 
, qe, ρ and θ, the share of service aggregator γ (equals to 0.811011), can 
be calculated using the following Euler equation: 
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  reflects the share of electricity consumption and non-electricity consumption goods in 
the household’s utility function and its value is calculated 0.607675 as follows: 
The intra-temporal efficiency condition (the labour-leisure) trade off implies that the 
marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption must equal the marginal 
product of labour. That means, 
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Certain standard parameters are calibrated following standard literature. To begin with, 
since the length of a period in the model is taken to be one year, β, the discount factor, is set 
to 0.96 which is quite standard in DSGE literature (Heer and Mausser, 2009). We repeat the 
sensitivity analysis along three different discount parameters (β 0.88, β 0.96 and 
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β 0.99) and confirm that our results are robust to a wide range of possible β values (See 
Table 5.4). This implies a real interest rate of 7.6%. The capital and labour income tax rates 
  and    are set as 0.15 and 0.10 as mentioned in Bangladesh Tax Handbook 2012. Next, 
the household consumer price of electricity, qe, the industry consumer price of electricity, 
qg and the service consumer price of electricity, qs are taken as 4.93 Taka/Kwh, 6.95 
Taka/Kwh and 9.00 Taka/Kwh respectively from Bangladesh Power Development Board 
(BPDB) for the year 2012. The selling price of electricity by QR (PH), and IPP (PI) are set as 
7.79 Taka/Kwh and 3.20 Taka/Kwh respectively, which is taken from Dutch Bangla Power 
and Associates and Summit Power Limited Company. However, the selling price of 
electricity by PDB (PG) is calibrated using the country data which is equal to the value of 
2.307534. 
Finally, the world market price of oil, ve and domestic market price of oil, vh are calculated 
as 8.19 Taka/Kwh and 5.72 Taka/Kwh respectively from Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation (BPC) which is also consistent with the data obtained from Dutch Bangla 
Power and Associates. The market price of natural gas (vm) is considered to be as 0.7755 
Taka/Kwh, taken from Summit Power Limited Company. The extraction cost of gas,     is 
set to be equal to the world gas price which is 1.1 Taka/Kwh. 
Due to unavailability of the data of working hours, we set l=0.33 with an assumption that 
people work about one-third of their time endowment which is a widely accepted value for 
RBC/DSGE analysis. For example, l is set equal to 0.30, consistent with the time-allocation 
measurements of Ghez and Becker (1975) for the US economy. In this chapter, the 
household’s utility function follows a general CES form, meaning that it cannot be used to 
model an elasticity of substitution of exactly 1. Following Tan (2012) here, it is set at 0.9 for 
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the main analyses, and the CES parameter of the household’s utility function, ρ, is therefore 
-0.11(1-(1/0.90)), which is negative and indicates that electricity and non-electricity 
consumption are somewhat complementary. 
Owing to the unavailability of data, following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), we set the 
persistence of our exogenous shocks to 0.95 and standard deviation of the shocks to 0.01. 
Using different series, empirical literature get a range of estimates for persistence 0.85-
0.95 and standard deviation 0.0095-0.01. We assume that productivity and oil shocks 
follows a mean zero AR (1) process in its natural log, with an i.i.d disturbance which is 
standard in DSGE literature (Tan, 2012). 
5.5 Solution Algorithm 
Solving DSGE models remain a wide area of research (Flotho, 2009). Both theoretical and 
computational issues are explored when setting up a DSGE model and applying it for 
macroeconomic analysis for analysing various questions in macroeconomics. In general, 
solving DSGE models follow the same solution procedure no matter what kind of model is 
analysed. After having identified the model's assumptions, the first-order equilibrium 
conditions have to be derived. The idea is that together with the structural equations, the 
non-linear system of optimality conditions and resource constraints are converted to a 
linear system of equations via a linear approximation of all equations in the neighbourhood 
of the non-stochastic steady state. Then a solution to the linear system is derived, which is 
an approximation to the solution of the underlying problem in the near of the stationary 
point. Finally, in order to analyse the performance of the model, impulse response 
functions or second moments are computed. The core of solving DSGE models consists of 
finding the solution of these linear systems of equations. 
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We use the stochastic perturbation method (log linearisation around the deterministic 
steady state) put forward by Collard and Julliard (2001) in order to approximate the 
dynamics of our model economy. In a nutshell, the main idea of perturbation methods is to 
replace the original difficult problem with a simpler one which is much easier to handle 
and solve. Then the solution of the simpler model is used to approximate the solution of the 
problem of interest. To be more precise, in practice this method refers to finding Taylor 
expansion of the policy function describing the dynamics of the variables of the model 
around the deterministic steady state. Judd (1998) refers to solution methods including the 
calculation of smooth Taylor series approximation to the solution of the equations as 
"perturbation methods". 
From the Euler equations and the other relevant model equations in Table 5.1 and the first 
order conditions in Table 5.5, we derive twenty eight equations guiding the dynamic 
behaviour of twenty eight endogenous variables plus five equations for the shocks. Since 
DSGE literature calibrates not only the parameter values but also the fundamental steady 
state variables (which Dynare consider as initial values), we follow the same procedure. 
The calculated steady state values are listed in Table 5.6 along with the Dynare generated 
results. However, Dynare can solve models without setting up the steady state and by 
guessing initial values for the endogenous variables. In the same fashion, the RBC/DSGE 
model can be solved recursively by using initial value and given the Steady State (SS) 
results (Levine and Yang, 2012). In order to solve the models to generate a first order 
approximation for the policy function (See Adjemian et al., 2011 and Collard and Julliard, 
2011 for the methodological details) and to conduct stochastic simulations, we run the 
program Dynare version 4.4.3-a pre-processor and a collection of Matlab routines. These 
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routines linearise the system around its deterministic steady state and perform a second 
order Taylor approximation as argued by Schimitt and Uribe (2004). The Dynare codes are 
given in Table 5.7. 
5.6 Results  
In order to evaluate the performance of our model, i) we will compare steady state ratios 
from the models with their empirical counterpart and ii) analyse the impulse response 
function of different shocks. 
Our model shows that most of the relevant variable ratios in steady states are fairly close to 
the actual data (Table 5.8). The model does a good job at matching the model generated 
ratios to the actual variable ratios in the industrial sector, service sector, IPP sector and 
government sector as showed in data. However, our model undershoots the ratio values in 
the QR sector by a small extent. 
After considering the steady state ratios for our model with their empirical counterparts, 
finally we take a brief look at the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) generated in response 
to the productivity and oil price shocks. It is worth noticing that, IRF shows the expected 
future path of the endogenous variables conditional on a shock in period 1 of one standard 
deviation. 
The model introduces five exogenous shocks, namely, oil price shock, productivity shocks 
in industry, BPDB, IPP and QR power plants. In this section, we analyse the impacts of the 
five shocks on the model variables through the impulse response functions. The impulse 
responses show deviations of key model variables from their steady state upon the positive 
exogenous shocks of one standard deviation. All the vertical axes are multiplied by 100, 
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indicating the percentage deviation of the endogenous variables from their steady state 
values (Jian et al., 2010). 
5.6.1 Transmission Mechanisms of Oil Price Shocks 
In this section, we describe the dynamic mechanism in which oil price shock is propagated. 
Changes in oil prices have a direct impact on the price level of the economy, they affect 
intra/intertemporal consumption decisions, and also influence the cost structure of firms 
and through this channel have a second round effect on domestic prices. The shock is equal 
in size to the standard deviation of the actual price. Figure 5.1 plots the impulse responses 
to an oil price shock. A rise in world oil price (v_e) implies higher import price which 
makes the country worse off with respect to Terms of Trade (TOT). So, higher oil price 
makes consumption more expensive and thus reduces consumption (c), electricity 
consumption (e) and service consumption (x) through income effect. This is equivalent to a 
reduction of the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in production. Changing oil prices may 
create uncertainty about the future path of the price of oil; causing consumers to postpone 
irreversible purchases of consumer durables (Bernanke, 2004 and 2006). Even when 
purchase decisions are reversible, consumption may fall in response to oil price shocks, as 
consumers increase their precautionary savings. Since taxes and other prices are fixed, 
higher world oil price makes the government worse off and reduces government transfer 
(g_t). Lower government transfer (g_t) increases labour supply (l) through income effect 
which in turn lowers the household wages (w). Industrial production (y) increases because 
oil imports are now more expensive and industrial sector needs to produce more 
exportable goods to keep the trade balance unchanged. In fact, lower household wage and 
capital interest rate allow industrial sector to employ more labour and capital which in 
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turn increases the industrial production. Trade balance is also unchanged as we assume 
Ricardian equivalence which works through lump sum transfer in our model. The basic 
idea behind Ricardian equivalence is that no matter how a government chooses to increase 
spending, the outcome would be the same and demand would remain unchanged. For every 
level of oil import, the country needs to produce more goods for export. Higher oil price 
also acts as a negative technological shock which causes aggregate capital (k) to reduce 
initially to prevent household consumption to fall by a large extent. Lower wages coupled 
with fixed domestic prices allow the private electricity generating firms to produce at a 
cheaper cost. As a result, more resources are devoted towards IPP (e_i) and QR (e_h) 
sectors through factor markets which expands both IPP (e_i) and QR (e_h) electricity 
production. Since QR power plants are facing domestic oil price (v_h) which is fixed and 
controlled by government, QR sector is not affected by the negative consequences of higher 
oil price. The cost of oil becomes high and the other prices are not adjusted. Thereby, 
government intervention is required and accordingly government subsidy increases (g_s). 
Additionally, private sectors tend to expand with wrong prices and the government ends 
up paying for the differences. Since the industrial sector expands, higher currency inflows 
make the other sectors, especially the service sector, less competitive and the relative price 
between industry and service sector also declines (n). Apparently, this can be referred to 
the “Dutch Disease” in the economy as the service sector becomes less competitive.8 
Finally, government electricity supply (e_g) needs to be reduced to equate total supply and 
                                                             
8 Dutch disease is the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign 
currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves. The currency inflows lead to currency appreciation, 
making the country's other products less price competitive on the export market. 
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demand of electricity since electricity prices are fixed. Higher oil price in the world market 
also reduces GDP. 
Figure 5.1: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock 
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5.6.2 Transmission Mechanisms of Productivity Shocks 
Here, we describe the dynamic mechanism in which productivity shock is propagated in 
different sector. Figure 5.2 displays the impulse response to a positive productivity shock in 
industrial sector (y). Positive productivity shock makes the factors of production more 
productive and accordingly labour wages increase (w). Higher wages also increase the 
labour supply (l) in the industrial sector. This is the substitution effect of the positive 
productivity shock in industrial sector towards the economy. Additionally, consumers 
would have gained positive welfare because of higher productivity and higher production 
and non-electricity consumption (c) and electricity consumption (e) increases due to 
income effect. Since substitution effect dominates over income effect, overall labour supply 
(l_y) increases in the industrial sector. Industrial output (y) increases as the sector enjoys 
productive efficiency. However, positive productivity shock makes industrial capital and 
labour more productive and accordingly wages (w) and capital interest rate (r) increase. 
Since the private electricity generating firms are now facing higher factor prices, labour 
and capital decreases in private electricity firms and electricity production in IPP (e_i) and 
QR (e_h) firms also decreases. Higher wage (w) and capital (k) also implies higher tax 
revenue for the government which increases government transfer (g_t). Industry now uses 
more electricity (g) as the sector expands and government intervenes in the electricity 
market to supply more electricity. Additionally, service sector uses more electricity (s) as 
electricity becomes relatively cheaper. However, overall service production (X) reduces as 
resources are being diverted to industrial sector and the sector faces higher wage and 
capital interest rate. Household also needs to cut off their leisure consumption and 
increases labour supply (l) to compensate the contraction of the service sector.   
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Figure 5.2: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in Industry 
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Figure 5.3 presents the impulse response of a positive productivity shock in government 
electricity generating firm, BPDB. Higher productivity in BPDB implies that government 
becomes more efficient regardless of the prices and fewer resources are now needed. As a 
result, electricity generation (e_g) has increased in government sector and government 
transfer (g_t) also increases. Additionally, these free resources are diverted to private 
sectors and using these resources, IPP (e_i) and QR (e_h) expand their electricity supply. 
Higher government transfer also increases household leisure consumption and decreases 
labour supply (l) which causes labour wage to rise (w). The economy has experienced 
positive welfare gain because of higher productivity and household electricity consumption 
(e) and non-electricity consumption (c) increases. Positive productivity shock in BPDB 
causes a very small increase in consumption. Furthermore, domestic resources are now 
more productive and as a result, the volume of import and export also decreases. This can 
also be referred to the “Dutch Disease” as deindustrialisation is taken place in the economy. 
However, these changes are completely outweighed by the rest of the variables in the 
economy wide resource constraint, mainly the dominancy of the extraction cost. This is 
purely a quantitative issue where the household sector faces small changes and the gas 
sector has bigger effects on the economy. In fact, extraction cost creates few odd results as 
observed out of the positive productivity shock in BPDB. 
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Figure 5.3: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in PDB 
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Figure 5.4 shows the impulse response of a positive productivity shock in IPP electricity 
generating firms. Higher productivity makes household better off as their consumption 
increases (c, e and x). Household further increases their leisure consumption and reduce 
labour supply (l) for which overall wage (w) increases. IPP electricity supply (e_i) 
increases because of productivity efficiency achieved in this sector through positive 
productivity shock. In general, if both wage (w) and capital interest rate (r) increases, then 
relative factor prices are higher considering other prices being fixed. This is in turn should 
decrease the production of any sector. However, in our model, the results show that wage 
(w) increases and capital interest rate (r) decreases. So, the overall effect of the production 
side depends on the factor intensity in the production process. Since QR power plants are 
capital intensive, it could now produce more electricity as capital is increasing (for the 
same logic explained in previous shock). This result is sensitive with the type of production 
function and the degree of substitutability among the factors of production. Government is 
forced to reduce its electricity supply to hold equilibrium condition as both IPP and QR 
increases electricity production. Oil import is increasing and government also needs to 
increase its subsidy (g_s). Since government reduces electricity supply, it is also cutting 
back its transfer (g_t) to household from its budget. 
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Figure 5.4: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in IPP
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Figure 5.5 describes the impulse response to a positive productivity shock in QR electricity 
generating firms. Impulse response function shows production inefficiency as a result of 
higher productivity because of the prevalence of the distorted prices in the economy. Any 
change in QR firms without price changes make the sector more expensive. Inefficient 
allocation of resources will have negative impact on household welfare and household 
consumption (c) decreases. Households reduce their leisure consumption and accordingly 
wage (w) decreases. Oil imports have increased to meet the higher demand coming from 
the QR firms which causes industrial production (y) to rise and government subsidy (g_s) 
also increases. Lower wage (w) and capital interest rate (r) makes labour and capital 
cheaper which expands the IPP (e_i) electricity production. Since both IPP and QR (e_h) 
production increases, government needs to cut back its electricity supply (e_g). 
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Figure 5.5: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in QR 
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5.7 Conclusions 
The measure of economic performances in the developing countries like Bangladesh is 
synonymous with the level of electricity used in the economy as it is required in some form 
almost in every activity. Ferguson (2000) analysed the correlations between electricity use 
and economic development in over 100 countries and found strong correlation between 
these concerned variables throughout the globe. Since, generating and supplying electricity 
remains an unsolved challenge for Bangladesh persistently, the government has allowed 
the private generating firms to produce electricity and some of the private firms rely on 
imported oil. Oil price shocks are often identified as a source of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in the developing countries and Bangladesh economy is also vulnerable to the 
world oil price as the country needs to import oil to generate electricity. Historically, oil 
price increases appear to cause substantial and persistent recessions in economic activity 
(Finn, 2000). 
Despite the wide literature on DSGE models, there is no model for Bangladesh economy to 
ask the question of how the oil price shocks and other disturbances related to oil industry 
would affect macroeconomic variables and what impacts do they have on a small, oil-
importing developing country like Bangladesh. In order to answer these questions, this 
chapter constructs an energy augmented DSGE Model for the Bangladesh economy. 
Therefore, this chapter would fill this gap, which ultimately can positively influence the 
effectiveness of policy management in Bangladesh and other countries with similar 
economic structures. 
Our model includes household consumption of electricity along with non-electricity 
oriented consumption and service consumption in the utility function in addition to 
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electricity use at the firm level in industry and service sector. Our model further includes 
price setting mechanism, three electricity generating firms where electricity is produced 
both publicly and privately with multi fuel generating capacity. These firms combine 
capital, labour and energy (gas or oil) in a CES production functions to generate electricity. 
As far as we have been concerned this is the first study that considers government price 
setting mechanism in energy sector in the model economy. One of the main assumptions of 
this model is that all the economic agents rely on electricity either for household electricity 
consumption or for production of various goods. Any electricity production is allowed to 
freely respond to demands. 
The model is solved and quantitatively simulated, so that the dynamic impacts of various 
shocks can be computed. Our simulation results highlight several important dimensions to 
the relationship between oil prices and economic performances in Bangladesh. First, oil 
price shocks have a negative welfare effect on the economy through reducing electricity 
consumption, non-electricity consumption and service consumption and reducing 
economic activities. Second, relative factor prices play a substantial role in shaping the 
energy (electricity) sector as more resources are devoted towards IPP sector through 
factor market which expands IPP electricity production. Several authors [Davis (1987), 
Loungani (1986) and Mork (1989)] have emphasised the “re-allocative” effects of energy 
(oil) price shocks. In a multi-sector economy with specialised inputs, oil price shocks can 
require costly reallocations of capital and labour across sectors, and this may be an 
important channel through which oil price can affect the economy. Third, higher oil price 
also acts as a negative technological shock which causes aggregate capital to reduce 
initially to prevent household consumption to fall by a large extent. Finally, industrial 
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production increases because oil imports are now more expensive and industrial sector 
needs to produce more exportable goods to keep the trade balance unchanged. 
Given our results, it is advisable that policymakers carefully assess the overall welfare 
effect of oil price shocks and when appropriate take measures to redistribute welfare from 
industrial sector to the household sector. This is left for future research. Additionally, it 
would be interesting to see how electricity tariff liberalisation could affect the household 
welfare, electricity sector and overall economy in Bangladesh. Another avenue of future 
research would be to see the welfare effect of subsidies removal and privatisation policy in 
Bangladesh.  
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Appendix 5A 
Table 5.1: The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: The Model Structure 
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Table 5.2: The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: The Basic Data Set 
c, Consumption by Household As percentage of GDP 0.806 
qe.e, electricity consumption by household Sectoral Share of GDP (%) 1.45 
Y, Industry, value added  (% of GDP) 29.81% 
GDP Value 9,147,840,000,000 
Taka 
Y Value 2,726,971,104,000 
Taka 
Vh.h Value 30,803,363,910 
Taka 
Vh.h/ GDP Ratio 0.003367 
c/Y Ratio 0.337915 
nX, Service, value added  (% of GDP) 49.45% 
nX/Y Ratio 1.658839 
c/nX Ratio 0.203706 
e/GDP Ratio 0.002941 
e/Y Ratio 0.009866 
e/c Ratio 0.029197 
e, Domestic Electricity Consumption  Million Kilowatt 
Hours(Mkwh) 
11627 
g, Industrial  Electricity Consumption Million Kilowatt 
Hours(Mkwh) 
6719 
s, Service  Electricity Consumption Mkwh 5612 
lY, Labour Share of Industry In Percentage 27.668593% 
lX, Labour Share of Service In Percentage 71.946050% 
le, Labour Share of Electricity In Percentage 0.385356% 
qe, consumer price of electricity faced by 
residential household 
Taka/Kwh 4.93 
qS, consumer price of electricity faced by 
commercial/service sector 
Taka/Kwh 9.00 
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qZ, consumer price of electricity faced by 
industry 
Taka/Kwh 6.95 
pH, selling price of electricity produced by Quick 
Rentals 
Taka/Kwh 7.79 
PI, selling price of electricity produced by IPP Taka/Kwh 3.20 
Vm, market price of gas Taka/Kwh 0.7755 
Vh, market price of Oil (Domestic) Taka/Kwh 5.72 
Ve, market price of gas(World) Taka/Kwh 8.19 
δ ,extraction Cost of Gas Taka/Kwh 1.1 
Sources: BBS (2012), BER (2012), BPDB (2012), BPC (2015), Annual Report of Summit Power 
Limited 2012, Annual Report of Dutch Bangla Power and Associates Limited 2012 and Bangladesh 
Tax Handbook (2012). 
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Table 5.3: The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: The Structural Parameters 
1. β, discount factor 0.96(Borrowed) 
2. , the share of electricity and non-electricity consumption in 
the household’s utility 
0.607623 (Calculated) 
3. θ, the share of non-electricity consumption in household 
aggregator 
0.091109 (Calculated) 
4. σ, the CES parameter of household’s utility function ρ 0.11(Borrowed) 
5. γ, the share of service in the household consumption 
aggregator 
0.811011 (Calculated) 
6. αH, labour distributive share in QR 0.004125 (Calculated) 
7. αI, labour distributive share in IPP 0.036183 (Calculated) 
8. αG, labour distributive share in BPDB 0.058408(Calculated) 
9. αY, labour distributive share in industrial sector 0.2(Calculated) 
10. αX, labour distributive share in service/commercial sector 0.313410 (Calculated) 
11. H, share of capital used in electricity production by QR 0.596484(Calculated) 
12. I, share of gas used in electricity production by IPP 0.309381 (Calculated) 
13. G, share of gas used in electricity production by BPDB 0.302053(Calculated) 
14. Y, share of electricity  used in industrial production 0.073398(Calculated) 
15. X, share of electricity used in commercial production 0.079017(Calculated) 
16. ϑH, share of non-labour input used by QR 0.895874(Calculated) 
17. ϑI, share of non-labour input used by IPP 0.863816(Calculated) 
18. ϑG, share of non-labour input by BPDB 0.857936(Calculated) 
244 
 
19. ϑY, share of non-labour input used in industrial production 0.7(Calculated) 
20. ϑX, share of non-labour input used in service production  0.586494(Calculated) 
21.   , Domestic Price of Oil 5.72 (Data) 
22.   , Extraction Cost of Gas 1.1(Data) 
23.  , fraction of system loss 0.10(Data) 
24. ω, persistence coefficient of oil price shock 0.95(Borrowed) 
25.  Y, persistent coefficient of productivity  in industry 0.95(Borrowed) 
26.  G, persistent coefficient of productivity shock in BPDB 0.95(Borrowed) 
27.  I, persistent coefficient of productivity shock in IPP 0.95(Borrowed) 
28.  H, persistent coefficient of productivity shock in QR 0.95(Borrowed) 
29. ζ, standard error of oil price shock 0.01(Borrowed) 
30. εY, standard error of productivity shock in industry 0.01(Borrowed) 
31. εG, standard error of productivity shock in BPDB 0.01(Borrowed) 
32. εI, standard error of productivity shock in IPP 0.01(Borrowed) 
33. εH, standard error of productivity shock in QR 0.01(Borrowed) 
34. δ, depreciation rate 0.025(Borrowed) 
35.  K, tax on capital 0.15(Data) 
36.  l, tax on labour 0.10(Data) 
37. qe, consumer price of electricity faced by household 4.93(Data) 
38. qS, consumer price of electricity faced by service sector 9.00(Data) 
39. qg, consumer price of electricity faced by industry 6.95(Data) 
40. pH, selling price of electricity produced by Quick Rentals 7.79(Data) 
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41. PI, selling price of electricity produced by IPP 3.20(Data) 
42. Vm, market price of gas 0.7755(Data) 
43. PG, selling price of electricity produced by BPDB 2.307534(Calculated) 
44.   , , depends on the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and gas used by BPDB in generating electricity 
0.1 (Calculated) 
45.   , , depends on the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and gas used by IPP in generating electricity 
0.1 (Calculated) 
46.   , depends on elasticity of substitution between capital 
and electricity used in industry 
0.1 (Calculated) 
 47.   , depends on elasticity of substitution between capital 
and electricity used by commercial (service) production 
0.1 (Calculated) 
   48.   , depends on elasticity of substitution between capital 
and oil used by Quick Rentals in generating electricity 
0.1 (Calculated) 
49.   , , degree of homogeneity in CES function in PDB 0.2(Assumed) 
50.   , , degree of homogeneity in CES function in IPP 0.2(Assumed) 
51.   , degree of homogeneity in CES function in Industry 0.2(Assumed) 
52.   , degree of homogeneity in CES function in Service 0.2(Assumed) 
53.   , degree of homogeneity in CES function in QR 0.2(Assumed) 
54.  , coefficient in the oil Price shock equation  0.105145(Calculated) 
55.  , coefficient in the  productivity shock equation in IPP -0.184991(Calculated) 
56.  , coefficient in the productivity shock equation in 
Industry 
-0.011859(Calculated) 
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57.  , coefficient in the  productivity shock equation in PDB -0.132152(Calculated) 
58.  , coefficient in the productivity shock equation in QR -0.192480(Calculated) 
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Table 5.4: Sensitivity Analysis for β (Main Model) 
Endogenous Variables β 0.88 β 0.96 β 0.88 
1. c, non-electricity oriented goods by household 0.1990 0.2548 0.2736 
2. e, electricity consumption by household 0.005810 0.007439 0.007988 
3. X, Total production in Service Sector 0.589014 0.789328 0.940821 
4. Y, Total production in industry 0.253645 0.412446 0.412446 
5. G, electricity produced by government sector 
(BPDB) 
0.010249 0.013914 0.015847 
6. I, electricity produced by private sector(IPP) 0.001662 0.002580 0.003543 
7. H, electricity produced by private sector(QR) 0.000944 0.001197 0.001411 
8. K, total capital(K=KH+KI+KG+KY+KX) 1.77588 5.7749 12.8867 
9. KH, capital used in Quick Rental firms 0.005897 0.017145 0.036895 
10. KI, capital used by IPP 0.007820 0.028532 0.072787 
11. KG, capital used by BPDB (Government sector) 0.041787 0.114601 0.196097 
12. KX, capital used in commercial/service sector 1.30958 4.01408 8.11753 
13. l, total labour(l=lH+lI+lG+lY+lX) 0.293132 0.300926 0.314385 
14. lH, labour used in Quick Rental firms 0.000024 0.000024 0.000026 
15.lI, labour used by IPP 0.000157 0.000188 0.000236 
16. lG, labour used by BPDB (Government sector) 0.000973 0.000877 0.000737 
17. lY, labour used in industrial sector 0.041489 0.052110 0.070429 
18. lX, labour used in service sector 0.250487 0.247725 0.242955 
19. g, electricity consumption by industry 0.001552 0.002708 0.004215 
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20. s, electricity consumption by service sector 0.004207 0.005774 0.006517 
21. h, oil used by Quick Rental in electricity 
production 
0.000380 0.000495 0.000594 
22. mI, gas used by IPP in electricity production 0.001048 0.001712 0.002438 
23. mG, gas used by BPDB in electricity production 0.005429 0.006666 0.006366 
24. n, price of service products 1.65858 1.58467 1.42764 
25. w, price of labour 1.22271 1.58297 1.73318 
26. r, price of capital 0.18984 0.0784314 0.0412953 
27. b, subsidy -0.040977 -0.057779 -0.068437 
28. ъ, government transfer 0.134663 0.185974 0.220678 
29. Ve,  World market price of oil 8.19 8.19 8.19 
30. AtY, productivity shock in industrial sector 0.788846 0.788846 0.788846 
31. AtG, productivity shock in government 
electricity generating firms(BPDB) 
0.0711435 0.071143 0.0711435 
32. AtI, productivity shock in private electricity 
generating firms(IPP) 
0.024727 0.024727 0.024727 
33. AtH, productivity shock in private electricity 
generating firms(Quick Rentals) 
0.021287 0.021287 0.021287 
34. GDP 1.66142 2.10122 2.39332 
 
 
 
 
249 
 
Table 5.5: Euler Equations and First Order Conditions 
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Table 5.6: The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: The Steady State(SS) Values 
Endogenous Variables Initial  SS Values Dynare SS Values 
1. c, non-electricity oriented goods by household 0.3379 0.2548 
2. e, electricity consumption by household 0.009866 0.007439 
3. X, Total production in service Sector 1.010007 0.789328 
4. Y, Total production in industry 1 0.412446 
5. G, electricity produced by government sector(BPDB) 0.017323 0.013914 
6. I, electricity produced by private sector(IPP) 0.003364 0.002580 
7. H, electricity produced by private sector(QR) 0.001901 0.001197 
8. K, Total capital(K=KH+KI+KG+KY+KX) 9.3645 5.7749 
9. KH, capital used in Quick Rental firms 0.028670 0.017145 
10. KI, capital used by IPP 0.038420 0.028532 
11. KG, capital used by BPDB(Government sector) 0.184667 0.114601 
12. KX, capital used in commercial/service sector 5.28755 4.01408 
13. l, total labour(l=lH+lI+lG+lY+lX) 0.33 0.300926 
14. lH, labour used in Quick Rental firms 0.000027 0.000024 
15.lI, labour used by IPP 0.000177 0.000188 
16. lG, labour used by BPDB(Government sector) 0.001065 0.000877 
17. lY, labour used in industrial sector 0.091306 0.052110 
18. lX, labour used in commercial/service sector 0.237421 0.247725 
19. g, electricity consumption by industry 0.005701 0.002708 
20. s, electricity consumption by service sector 0.004762 0.005774 
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21. h, oil used by Quick Rental in electricity production 0.001792 0.000495 
22. mI, gas used by IPP in electricity production 0.005608 0.001712 
23. mG, gas used by BPDB in electricity production 0.011182 0.006666 
24. n, price of service products 0.49170 1.58467 
25. w, price of labour 2.19042 1.58297 
26. r, price of capital 0.078431 0.0784314 
27. b, subsidy -0.065575 -0.057779 
28. ъ, government transfer 0.275536 0.185974 
29. Ve,  World market price of oil 8.19 8.19 
30. AtY, productivity shock in industrial sector 1.267680 0.788846 
31. AtG, productivity shock in government electricity 
generating firms(BPDB) 
0.071143 0.071143 
32. AtI, productivity shock in private electricity 
generating firms(IPP) 
0.024727 0.024727 
33. AtH, productivity shock in private electricity 
generating firms(Quick Rentals) 
0.021287 0.021287 
34. GDP 2.10121 2.10122 
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Table 5.7: The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: Dynare Code 
 
% Dynare Code for Dynamic Modelling of Electricity Reforms in Bangladesh 
% Sakib Amin, Dr. Laura Marsiliani and Dr. Thomas Renstrom, Durham University Business School 
 
var v_e c e x g_t l w y k e_i e_h e_g g_s n GDP r k_h k_i k_g k_x l_h l_i l_g l_y l_x g s h m_i m_g a_y a_g a_i a_h ; 
 
varexo kappa eta_yeta_geta_ieta_h; 
 
parameters v_hdelta_cdelta_gnu_m_ggdelta_inu_m_iidelta_xnu_ssdelta_ynu_ggdelta_hnu_hh  betaphithetarho 
gama alpha_ialpha_halpha_galpha_yalpha_xpsi_hpsi_ipsi_gpsi_ypsi_xnu_m_gnu_m_inu_hnu_gnu_s chi omega 
mu_ymu_gmu_imu_hzetaepsilon_yepsilon_gepsilon_iepsilon_h delta 
tau_ktau_lq_eq_sq_gp_hp_iv_mp_gcapomega_vcapomega_gcapomega_icapomega_hcapomega_y; 
 
v_h=5.72; 
delta_c=1.1; 
delta_g=0.857936486; 
nu_m_gg=0.2; 
delta_i=0.863816687; 
nu_m_ii=0.2; 
delta_x=0.586494222; 
nu_ss=0.2; 
delta_y=0.7; 
nu_gg=0.2; 
delta_h=0.895874254; 
nu_hh=0.2; 
beta=0.96; 
phi=0.607623316; 
theta=0.911090619; 
rho=-0.11; 
gama=0.811011098; 
alpha_i=0.036183313; 
alpha_h=0.004125745272; 
alpha_g=0.042063514; 
alpha_y=0.2; 
alpha_x=0.313505778; 
psi_h=0.5964848; 
psi_i=0.309381618; 
psi_g=0.302053239; 
psi_y=0.073398567; 
psi_x=0.079017608; 
nu_m_g=0.1; 
nu_m_i=0.1; 
nu_h=0.1; 
nu_g=0.1; 
nu_s=0.1; 
chi=0.10; 
omega=0.95; 
mu_y=0.95; 
mu_g=0.95; 
mu_i=0.95; 
mu_h=0.95; 
zeta=0.01; 
epsilon_y=0.01; 
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epsilon_g=0.01; 
epsilon_i=0.01; 
epsilon_h=0.01; 
delta=0.025; 
tau_k=0.15; 
tau_l=0.10; 
q_e=4.93; 
q_s=9.0; 
q_g=6.95; 
p_h=7.79; 
p_i=3.20; 
p_g=2.307534701; 
v_m=0.7755; 
capomega_v=0.105145694;  
capomega_g=-0.132152826; 
capomega_i=-0.184991735; 
capomega_h=-0.192480869; 
capomega_y=-0.011859455; 
 
model; 
 
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*((1- tau_k)*r(+1)+(1- delta)) * (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-
1)))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
c = (1-l)*(1-gama)* w*(1-tau_l)* (phi/(1-phi))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
 
c=n*x*((1- gama)/ gama)/ (1+ (theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1))* q_e ^ (rho/ (rho-1))); 
 
e = c*(q_e *theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
 
w * l_h = alpha_h* p_h* e_h; 
 
r *((1- psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*(1-psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
 
v_h*((1-psi_h)*k_h ^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*psi_h*h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
 
w * l_i = alpha_i* p_i* e_i; 
 
r *((1- psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i*m_i^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*(1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i 
-1)*e_i; 
 
v_m *((1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i* m_i ^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*psi_i* m_i ^ (-
nu_m_i -1)*e_i; 
 
w * l_y = alpha_y * y; 
 
r *((1- psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*(1-psi_y)* (k(-
1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g-1)*y; 
 
q_g*((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i) ^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*psi_y*g^ (-
nu_g-1)*y; 
 
w * l_x = alpha_x * n*x; 
 
r *((1- psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*(1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
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q_s*((1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*psi_x*s^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
 
v_m*alpha_g*((1- psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g*m_g^ (-nu_m_g))=((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)* psi_g* m_g 
^ (-nu_m_g -1)* l_g*w; 
 
r* psi_g* m_g ^ (-nu_m_g -1)= (1- psi_g)* k_g^ (-nu_m_g -1)* v_m; 
 
e_h = a_h * l_h ^alpha_h * ((1-psi_h)* k_h ^ (-nu_h) + psi_h * h^(-nu_h))^-(delta_h/nu_hh); 
 
e_i = a_i * l_i ^alpha_i * ((1-psi_i)* k_i ^ (-nu_m_i) + psi_i * m_i^(- nu_m_i))^-(delta_i/nu_m_ii); 
 
e_g = a_g * l_g ^alpha_g * ((1-psi_g)* k_g ^ (-nu_m_g) + psi_g * m_g^(- nu_m_g))^-(delta_g/nu_m_gg); 
 
y = a_y * l_y ^alpha_y * ((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) + psi_y * g^ (-nu_g)) ^-(delta_y/nu_gg); 
 
x = l_x ^alpha_x * ((1-psi_x)* k_x ^ (-nu_s) + psi_x * s^(-nu_s))^-(delta_x/nu_ss); 
 
v_e = (exp(capomega_v))*(v_e(-1)^(omega))*exp(kappa); 
 
a_y = (exp(capomega_y))*(a_y (-1) ^(mu_y))*exp (eta_y); 
 
a_g = (exp(capomega_g))*(a_g (-1) ^(mu_g))*exp (eta_g); 
 
a_i = (exp(capomega_i))*(a_i (-1) ^(mu_i))*exp (eta_i); 
 
a_h = (exp(capomega_h))*(a_h (-1) ^(mu_h))*exp (eta_h); 
 
l = l_h+ l_i + l_g +l_y + l_x; 
 
tau_l * w *l + tau_k * r *k(-1) +v_h*h -v_e*h+ v_m*m_i + v_m*m_g-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g-r*k_g-w *l_g -v_m 
*m_g- g_t+ p_g * e_g=g_s; 
 
g_s = p_g *e_g +p_i * e_i + p_h * e_h-q_e*e-q_s *s-q_g *g; 
 
e + s + g = (1-chi)*(e_h +e_i +e_g); 
 
k= y-c-v_e * h + (1-delta)*k(-1)-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g; 
end; 
 
initval; 
c=0.337915857; 
e=0.009866408825; 
x=1.010007997; 
l=0.33; 
y=1; 
e_g=0.017323554; 
e_i=0.00336425; 
e_h=0.001901324262; 
k=9.364512596; 
k_h=0.028670212; 
k_i=0.038420574; 
k_g=0.184667446; 
k_x=5.287550443; 
l_h=0.00002789761551; 
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l_i=0.0001778351454; 
l_g=0.001065944239; 
l_y=0.091306358; 
l_x=0.237421965; 
g=0.005701591201; 
s=0.004762216077; 
h=0.001792468442; 
m_i=0.005608390837; 
m_g=0.011182969; 
n=0.491705834; 
w=2.190427966; 
r=0.078431372; 
g_s=-0.065575779; 
g_t=0.275536049; 
v_e=8.19; 
a_y=1.267680833; 
a_g=0.071143485; 
a_i=0.024727613; 
a_h=0.021287879; 
 
end; 
shocks; 
var kappa = zeta ^2; 
var eta_y = epsilon_y ^2; 
var eta_g = epsilon_g ^2; 
var eta_i = epsilon_i ^2; 
var eta_h = epsilon_h ^2; 
 
end; 
 
steady(maxit=2000); 
check(qz_zero_threshold=1e-10); 
model_diagnostics; 
 
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=2, irf=500, relative_irf ); 
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Table 5.8: Ratios of Economic Variables of Bangladesh Data and Models in the Steady State 
Economic Ratios Data Model  
c
Y
 0.337915857 0.366179146 
e
Y
 0.009866408825 0.010691614 
wl
Y
 
0.722841226 0.766714885 
wl 
Y
 
0.2 0.20000066 
g
e
 0.577879074 0.533274284 
s
e
 0.482669648 0.482664841 
l 
l
 
0.2766859345 0.26085402 
l 
l
 
0.719460501 0.735026207 
v m 
wl 
 
3.71428727 3.714323001 
rk 
v m 
 
3.340192542 3.340275433 
wl 
P H
 
0.004125745272 0.003639919117 
rk 
P H
 
0.303638701 0.282791109 
v h
P H
 
0.692235553 0.690616997 
wl 
P I
 
0.036183313 0.036181998 
rk 
P I
 
0.559816252 0.559814098 
v m 
P I
 
0.40400036 0.403998855 
wl 
nX
 
0.313505778 0.313505084 
r  
nX
 
0.660656913 0.660660048 
q  
nX
 
0.025837309 0.025836835 
q  
Y
 
0.039626058 0.039625861 
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Appendix 5B 
Technical Appendix 
1. Derivation of Euler Equation: 
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2. Derivation of Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) condition 
Assuming DRS implies, the following equation holds in each sector in the model (except the 
government sector, since they are cost minimiser). Let us focus on the industry sector to 
derive the necessary conditions for the model. 
Y- 
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This equation give use the following two conditions to hold DRS. 
1. 
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3. Derivation of Economy Wide Resource Constraint 
Household Resource Constraint: 
k    c  n. X  q 
 . e  (1   
 )w. l  ъ  (1   
 )r. k  (1  δ)k +     (1) 
Government Resource Constraint: 
  . w. l   
 . r. k  (v
  δ )(  
    
 )  (v  v )h  P
 . G  rk  wl  v
 .m 
  
ъ  b   (2) 
So, the negative of total subsidy is: 
     .     
 .     
 .     
 .     
 .     
 .      (3) 
Finally, combining household resource constraint, government resource constraint and the 
subsidy equation, the economy wide resource constraint can also be derived as follows. 
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Inserting the previous equation in the household resource constraint we find: 
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Now, holding Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) we have: 
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 k    c  (1  δ)k  δ
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  v . h    
 k    Y  c  v
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  δ   
  
 k    Y  c  v
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 (     )   (Economy wide Resource Constraint) 
4. GDP Calculation 
We model GDP as follows. 
        .      .     .   
From Data, we know that, 
 
   
 0.1929 
Let us assume that,  .      .     .    . This implies that, 
    0.1929      
     
 
1  0.1929
 
     
0.1929
1  0.1929
  
Now given the steady state value of expression B and    , we calculate  
     .           
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Chapter 6 
A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Analysis of 
the Welfare Effects of Alternative Electricity Pricing 
Schemes: The Case of Bangladesh 
6.1 Introduction 
Energy (electricity) sector reforms are multidimensional with a variety of impacts on 
economy. One of the key forces of energy (electricity) sector reform is price reform in the 
form of setting subsidy-free and competitive prices. Energy (electricity) price and subsidy 
reform is considered as the pillar for any energy/electricity market restructuring. In most 
of the developing countries, electricity reform requires extensive restructuring of prices 
and subsidy arrangements (Jamasb, 2006). However, policymakers are very sensitive 
regarding the effect of energy (electricity) price changes on consumers and producers. In 
general, energy (electricity) demand and supply situation in any country depends on a 
subsidy and price fixing effect. Subsidising consumers of fuel products is a common 
phenomenon in many developing countries like Bangladesh. 
The term subsidy is very common and widely used in economics. Energy (electricity, gas 
and petroleum) subsidies lower the prices paid by energy consumers, lower the cost of 
energy production or raise the revenues of energy producers (IEA, OECD and World Bank, 
2010). However, economic theory suggests that subsidies are inefficient as consumers do 
not use resources optimally (Katz and Rosen, 1994). Economists further argue that income 
transfers are superior to subsidies and reduce inefficiencies, as the former do not create 
the deadweight loss associated with subsidies and maximise welfare. There have been 
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studies on subsidies and economy and several researchers have directed the focus of their 
studies on subsidies and economic welfare in many developing countries (Moltke et al., 
2004). 
Some subsidy schemes are designed to be permanent in the developing countries like cross 
subsidies across different consumer categories. For example, in Bangladesh the electricity 
price structures differ across sectors and levels of consumption. Industrial and service 
sectors pay higher price compared to the domestic sectors. Thus, the domestic sectors are 
cross subsidised by the industrial and service sectors. According to World Bank (2010), 
cross‐subsidies include a group of consumers paying more than the general cost of supply 
and the surplus is used to subsidise the provision to the other group at a price that is lower 
than the cost of supply to the subsidised group. It is also argued in the World Bank group 
energy sector background paper (2010) that this cross‐subsidisation may be formulated 
with varying degrees of transparency. A variation on this theme is where the cost of supply 
is higher to the targeted group, but the price to both groups is set the same. This has the 
consequence that one group pays above cost and the other pays below cost.  
Subsidies on energy (electricity, gas and petroleum) sector have also been an important 
issue for many developing countries because of the cost of providing them. For example, 
one IMF report (2013) shows that energy subsidies exceeded 3% of GDP in four countries 
(Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, and Pakistan) where petroleum products and electricity 
accounts for nearly 90% of subsidies. They could also create distortions which would have 
negative impact on welfare. Another reason that energy subsidies have been an important 
policy issue is the difficulty in reducing or removing them, often due to the political turmoil 
their removal causes. Subsidies prevail in most of the developing countries due to equity 
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consideration. In most of the developing countries, subsidies serve the purpose of 
legitimate social goals benefiting the marginalised consumers by lowering the cost of 
energy. However, there are controversies whether these subsidies actually benefit the poor 
people. Energy subsidies are mentioned as both inefficient and inequitable (IMF, 2013). 
They send false price signal that encourage overconsumption of fuel, delay the adoption of 
energy-efficient technologies, and crowd out high-priority public spending, including 
spending on physical infrastructure, education, health and social protection. Most of the 
benefits of fuel subsidies also go to higher income groups who tend to consume more fuel 
(Arze et al., 2012). Moreover, Moltke et al. (2004) discuss that cross subsidies could 
undermine the international competitiveness of industrial firms that are forced to pay 
above cost tariffs and impede economic development. Jamasb and Nepal (2015) also argue 
that cross subsidies from industrial to residential users are not economically desirable. 
In fact, there are some differences in subsidy definition as several international players like 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Global Subsidies 
Initiatives (GSI), have contributed to defining subsidy boundaries (OECD, 2013). In 
practice, how a country defines a subsidy depends on regional and political decision 
reflecting domestic political, economic settings and institutional frameworks and local 
traditions. Both at the domestic and international level, these definitions largely reflect the 
essential elements of a subsidy as accepted in economic theory. The original and simple 
definition of a subsidy is a direct budgetary payment made by a government to the 
producers and the consumers under the form of a grant or loan. The practice of providing 
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direct subsidies to the recipients is known as explicit (cash) subsidies. Additionally, when 
government provides subsidy to protect the consumers through price mechanism is called 
Market Transfer. These transfers usually delivered as regulated prices for consumers set at 
below market prices and provided as a means to guarantee access to minimum volumes of 
consumption of a certain goods (OECD, 2013). This kind of subsidy is more widespread in 
the energy sector in the developing countries. This form of subsidy can also be defined as 
implicit subsidy. Consumer subsidies (such as electricity tariffs provided at a price lower 
than the full supply cost) are also known as on-budget subsidies which are easily 
identifiable. On the other hand, producer subsidies are often off-budget subsidies and less 
visible. One can also classify subsidy as indirect subsidies where subsidies are received 
indirectly by the recipient as a higher market price for output and/or a lower market price 
for input goods (For example, a reduced cost of oil  fuel sold to electricity companies  as a 
result of subsidies to electricity generators). Thus, governments can provide support 
directly or indirectly through market interventions and the overall impact of subsidies 
entirely depends on the underlying elements of the subsidies. Our model mainly includes 
implicit form of subsidy directed to both the consumers and energy producers. 
Furthermore, we pay attention to cross subsidies across sectors since industrial and 
service sectors cross subsidising domestic sector by 40.97% and 82.55% respectively 
(BPDB, 2015). We have also estimated that industrial and service customers have to pay 
34.94% and 74.75% more than actual supply cost. On the other hand, prices to domestic 
consumers cover only 64.66% of the supply cost. Jamasb and Sen (2012) argue that 
reduction on cross-subsidies would in themselves lead to the release of previously 
constrained capital, thus improving efficiency. However, the representative agent 
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assumption of the model would not allow us to consider the cross subsidies prevailing 
within domestic group of consumers. 
Bangladesh has undergone fundamental changes in their electricity industry over the last 
few decades. The country has practiced some reforms in 1970s and 1980s since the 
demand for electricity was low during that time. However, intensive reform initiatives have 
been observed in the electricity sector in the 1990s and 2000s and is still continues. For 
example, the electricity industry has been functionally unbundled. The generation sector 
has been rearranged to encourage competition and increase electricity supply. This is also 
clearly observed that the industry is driving away from the public domain towards the 
private domain. 
The energy policymakers would like to achieve a wide range of objectives like attracting 
foreign investments, providing electricity to all, ensuring price competitiveness, tackling 
fiscal burden from the removal of energy subsidy, encouraging privatisation to increase 
efficiency and economic development. However, to the best of our knowledge, existing 
literature has not paid any attention to examine the effect of electricity price reform on 
Bangladesh economy in a dynamic framework. This chapter addresses this concern and 
considers a DSGE model to study some alternative electricity pricing experiment for policy 
purposes in Bangladesh as an example of small developing country where energy (mainly 
electricity and fuels) subsidy is very high, energy prices are distorted and government 
controls energy prices. Since policy discussions were primarily focused in this chapter, we 
examine the effects of some proposed energy reforms particularly electricity pricing 
reform policies on household welfare and macroeconomy in Bangladesh in its endeavours 
to develop and enhance electricity systems. Although the analysis mainly focuses on 
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Bangladesh electricity sector, the results and policy implications are also relevant for the 
other developing countries undertaking reform in this sector. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The literature review is discussed in section 6.2; policy 
experiments are explained in section 6.3. Section 6.4 focuses on welfare estimation 
formula; followed by a discussion on dataset, parameter specification and calibration in 
section 6.5. Section 6.6 portrays the analysis of the results obtained and finally, in the last 
section, we present the conclusions.   
6.2 Literature Review 
According to Jamasb et al. (2005), the reviewed literature on energy reforms can be 
broadly divided into two categories: i) the determinants of reform and the key steps taken 
and ii) the effects of various reform steps on performance indicators. Following Jamasb et 
al. (2004), Zhang et al. (2008), Jamasb and Nepal (2011), the primary driving forces behind 
energy reform movement can be distinguished between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. The ‘push 
factors’ were twofold; the first was related to the adoption of structural adjustment 
programmes by developing countries, such as Bangladesh, in cooperation with multilateral 
lending agencies, such as the World Bank, the ADB and the IMF, as a condition of 
multilateral financial support following fiscal crises. The second ‘push factor’ was related to 
widespread problems within the electricity sectors of developing countries, and a genuine 
need for reform (Sen, 2014). For example, the push factor includes the poor performance 
of state-run electricity operators in terms of high costs, the inability of the state sector to 
meet the investment and maintenance costs of the electricity industry associated with the 
increasing demands for electricity resulting from economic development in other sectors of 
the economy and the need to remove electricity subsidies so as to release resources for 
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other areas of public expenditure etc. The ‘pull’ factors included a demonstration effect 
following experiences in the Chile, England and Wales and Norway in the 1980s and early 
1990s (Zhang et al., 2008). 
The core reform elements so far adopted by different countries as mentioned by Jamasb 
(2006) have tended to include i) Restructuring and corporatisation or commercialisation 
of the core power utility, ii) Tariff and subsidy reform, iii) Development of an independent 
regulatory authority, iv) Enactment of an ‘Energy Law’ and v) Privatisation. These elements 
would aim to introduce competition by increasing the number of players in the market, 
ensuring cost-reflective tariffs, breaking up the incumbent monopoly utilities and shifting 
the regulatory mandate from the Ministry/Department of Energy to an “independent” 
regulatory agency to ensure a level playing field. 
Researchers have also attempted to quantify the effect of energy (electricity) price and 
subsidy reform on economy. Several findings emanate from the empirical investigations on 
energy (electricity) price reform and petroleum products subsidy and its effect of removal 
on household welfare. For example, Hartley and Medlock (2008) studied the behaviour of 
National Oil Companies (NOC's) and showed that NOC's are inefficient compared to private 
companies and having the NOC's subsidise domestic customers increased this inefficiency. 
Using a small open-economy model, Plante (2014) showed that sizable subsidies could 
introduce significant distortions into the country that put them in place.  
Andriamihaja and Vecchi (2007) employed Price Shifting Model to assess the distributional 
impact of higher energy price in Madagascar on households’ real expenditure. They showed 
that a 17% rise in the price of energy products leads to a 1.75% average decrease in real 
expenditure. This percentage is higher for low-income households (2.1%) than for high-
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income households (1.5%). The study concludes that the benefit of introducing price 
subsidies would be progressive; that is, in percentage terms, subsidy would benefit poor 
households’ more than rich household. However, subsidising would involve substantial 
leakage in favour of high income households and there is an issue of identifying more cost-
effective policies to protect poorest households.  
Adagunodo (2013) examined petroleum products pricing reform and welfare in Nigeria 
and concluded that if implemented correctly, the removal of subsidy would save largest 
amount from government budget and the subsidy funds could lead to major development 
gains for the country. Nwafor et al. (2006) investigated the impact of removal of petroleum 
products subsidies on poverty in Nigeria. The study concluded that subsidy removal, 
without spending of the associated savings, would increase the national poverty level. This 
is due to the consequent rise in inputs’ costs which is higher than the rise in selling prices 
of most firms. The key sectors which experience increased nominal output are the refined 
petroleum products which provide income for an extremely low number of households. 
Freund and Wallach (1995) looked at the welfare effects of increasing energy prices in 
Poland and concluded that programmes that subsidising household energy prices in Poland 
as well as the other transition economies help the rich more than they help the poor. Not 
only do the wealthy consume more energy in absolute terms, but also spend a larger 
portion of their income on energy. Based on their results, they proposed that the first best 
policy would be to raise energy prices while targeting cash relied to the poor through a 
social assistance programme.  
Oktaviani et al. (2007) used a CGE model to analyse the elimination of fuel subsidies in 
Indonesia, which occurred in three stages over the period 2000-2005 (prices were 
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increased by 21% in 2000, 30% in 2001 and 29% in 2005). They concluded that the short 
to medium-term macroeconomic performance of the economy was adversely affected by 
the removal of the subsidies, due to reduction in household incomes and increase in 
domestic prices. Furthermore, the reduction of fuel subsidies increased overall impact of 
poverty in Indonesian economy from 8.9 to 12.9% of population, with rural areas are worst 
affected. However, Gibson and Olivia (2008) used the Marginal Social Cost approach to 
evaluate the equity and efficiency of subsidy reform in Indonesia and concluded that large 
subsidies on kerosene should be reduced. 
Kpodar and Djiofack (2009) assessed the distributional effects of a rise in various 
petroleum product prices in Mali using a standard CGE model. Their results suggest that 
higher diesel prices primarily affect richer households, while the poorest ones tend to 
suffer more from higher kerosene and gasoline prices. Overall, the impact of fuel prices on 
household budgets shows a U-shaped relationship with expenditure per capita. Regardless 
of the oil product considered, high-income households benefit disproportionately from oil 
price subsidies. This suggests that petroleum price subsidies are ineffective in protecting 
the income of poor households compared with a targeted subsidy. 
Coady et al. (2006) simulated both direct and indirect effects of fossil-fuel subsidy reform 
in Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, Mali and Sri Lanka. They found that the direct effects of increased 
fossil fuel prices on aggregate real income ranged from 0.9% in Mali to 2.0% in Bolivia. 
However, in Ghana, Jordan and Sri Lanka they were regressive affecting the lowest income 
more than the highest. Indirect effect resulting from increases in the prices of other goods 
and services were higher, ranging from 1.1% to 6.7%, but tended to be equally distributed 
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across income quintiles. This reflects the higher proportion of their budgets that lower 
income quintiles must devote to energy as opposed to other goods and services.  
Angel-Urdinola et al. (2006) examined the extent to which the poor did benefit from past 
subsidies in Rwanda, and to discover whether they would benefit from alternative implicit 
or explicit cross-subsidies. Because access rates to network are very low among the poor, 
the share of the implicit subsidies that prevailed before the increase in tariff and that 
benefited the poor was also very low. They concluded that previous subsidies were badly 
targeted. Another important result of their analysis was the finding that it would probably 
be better for poverty reduction to give priority to a subsidy mechanism for new 
connections to the network rather than a subsidy for consumption for those households 
that are already connected.  
6.3 Policy Experiments 
In general, the electricity sector in developing countries performs poorly. Electricity access 
is scarce, transmission losses are high, blackouts are common, prevalence of high subsidy 
and distorted price and many state owned power utilities are in serious financial hardship. 
In order to bring the fiscal burden from subsidy under control, to remove the price 
distortions in electricity market and to ensure better service quality in electricity sector, we 
propose some electricity price reform policies in this section. Electricity price reform is 
considered as the foundation of long anticipated changes that are aimed at liberalising 
electricity sector. In almost all reforming countries, electricity reform has been a part of 
wider policies towards a liberal market economy. This liberalisation is generally set 
simultaneously through the pricing mechanism and through competition to provide 
incentives to consumers to use electricity productively. Some of the key elements of 
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electricity market reforms in the developing countries which are widely discussed in the 
literature (For example, Williams and Ghanadan, 2004, Jamasb et al., 2005) include tariff 
reforms, privatisation, commercialisation etc. A tariff reform implies adjusting tariffs in 
order to remove subsidies to reflect cost efficiency. This process is also known as 
commercialisation. 
Philip (2004) argues that liberalisation acts as the most effective means of fixing the many 
difficulties and challenges faced by energy (electricity) sectors across the world. 
Liberalisation, in its fullest sense, comprises four main reforms: i) A change in the structure 
of the energy (electricity) industry, ii) A change in the ownership of the energy (electricity) 
companies, iii) A change in the structure and function of government and iv) the 
development of energy (electricity) markets regulation. 
A successful privatisation and liberalisation programme can improve the financial position 
of both the government and the company. In the short term, the government is relieved of 
the need to subsidise a loss-making entity and should raise money from the sale. The 
company gains from privatisation because, free from social objectives, it should find it 
easier to raise loans for financing capital projects. Moreover, other financial and economic 
benefits may accrue. The budget deficit should decline along with the need to subsidise 
loss-making enterprises, and thus the pressures on inflation are reduced. If the privatised 
company increases its profitability, the government’s tax revenue will increase. Successful 
liberalisation should lead to increased level of investment in the energy sector from the 
newly privatised companies as well as new entrants. If foreign companies purchase part of 
or all of the state entity, the foreign exchange reserves are boosted. Finally, public flotation 
can help the domestic stock markets develop. 
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In Bangladesh, electricity is the most widely used form of energy. However, since 
independence from Pakistan in 1971, the country has struggled to generate adequate 
electricity to meet demand. Meanwhile, state-owned electricity utilities suffer from large 
deficits. The electricity sector has also failed to attract adequate private investments due to 
poor pricing policies and other bottlenecks. This lack of investment is a major contributing 
factor to Bangladesh’s electricity crisis.  In order to improve the situation, the government 
has adopted a comprehensive electricity development strategy to explore supply-side 
options along with demand management that conserves electricity and discourages 
inefficient use. The thrust of the government’s policy is to treat electricity as a private good 
such that its price reflects the cost of production and a fair return is generated on 
investment. The policy maintains that “social objectives like reaching out to the poor and 
rural community could be achieved through cross-subsidisation as well as explicit budget 
subsidies” (Planning Commission 2011). As such, a key policy reform for the government is 
to ensure proper pricing of electricity based on international best practices. However, the 
rationality of subsidies needs to be economically justified. 
In order to perform policy experiments, we proceed as follows. We first assume the 
economy is in an initial steady state condition consistent with our calibration, dataset, 
existing electricity prices, underlying subsidies, parameter values and the model's 
equations explained in chapter 5.  
We then propose some alternative electricity pricing schemes and analyse what would 
happen in the economy in terms of welfare context if these policies are being implemented. 
More precisely, we intend to focus on the macroeconomic impact of these policy changes, 
i.e. we ask how the steady state of the model is affected. Technically, we conduct a 
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comparative statics exercise. For each variable of interest we numerically calculate the 
percentage change of that variable across steady states. Introducing different policy 
experiments, we make an attempt to remove the price distortions which had led to sub 
optimal outcomes in the economy. 
Our proposed policy experiments are as follows. 
6.3.1 Equal Price Experiment 
Like many other developing countries, Bangladesh has a complicated electricity pricing 
system that includes different approaches for households, industry and commercial users. 
The pricing of electricity is the most complex among all energy resources, perhaps because 
it is also politically sensitive. The pricing policy for energy (electricity) in Bangladesh is 
formulated and implemented by the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) 
with support from related agencies. It may be mentioned here that there are separate tariff 
rates in Bangladesh for different categories of consumers. Some of these tariffs are 
distorted. This experiment can be considered as the most common forms of government 
reform to phase out electricity price distortions. We would like to analyse how policy could 
work if we remove the differential electricity consumer prices and selling prices and 
introduce common electricity price respectively for all the consumers and the generators. 
Nevertheless, we eliminate price distortions; propose new electricity prices as a method of 
simple reform. This experiment involves partial liberalisation. 
6.3.2 Flexible Price Experiment 
This experiment suggests full electricity liberalisation policies to eliminate electricity and 
fuel price distortions all the way. Here, government abolishes all price controls and allow 
market to adjust prices. We intend to examine whether flexible price regime is better than 
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the fixed price regime to protect the economy from adverse effects of oil price shocks. 
Therefore, we consider a weighted average electricity price for all the electricity consumers 
and producers. We also propose there is no difference in world and domestic fuel prices. 
Erdogdu (2011) mentions that in a situation where there is no cross subsidy across 
different group of consumers and ignoring disproportional transmission and distribution 
charges paid by different consumer groups, electricity prices across different consumer 
groups are expected to be almost the same. Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) also argue that the 
existence divergence of transmission and distribution network tariffs limits the 
convergence of end-user prices. However, for simplicity, we do not consider the differences 
in cost of electricity supplying households and industry in terms of transmission and 
distribution. 
6.3.3 Efficient Electricity Price Experiment 
This is the extension of the previous policy experiment (Flexible Price Experiment). In the 
previous experiment, there was no government intervention in price control at all. 
However, in this policy experiment we would like to consider the controlled price for oil 
and gas simply liberalising the electricity sector and study what electricity price is needed 
for government to operate at efficient level. 
6.3.4 Privatisation Experiment 
This experiment also advocates partial liberalisation reform steps. The electricity market in 
Bangladesh is mainly controlled by the public sector which does not necessarily allocate 
resources efficiently. In our benchmark model, government is a cost minimiser. However, 
in this policy experiment, we consider government as a profit maximising firm and then 
investigate the differences in steady state values of some selected economic indicators and 
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household welfare under two scenarios. Being a profit maximiser, government is now not 
dictating electricity prices anymore. Given fixed factor prices, now consumers’ electricity 
prices need to be adjusted to hold equilibrium condition in electricity market. Here we 
liberalise the government firm in order to get rid of government involvement in the 
production side and accordingly, budget constraint should be free from any kind of 
government intervention. It is widely believed that privatisation would improve not only 
the financial health of the sector, but would also increase revenue for government 
treasuries which help to reduce and restructuring public debt. Baumol (1982, 1996) argue 
that privately owned firms are more efficient than the state owned ones under perfect 
contestability theory. The contestability theory (the contestable market analysis) does 
offer the regulator guidance on the regulatory rules for the behaviour of privatised firms 
that would provide the economy with the benefits of effective competition. Jamasb et al. 
(2014) also mentions that the theoretical arguments for efficiency improvements 
dominated the motives for privatisation and adopting market-oriented reforms. It is also 
assumed that a blend of privatisation, regulatory reform and liberalisation improves 
economic efficiency and service standards in all energy sectors (Pollitt, 2002). However, 
Bonifaz and Jaramillo (2010) reveal that privatisation does not lead to an improvement in 
efficiency in distribution operators in Peruvian electricity market. 
6.3.5 Subsidy Experiment 
In this policy experiment, we would like to explore what would happen to the economy if 
government decides to change the subsidy. At present government provides 30% subsidy 
to the electricity generating firms for importing oil from the rest of the world. We propose 
a reduction of 10% subsidy as a step of reform instruments.  
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For the successful implementation of any policy experiment, it requires tremendous 
political will to take tough decision that results in adverse short term effect but positive 
impact on economy in the long run. If the country has a long history of subsidy, it would be 
very difficult to phase it out. Additionally, the consumers who get used to cheap energy 
(electricity and fuel) cannot be blamed when they react violently to major energy price 
increase. 
The model considered in this chapter is the same DSGE model of a small economy as 
explained in chapter five9. The only observed difference is in the government resource 
constraint for the privatisation policy experiment as we have liberalised the government 
firm who now acts as a profit maximising firm. Additionally, there should not be any 
government intervention on the production side and government resource constraint 
should be free from the government electricity firm’s monetary transactions. 
So, in the privatisation experiment, the government should satisfy the following resource 
constraint: 
  . w. l    . r. k  (v  δ )(m  m )  (v  v )h  ъ  b 
However, in the previous chapter, we assume that, the government, like any other entity in 
the economy, must satisfy a resource constraint: 
  . w. l    . r. k  (v  δ )(m  m )  (v  v )h  P G  rk  wl  v
 m  ъ  b 
6.4 Welfare Estimation 
In addition to asking how variables changed across steady states, we have also calculated 
how steady state welfare in the country was affected by the policy experiments. 
                                                             
9 For More detail discussion please see section 5.2 of chapter 5. 
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The welfare gain of different policy experiments can be estimated comparing two different 
states of the economy: an economy where consumers and producers face differential tariffs 
(The benchmark case) and an economy where various groups of consumers and producers 
face the proposed electricity prices under the policy experiments. If c1, e1, X1 and l1 are the 
steady state values with differential electricity prices, one can estimate the value of the 
utility, U1 for the first economy using the following equation: 
U1 =  
 (   
 
 (   )  
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Similarly, U2, the level of utility, can be obtained  with a new set of steady state values (c2, 
e2, X2 and l2) from the proposed policy experiments. Then the utility changes under two 
different states of economy can be observed. However, this value is not meaningful as 
utility is an ordinal measure.  
The actual gain in welfare can be calculated considering the percentage change of 
consumption which is required to reach the new level of utility, U2, according to the 
following equation10: 
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Here, we solve for how much non-electricity consumption would need to be increased in 
the benchmark steady state in order for utility to be the same as in the new steady state 
under different policies. We then convert these numbers into percentages which gives the 
welfare gain from the policy experiments. 
 
 
                                                             
10 See Technical Appendix for the derivation of the Welfare Equation 
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6.5 Dataset, Parameter Specification and Calibration 
The benchmark model is calibrated following Kydland and Prescott (1982). The model is 
implemented numerically using detailed data and parameter sets as discussed in chapter 5. 
The data needed to calibrate the model for Bangladesh economy comes from Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Bangladesh Economics Review (BER), World Development 
Indicator (WDI), Bangladesh Labour Force Survey (BLFS), Bangladesh Power Development 
Board (BPDB), Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC), Summit Power Limited, Dutch 
Bangla Power and Associates Limited and Bangladesh Tax Handbook. In this section, we 
present data used in the calibration to perform our proposed policy experiments to 
examine how sensitive Bangladesh economy are to these proposed electricity prices as 
policy alternatives. The data will be a key input into the theoretical models to quantify the 
importance of the policy experiments of different policy experiments. 
For some of the experiments, we calculate the proposed electricity prices for the different 
policy experiments from the original data following Weighted Average Index. Weighted 
averages are used extensively in descriptive statistical analysis. We estimate an average 
(mean) electricity price in which electricity price of a particular group of consumer or 
producer in any sector being averaged is multiplied by quantity (weights) based on the 
respective sector’s relative importance. The result is summed and the total is divided by 
the sum of the quantities. Table 6.1 shows the experimental prices under different policy 
experimentation. 
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6.6 Results 
Our results are presented in Table 6.2 and 6.3. At first, we analyse the percentage changes 
across steady state for the different variables and then calculate the household welfare 
under alternative policy experiments.  
Under the “Equal Price Experiment (EPE)”, non-electricity consumption, service 
consumption increases by 0.45% and 1.45%. Since the QR firms now face only one third of 
the benchmark price under this experiment, they are reluctant to generate electricity with 
oil. So, oil usage has declined by 84.25% which in turn lowers the import volume and bills. 
This causes a reduction in industrial production by a small margin (-0.06%) as industrial 
sector now does not need to produce extra volume of exportable goods to counter the 
higher import bills. In the benchmark model with the given electricity price, household, 
industry and service represents 47%, 37% and 16% of total electricity consumption 
respectively as observed in the steady state. However, under this experiment with a higher 
electricity price faced by the household consumers and lower electricity price faced by the 
industry and service consumers, the previous ratio has been altered. Now, consumer share 
of total electricity consumption is only 35%. Nevertheless, service and industrial electricity 
consumption increased by 48% and 17% respectively. The overall electricity supply and 
demand increases by 0.51% under the equalisation of electricity prices among the different 
group of consumers. The increase in electricity supply mainly comes from the higher 
government electricity generation to equalise electricity demand and supply in the 
economy. Government now uses more gas to produce electricity and need 16.93% higher 
amount of gas than the benchmark scenario. Implicit subsidy also decreases, but this is a 
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purely quantitative issue as modelled in the equation. The overall household welfare 
increases by 3.70% and GDP increases by 0.72% in this experiment. 
The “Flexible Price Experiment (FPE)” leads to an increase of overall household 
consumption as the relative price of electricity faced by the household has declined. 
Industry enjoys lower input price since electricity prices go down under this experiment 
which expands the industrial production by 2.85%. There is a reallocation of the usage of 
fuel needed to generate electricity because of the changes of the relative prices faced by the 
producers. Quick rental firms have to sell their electricity at a price which is half of the 
benchmark price. Consequently, these firms are facing loses as there is no changes in 
subsidy compared to the benchmark cases. Thus, they reduced their electricity generation 
by 34.44% and accordingly use of oil has also declined by 61%. But a boom is observed in 
IPP sector as their production has increased by almost 40%. The overall demand and 
supply is also increased by 43.44% in this experiment. Government has no control over 
prices in this scenario and increased the electricity generation to match the overall 
electricity supply. Since all the price distortion has been removed in this experiment, this is 
the most welfare enhancing policy as observed in the results. There is a 20.87% increase in 
household welfare in this policy experiment. GDP has also increased by 2.15% here. 
In the next policy experiment titled “Efficient Electricity Price Experiment (EEEP)”, we have 
calculated the most efficient price of electricity which helps to operate government 
electricity firm at an efficient level. This is the extension of the previous policy where we 
have not locked the fuel prices. The results revealed nearly comparable picture like the 
flexible price experiment in terms of qualitative and quantitative changes. The magnitude 
of quantitative changes is slightly different than the previous policy experiment. For 
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example, now household non-electricity consumption increases by 1.94% compared to a 
2.49% increment in the previous analysis. Industrial output increases at 3.08% rate as they 
can efficiently use the resources than before. The welfare and the GDP have increased by 
18.9% and 1.86% respectively under this experiment. The results also show that the price 
faced by the government electricity firm should be kept at 3.22 Taka/kwh to make them 
operate at a most efficient level. 
Unlike the other policy experiments, the “Privatisation Experiment” observes a reduction in 
total use of gas by 44% while total supply of electricity has increased by 8.17%. Although, 
we have observed a huge reduction in oil usage in the previous three experiments, here it 
has declined by a very small margin (-0.01%). This happens because now the quick rental 
producers are facing the exactly same price like the benchmark cases. There are no changes 
in producer prices in this experiment as consumers are now facing uniform electricity price 
which is needed to be adjusted to hold equilibrium. Since household consumers now face 
higher electricity price, they reduce their electricity consumption. However, industry and 
service sector enjoys the lower electricity price and increase their overall electricity 
consumption. Household welfare is increased by 7.61% and GDP increases nearly about 
1%. 
Our “Subsidy Experiment” with alternative subsidy policy shows that household welfare 
varies inversely with the level of producer subsidy. In the subsidy experiment, a 10% 
reduction of producer subsidy is experimented. As a result, overall household welfare 
increases by 0.36% and GDP increases by 0.10%. All the consumer and producer electricity 
prices remain unchanged from the benchmark scenario under this experiment. Since the 
producers are facing less subsidy than before they reduce their oil import by 19% which 
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lowers QR electricity generation by 7.25%. The IPP generation has also reduced by 0.77% 
and government generation has increased by 0.74%. This implies that the private and 
public sectors react inversely to subsidy reductions. The government has now higher 
revenue, while the private sector has to buy electricity at higher prices. The total use of gas 
has increased by 1.59%. Although the electricity price reform is necessary, the removal of 
fuel subsidies creates a huge burden on electricity-intensive industries which led to 
disruption in production. As a result industrial production deceases by a small margin (-
0.051%) in Bangladesh. 
6.7 Conclusions 
Electricity demand is rising rapidly in developing countries. The electricity pricing policies 
of those countries are therefore increasingly important for the efficient use of the overall 
electricity supply. However, electricity markets in most of the developing countries are 
highly distorted. Additionally, subsidising consumers of petroleum goods is a common 
phenomenon in many developing and emerging economies. Given their cost and 
persistence, it is likely that these price distorions and subsidies have important 
macroeconomic implications for the developing countries. For example, fuel subsidies 
affect wages, distort input choises in the production of goods and services, altering the 
demand for production factors. These efffects also  lead to changes in the composition of  
sectoral and overall output. Thus, the energy sector is one of the most strategic ones from a 
development perspective. This chapter proposes some policy alternatives to remove 
electricity price distortions and phase out subsidies and evaluate how effective they are 
towards the economy  of a small, oil importing developing country compared to the 
existing disorted fuel prices and subsidies.  
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Electricity price reform has been on the Bangladesh government’s policy reform agenda 
over the past few years. A very few number of reports have been published analysing the 
approach to electricity pricing, the need for electricity price and fuel subsidy reforms and 
reform options in Bangladesh. The reform options need to be sorted very carefully 
evaluating the policy’s overall performance in terms of achieving the goals as the demand 
and supply in Bangladesh are inelastic to some extent.  
The purpose of this chapter is to propose some alternative electricity price mechanisms 
using a DSGE model assuming the country to be a small open developing economy where 
government controls electricity and fuel prices and to analyse the consequences of the 
energy price reforms (the removal of distorted electricity prices and electricity and fuel 
subsidies) on household welfare and macroeconomic condition in Bangladesh as an 
example of the developing countries. Our results show that electricity tariff and subsidy 
experiments have important effects on a number of macroeconomic variables and 
electricity market in Bangladesh economy. 
Since all our proposed policies are welfare and GDP enhancing, decision makers can 
implement any of the policies considering the country’s underlying macroeconomic 
condition, energy security, fuel options and political condition. Our results reveal that full 
liberalisation will ensure maximum welfare for Bangladesh. Moreover, the stochastic 
nature of our dynamic model also allow us to analyse the possible expected future path of 
different endogenous variables especially GDP on an oil price shock in period 1 of one 
standard deviation from the Impulse Response Functions. In fact, the transition path of the 
key endogenous variable of different policy experiments is very similar to their response to 
an oil price shock and the only difference observed is in the magnitude of the effect. The 
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most feasible policy depends on government’s objective as to whether it would maximise 
welfare or reduce the risk of oil price shocks. For example, impulse response function 
shows that equal price experiment should be the best option to be implemented at the risk 
of high oil price fluctuations as the deviation in GDP and the other key endogenous 
variables out of an oil price shock is lowest in this experiment. However, if government 
wants to maximise welfare, flexible price experiment should be the most feasible one 
(Figure 6.1-Figure 6.5).  
We have found few common outcomes in all the policy experiments. For example, 
reduction in private activities and expansion of public sector, reallocation of fuel within 
electricity industry, higher welfare and higher GDP has been observed in our experiments. 
Firstly, all the policy experiments lead to a reallocation of fuel uses. Secondly, under every 
experiment, government electricity generating firm increases their generation because of 
following reasons mainly. First, the new prices faced by the private producers under some 
experiments are much lower than the price the firms faced in the benchmark case. This 
increases their relative input costs which reduce private supply of electricity. Thus, 
government need to intervene in the market and supply more electricity to equate the 
electricity demand. Second, the removal of subsidy reduces government expenditure which 
can be diverted to innovate in R&D sector, purchase new equipment etc. This would make 
government firm more efficient and allow generating more electricity. Finally, all the policy 
experiments are welfare and GDP enhancing. 
Given our results, it is worthwhile that government could use the revenue earned from the 
subsidy removal and offer monetary and non-monetary incentives to producers who are 
affected. Uses of natural and renewable resources as alternative sources of fuel in 
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electricity generation, innovation, application of R&D could play a key role to mitigate the 
current crisis in electricity market in Bangladesh. Hence, incentive could also be given to 
new electricity generators who would enter in the market planning to produce electricity 
with renewable energy or existing electricity generating companies intending to convert 
from using traditional fuel to renewable energy in producing electricity. For example, 
incentives could include tax rebates, long term subsidised loans for purchasing equipment, 
access to foreign exchange at preferred rates, etc. A limited amount of subsidy could also be 
reallocated to the electricity generators for the use of renewable inputs or the introduction 
of renewable technology. The policy implications of our results are clear and relevant not 
only for Bangladesh but also for many other developing countries sharing a similar 
electricity sector. 
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Appendix 6A 
Table 6.1: Calibration & Parameter Values of Alternative Policy Experiments 
Policy Experiments11 qe qg qs pI pH pG 
Benchmark Model 4.93 6.95 9.00 3.20 7.79 2.30 
Equal Price Experiment 6.74 6.74 6.74 2.80 2.80 2.30 
Flexible Price Experiment12 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 3.24 
Efficient Electricity Price Experiment 4.67 4.67 4.67 4..67 4.67 3.22 
Privatisation Impact 6.26 6.26 6.26 3.20 7.79 2.30 
Subsidy Experiment 4.93 6.95 9.00 3.20 7.79 2.30 
Source: BPDB and Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
Table 6.2: Percentage Change in SS Values from Policy Experiments 
Policy Experiments c x y H+I+G GDP h mI +mG 
Equal Price Experiment 0.45% 1.45% -0.06% 0.51% 0.72% -84.52% 8.95% 
Flexible Price Experiment 2.49% 3.35% 2.85% 43.44% 2.15% -60.66% 9.47% 
Efficient Electricity Price Experiment 1.94% 3.17% 3.08% 42.86% 1.86% -60.66% 9.45% 
Privatisation Impact 1.06% 1.90% 0.44% 8.17% 1% -0.01% -44.25% 
Subsidy Experiment 0.12% 0.03% -0.05% 0.09% 0.1% -18.68% 1.26% 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Some of the electricity prices are calculated in Dynare software. 
12 The world and domestic price of oil and the domestic price of gas and extraction cost assumed to be same in 
the flexible price experiment. 
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Table 6.3: Welfare Changes of Alternative Policy Experiments 
Policy Experiments Welfare Increases 
Equal Price Experiment 3.70% 
Flexible Price Experiment 20.87% 
Efficient  Electricity Price Experiment 18.9% 
Privatisation Impact 7.61% 
Subsidy Experiment 0.36% 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 6.4: Dynare Code for Equal Price Experiment 
 
% Dynare Code for Dynamic Modelling of Electricity Reforms in Bangladesh 
% Sakib Amin, Dr. Laura Marsiliani and Dr. Thomas Renström, Durham University Business School 
var GDP v_e c e x l y e_g e_i e_h k k_h k_i k_g k_x l_h l_i l_g l_y l_x g s h m_i m_g n w r g_s g_t  a_y a_g a_i a_h ; 
  
varexo kappa eta_y eta_g eta_i eta_h; 
  
parameters A v_h delta_c delta_g nu_m_gg delta_i nu_m_ii delta_x nu_ss delta_y nu_gg delta_h nu_hh  beta phi 
theta rho gama alpha_i alpha_h alpha_g alpha_y alpha_x psi_h psi_i psi_g psi_y psi_x nu_m_g nu_m_i nu_h nu_g 
nu_s chi omega mu_y mu_g mu_i mu_h zeta epsilon_y epsilon_g epsilon_i epsilon_h delta tau_k tau_l q_e q_s q_g 
p_h p_i v_m p_g capomega_v capomega_g capomega_i capomega_h capomega_y; 
  
v_h=5.72; 
A=0.405324405; 
delta_c=1.1; 
delta_g=0.857936486; 
nu_m_gg=0.2; 
delta_i=0.863816687; 
nu_m_ii=0.2; 
delta_x=0.586494222; 
nu_ss=0.2; 
delta_y=0.7; 
nu_gg=0.2; 
delta_h=0.895874254; 
nu_hh=0.2; 
beta=0.96; 
phi=0.607623316; 
theta=0.911090619; 
rho=-0.11; 
gama=0.811011098; 
alpha_i=0.036183313; 
alpha_h=0.004125745272; 
alpha_g=0.042063514; 
alpha_y=0.2; 
alpha_x=0.313505778; 
psi_h=0.5964848; 
psi_i=0.309381618; 
psi_g=0.302053239; 
psi_y=0.073398567; 
psi_x=0.079017608; 
nu_m_g=0.1; 
nu_m_i=0.1; 
nu_h=0.1; 
nu_g=0.1; 
nu_s=0.1; 
chi=0.10; 
omega=0.95; 
mu_y=0.95; 
mu_g=0.95; 
mu_i=0.95; 
mu_h=0.95; 
zeta=0.01; 
epsilon_y=0.01; 
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epsilon_g=0.01; 
epsilon_i=0.01; 
epsilon_h=0.01; 
delta=0.025; 
tau_k=0.15; 
tau_l=0.10; 
q_e=6.749634418; 
q_s=6.749634418; 
q_g=6.749634418; 
p_h= 2.802819511; 
p_i= 2.802819511; 
p_g= 2.802819511; 
v_m=0.7755; 
capomega_v=0.105145694;  
capomega_g=-0.132152826; 
capomega_i=-0.184991735; 
capomega_h=-0.192480869; 
capomega_y=-0.011859455; 
  
model; 
  
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*((1- tau_k)*r(+1)+(1- delta)) * (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-
1)))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c = (1-l)*(1-gama)* w*(1-tau_l)* (phi/(1-phi))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c=n*x*((1- gama)/ gama)/ (1+ (theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1))* q_e ^ (rho/ (rho-1))); 
  
e = c*(q_e *theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
  
w * l_h = alpha_h* p_h* e_h; 
  
r *((1- psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*(1-psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
v_h*((1-psi_h)*k_h ^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*psi_h*h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
w * l_i = alpha_i* p_i* e_i; 
  
r *((1- psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i*m_i^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*(1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i 
-1)*e_i; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i* m_i ^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*psi_i* m_i ^ (-
nu_m_i -1)*e_i; 
  
w * l_y = alpha_y * y; 
  
r *((1- psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*(1-psi_y)* (k(-
1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g-1)*y; 
  
q_g*((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i) ^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*psi_y*g^ (-
nu_g-1)*y; 
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w * l_x = alpha_x * n*x; 
  
r *((1- psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*(1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
q_s*((1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*psi_x*s^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
v_m*alpha_g*((1- psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g*m_g^ (-nu_m_g))=((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)* psi_g* m_g 
^ (-nu_m_g -1)* l_g*w; 
  
r* psi_g* m_g ^ (-nu_m_g -1)= (1- psi_g)* k_g^ (-nu_m_g -1)* v_m; 
  
e_h = a_h * l_h ^alpha_h * ((1-psi_h)* k_h ^ (-nu_h) + psi_h * h^(-nu_h))^-(delta_h/nu_hh); 
  
e_i = a_i * l_i ^alpha_i * ((1-psi_i)* k_i ^ (-nu_m_i) + psi_i * m_i^(- nu_m_i))^-(delta_i/nu_m_ii); 
  
e_g = a_g * l_g ^alpha_g * ((1-psi_g)* k_g ^ (-nu_m_g) + psi_g * m_g^(- nu_m_g))^-(delta_g/nu_m_gg); 
  
y = a_y * l_y ^alpha_y * ((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) + psi_y * g^ (-nu_g)) ^-(delta_y/nu_gg); 
  
x = l_x ^alpha_x * ((1-psi_x)* k_x ^ (-nu_s) + psi_x * s^(-nu_s))^-(delta_x/nu_ss); 
  
v_e = (exp(capomega_v))*(v_e(-1)^(omega))*exp(kappa); 
  
a_y = (exp(capomega_y))*(a_y (-1) ^(mu_y))*exp (eta_y); 
  
a_g = (exp(capomega_g))*(a_g (-1) ^(mu_g))*exp (eta_g); 
  
a_i = (exp(capomega_i))*(a_i (-1) ^(mu_i))*exp (eta_i); 
  
a_h = (exp(capomega_h))*(a_h (-1) ^(mu_h))*exp (eta_h); 
  
l = l_h+ l_i + l_g +l_y + l_x; 
  
tau_l * w *l + tau_k * r *k(-1) +v_h*h -v_e*h+ v_m*m_i + v_m*m_g-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g-r*k_g-w *l_g -v_m 
*m_g- g_t+ p_g * e_g=g_s; 
  
g_s = p_g *e_g +p_i * e_i + p_h * e_h-q_e*e-q_s *s-q_g *g; 
  
e + s + g = (1-chi)*(e_h +e_i +e_g); 
  
k= y-c-v_e * h + (1-delta)*k(-1)-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g; 
GDP=A+n*x+y+q_e*e-v_e*h; 
  
end; 
  
initval; 
c=0.337915857; 
e=0.009866408825; 
x=1.010007997; 
l=0.33; 
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y=1; 
GDP=2.101215168; 
e_g=0.017323554; 
e_i=0.00336425; 
e_h=0.001901324262; 
k=9.364512596; 
k_h=0.028670212; 
k_i=0.038420574; 
k_g=0.184667446; 
k_x=5.287550443; 
l_h=0.00002789761551; 
l_i=0.0001778351454; 
l_g=0.001065944239; 
l_y=0.091306358; 
l_x=0.237421965; 
g=0.005701591201; 
s=0.004762216077; 
h=0.001792468442; 
m_i=0.005608390837; 
m_g=0.011182969; 
n=0.491705834; 
w=2.190427966; 
r=0.078431372; 
g_s=-0.065575779; 
g_t=0.275536049; 
v_e=8.19; 
a_y=1.267680833; 
a_g=0.071143485; 
a_i=0.024727613; 
a_h=0.021287879; 
  
end; 
shocks; 
var kappa = zeta ^2; 
var eta_y = epsilon_y ^2; 
var eta_g = epsilon_g ^2; 
var eta_i = epsilon_i ^2; 
var eta_h = epsilon_h ^2; 
  
end; 
  
steady(maxit=2000); 
check(qz_zero_threshold=1e-10); 
model_diagnostics; 
  
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=2, irf=500,relative_irf ); 
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Table 6.5: Dynare Code for Flexible Price Experiment 
 
% Dynare Code for Dynamic Modelling of Electricity Reforms in Bangladesh 
% Sakib Amin, Dr. Laura Marsiliani and Dr. Thomas Renström, Durham University Business School 
 
var GDP c e x l y e_g e_i e_h k k_h k_i k_g k_x l_h l_i l_g l_y l_x g s h m_i m_g n w r g_s g_t v_e a_y a_g a_i a_h p_g; 
  
varexo kappa eta_y eta_g eta_i eta_h; 
  
parameters A v_h delta_c delta_g nu_m_gg delta_i nu_m_ii delta_x nu_ss delta_y nu_gg delta_h nu_hh  beta phi 
theta rho gama alpha_i alpha_h alpha_g alpha_y alpha_x psi_h psi_i psi_g psi_y psi_x nu_m_g nu_m_i nu_h nu_g 
nu_s chi omega mu_y mu_g mu_i mu_h zeta epsilon_y epsilon_g epsilon_i epsilon_h delta tau_k tau_l q_e q_s q_g 
p_h p_i v_m  capomega_v capomega_g capomega_i capomega_h capomega_y; 
  
v_h=5.72; 
A=0.405324405; 
delta_c=0.7755; 
delta_g=0.841591248; 
nu_m_gg=0.2; 
delta_i=0.863816687; 
nu_m_ii=0.2; 
delta_x=0.586494222; 
nu_ss=0.2; 
delta_y=0.7; 
nu_gg=0.2; 
delta_h=0.895874254; 
nu_hh=0.2; 
beta=0.96; 
phi=0.607623316; 
theta=0.911090619; 
rho=-0.11; 
gama=0.811011098; 
alpha_i=0.036183313; 
alpha_h=0.004125745272; 
alpha_g=0.058408752; 
alpha_y=0.2; 
alpha_x=0.313505778; 
psi_h=0.5964848; 
psi_i=0.309381618; 
psi_g=0.108672063; 
psi_y=0.073398567; 
psi_x=0.079017608; 
nu_m_g=0.1; 
nu_m_i=0.1; 
nu_h=0.1; 
nu_g=0.1; 
nu_s=0.1; 
chi=0.10; 
omega=0.95; 
mu_y=0.95; 
mu_g=0.95; 
mu_i=0.95; 
mu_h=0.95; 
zeta=0.01; 
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epsilon_y=0.01; 
epsilon_g=0.01; 
epsilon_i=0.01; 
epsilon_h=0.01; 
delta=0.025; 
tau_k=0.15; 
tau_l=0.10; 
q_e=4.67236292; 
q_s=4.67236292; 
q_g=4.67236292; 
p_h=4.67236292; 
p_i=4.67236292; 
v_m=0.7755; 
capomega_v=0.105145694;  
capomega_g=-0.139983299; 
capomega_i=-0.184991735; 
capomega_h=-0.192480869; 
capomega_y=-0.011859455; 
  
model; 
  
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*((1- tau_k)*r(+1)+(1- delta)) * (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-
1)))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c = (1-l)*(1-gama)* w*(1-tau_l)* (phi/(1-phi))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c=n*x*((1- gama)/ gama)/ (1+ (theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1))* q_e ^ (rho/ (rho-1))); 
  
e = c*(q_e *theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
  
w * l_h = alpha_h* p_h* e_h; 
  
r *((1- psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*(1-psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
v_h*((1-psi_h)*k_h ^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*psi_h*h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
w * l_i = alpha_i* p_i* e_i; 
  
r *((1- psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i*m_i^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*(1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i 
-1)*e_i; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i* m_i ^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*psi_i* m_i ^ (-
nu_m_i -1)*e_i; 
  
w * l_y = alpha_y * y; 
  
r *((1- psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*(1-psi_y)* (k(-
1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g-1)*y; 
  
q_g*((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i) ^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*psi_y*g^ (-
nu_g-1)*y; 
  
w * l_x = alpha_x * n*x; 
  
r *((1- psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*(1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
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q_s*((1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*psi_x*s^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
w * l_g = alpha_g* p_g* e_g; 
  
r *((1- psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g*m_g^ (-nu_m_g)) = p_g*((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)*(1-psi_g)*k_g^ (-
nu_m_g -1)*e_g; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g* m_g ^ (-nu_m_g)) = p_g*((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)*psi_g* m_g ^ 
(-nu_m_g -1)*e_g; 
  
e_h = a_h * l_h ^alpha_h * ((1-psi_h)* k_h ^ (-nu_h) + psi_h * h^(-nu_h))^-(delta_h/nu_hh); 
  
e_i = a_i * l_i ^alpha_i * ((1-psi_i)* k_i ^ (-nu_m_i) + psi_i * m_i^(- nu_m_i))^-(delta_i/nu_m_ii); 
  
e_g = a_g * l_g ^alpha_g * ((1-psi_g)* k_g ^ (-nu_m_g) + psi_g * m_g^(- nu_m_g))^-(delta_g/nu_m_gg); 
  
y = a_y * l_y ^alpha_y * ((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) + psi_y * g^ (-nu_g)) ^-(delta_y/nu_gg); 
  
x = l_x ^alpha_x * ((1-psi_x)* k_x ^ (-nu_s) + psi_x * s^(-nu_s))^-(delta_x/nu_ss); 
  
v_e = (exp(capomega_v))*(v_e(-1)^(omega))*exp(kappa); 
  
a_y = (exp(capomega_y))*(a_y (-1) ^(mu_y))*exp (eta_y); 
  
a_g = (exp(capomega_g))*(a_g (-1) ^(mu_g))*exp (eta_g); 
  
a_i = (exp(capomega_i))*(a_i (-1) ^(mu_i))*exp (eta_i); 
  
a_h = (exp(capomega_h))*(a_h (-1) ^(mu_h))*exp (eta_h); 
  
l = l_h+ l_i + l_g +l_y + l_x; 
  
tau_l * w *l + tau_k * r *k(-1) +v_h*h -v_e*h+ v_m*m_i + v_m*m_g-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g-r*k_g-w *l_g -v_m 
*m_g- g_t+ p_g * e_g=g_s; 
  
g_s = p_g *e_g +p_i * e_i + p_h * e_h-q_e*e-q_s *s-q_g *g; 
  
e + s + g = (1-chi)*(e_h +e_i +e_g); 
  
k= y-c-v_e * h + (1-delta)*k(-1)-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g; 
GDP=A+n*x+y+q_e*e-v_e*h; 
end; 
  
initval; 
c=0.337915857; 
e=0.009866408825; 
x=1.010007997; 
l=0.33; 
y=1; 
GDP=2.101215168; 
e_g=0.017323554; 
e_i=0.00336425; 
e_h=0.001901324262; 
k=9.364512596; 
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k_h=0.028670212; 
k_i=0.038420574; 
k_g=0.184667446; 
k_x=5.287550443; 
l_h=0.00002789761551; 
l_i=0.0001778351454; 
l_g=0.001065944239; 
l_y=0.091306358; 
l_x=0.237421965; 
g=0.005701591201; 
s=0.004762216077; 
h=0.001792468442; 
m_i=0.005608390837; 
m_g=0.011182961; 
n=0.491705834; 
w=2.190427966; 
r=0.078431372; 
g_s=-0.065575779; 
g_t=0.275536049; 
p_g=4.67236292; 
v_e=5.72; 
a_y=1.267680833; 
a_g=0.060830377; 
a_i=0.024727613; 
a_h=0.021287879; 
  
end; 
shocks; 
var kappa = zeta ^2; 
var eta_y = epsilon_y ^2; 
var eta_g = epsilon_g ^2; 
var eta_i = epsilon_i ^2; 
var eta_h = epsilon_h ^2; 
  
end; 
  
steady(maxit=2000); 
check(qz_zero_threshold=1e-10); 
model_diagnostics; 
  
stoch_simul ( order=2, irf=500,relative_irf ); 
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Table 6.6: Dynare Code for Efficient Electricity Price Experiment 
 
% Dynare Code for Dynamic Modelling of Electricity Reforms in Bangladesh 
% Sakib Amin, Dr. Laura Marsiliani and Dr. Thomas Renström, Durham University Business School 
 
 
var GDP v_e c e x l y e_g e_i e_h k k_h k_i k_g k_x l_h l_i l_g l_y l_x g s h m_i m_g n w r g_s g_t  a_y a_g a_i a_h p_g; 
  
varexo kappa eta_y eta_g eta_i eta_h; 
  
parameters A v_h delta_c delta_g nu_m_gg delta_i nu_m_ii delta_x nu_ss delta_y nu_gg delta_h nu_hh  beta phi 
theta rho gama alpha_i alpha_h alpha_g alpha_y alpha_x psi_h psi_i psi_g psi_y psi_x nu_m_g nu_m_i nu_h nu_g 
nu_s chi omega mu_y mu_g mu_i mu_h zeta epsilon_y epsilon_g epsilon_i epsilon_h delta tau_k tau_l q_e q_s q_g 
p_h p_i v_m  capomega_v capomega_g capomega_i capomega_h capomega_y; 
  
v_h=5.72; 
A=0.405324405; 
delta_c=1.1; 
delta_g=0.841591248; 
nu_m_gg=0.2; 
delta_i=0.863816687; 
nu_m_ii=0.2; 
delta_x=0.586494222; 
nu_ss=0.2; 
delta_y=0.7; 
nu_gg=0.2; 
delta_h=0.895874254; 
nu_hh=0.2; 
beta=0.96; 
phi=0.607623316; 
theta=0.911090619; 
rho=-0.11; 
gama=0.811011098; 
alpha_i=0.036183313; 
alpha_h=0.004125745272; 
alpha_g=0.058408752; 
alpha_y=0.2; 
alpha_x=0.313505778; 
psi_h=0.5964848; 
psi_i=0.309381618; 
psi_g=0.108672063; 
psi_y=0.073398567; 
psi_x=0.079017608; 
nu_m_g=0.1; 
nu_m_i=0.1; 
nu_h=0.1; 
nu_g=0.1; 
nu_s=0.1; 
chi=0.10; 
omega=0.95; 
mu_y=0.95; 
mu_g=0.95; 
mu_i=0.95; 
mu_h=0.95; 
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zeta=0.01; 
epsilon_y=0.01; 
epsilon_g=0.01; 
epsilon_i=0.01; 
epsilon_h=0.01; 
delta=0.025; 
tau_k=0.15; 
tau_l=0.10; 
q_e=4.67236292; 
q_s=4.67236292; 
q_g=4.67236292; 
p_h=4.67236292; 
p_i=4.67236292; 
v_m=0.7755; 
capomega_v=0.105145694;  
capomega_g=-0.139983299; 
capomega_i=-0.184991735; 
capomega_h=-0.192480869; 
capomega_y=-0.011859455; 
  
model; 
  
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*((1- tau_k)*r(+1)+(1- delta)) * (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-
1)))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c = (1-l)*(1-gama)* w*(1-tau_l)* (phi/(1-phi))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c=n*x*((1- gama)/ gama)/ (1+ (theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1))* q_e ^ (rho/ (rho-1))); 
  
e = c*(q_e *theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
  
w * l_h = alpha_h* p_h* e_h; 
  
r *((1- psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*(1-psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
v_h*((1-psi_h)*k_h ^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*psi_h*h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
w * l_i = alpha_i* p_i* e_i; 
  
r *((1- psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i*m_i^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*(1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i 
-1)*e_i; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i* m_i ^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*psi_i* m_i ^ (-
nu_m_i -1)*e_i; 
  
w * l_y = alpha_y * y; 
  
r *((1- psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*(1-psi_y)* (k(-
1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g-1)*y; 
  
q_g*((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i) ^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*psi_y*g^ (-
nu_g-1)*y; 
  
w * l_x = alpha_x * n*x; 
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r *((1- psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*(1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
q_s*((1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*psi_x*s^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
w * l_g = alpha_g* p_g* e_g; 
  
r *((1- psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g*m_g^ (-nu_m_g)) = p_g*((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)*(1-psi_g)*k_g^ (-
nu_m_g -1)*e_g; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g* m_g ^ (-nu_m_g)) = p_g*((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)*psi_g* m_g ^ 
(-nu_m_g -1)*e_g; 
  
e_h = a_h * l_h ^alpha_h * ((1-psi_h)* k_h ^ (-nu_h) + psi_h * h^(-nu_h))^-(delta_h/nu_hh); 
  
e_i = a_i * l_i ^alpha_i * ((1-psi_i)* k_i ^ (-nu_m_i) + psi_i * m_i^(- nu_m_i))^-(delta_i/nu_m_ii); 
  
e_g = a_g * l_g ^alpha_g * ((1-psi_g)* k_g ^ (-nu_m_g) + psi_g * m_g^(- nu_m_g))^-(delta_g/nu_m_gg); 
  
y = a_y * l_y ^alpha_y * ((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) + psi_y * g^ (-nu_g)) ^-(delta_y/nu_gg); 
  
x = l_x ^alpha_x * ((1-psi_x)* k_x ^ (-nu_s) + psi_x * s^(-nu_s))^-(delta_x/nu_ss); 
  
v_e = (exp(capomega_v))*(v_e(-1)^(omega))*exp(kappa); 
  
a_y = (exp(capomega_y))*(a_y (-1) ^(mu_y))*exp (eta_y); 
  
a_g = (exp(capomega_g))*(a_g (-1) ^(mu_g))*exp (eta_g); 
  
a_i = (exp(capomega_i))*(a_i (-1) ^(mu_i))*exp (eta_i); 
  
a_h = (exp(capomega_h))*(a_h (-1) ^(mu_h))*exp (eta_h); 
  
l = l_h+ l_i + l_g +l_y + l_x; 
  
tau_l * w *l + tau_k * r *k(-1) +v_h*h -v_e*h+ v_m*m_i + v_m*m_g-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g-r*k_g-w *l_g -v_m 
*m_g- g_t+ p_g * e_g=g_s; 
  
g_s = p_g *e_g +p_i * e_i + p_h * e_h-q_e*e-q_s *s-q_g *g; 
  
e + s + g = (1-chi)*(e_h +e_i +e_g); 
  
k= y-c-v_e * h + (1-delta)*k(-1)-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g; 
GDP=A+n*x+y+q_e*e-v_e*h; 
end; 
  
initval; 
c=0.337915857; 
e=0.009866408825; 
x=1.010007997; 
l=0.33; 
y=1; 
GDP=2.101215168; 
e_g=0.017323554; 
e_i=0.00336425; 
e_h=0.001901324262; 
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k=9.364512596; 
k_h=0.028670212; 
k_i=0.038420574; 
k_g=0.184667446; 
k_x=5.287550443; 
l_h=0.00002789761551; 
l_i=0.0001778351454; 
l_g=0.001065944239; 
l_y=0.091306358; 
l_x=0.237421965; 
g=0.005701591201; 
s=0.004762216077; 
h=0.001792468442; 
m_i=0.005608390837; 
m_g=0.011182961; 
n=0.491705834; 
w=2.190427966; 
r=0.078431372; 
g_s=-0.065575779; 
g_t=0.275536049; 
p_g=4.67236292; 
v_e=8.19; 
a_y=1.267680833; 
a_g=0.060830377; 
a_i=0.024727613; 
a_h=0.021287879; 
  
end; 
shocks; 
var kappa = zeta ^2; 
var eta_y = epsilon_y ^2; 
var eta_g = epsilon_g ^2; 
var eta_i = epsilon_i ^2; 
var eta_h = epsilon_h ^2; 
  
end; 
  
steady(maxit=2000); 
check(qz_zero_threshold=1e-10); 
model_diagnostics; 
  
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=2, irf=500,relative_irf ); 
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Table 6.7: Dynare Code for Privatisation Experiment 
 
% Dynare Code for Dynamic Modelling of Electricity Reforms in Bangladesh 
% Sakib Amin, Dr. Laura Marsiliani and Dr. Thomas Renström, Durham University Business School 
 
var GDP v_e q_e c e x l y e_g e_i e_h k k_h k_i k_g k_x l_h l_i l_g l_y l_x g s h m_i m_g n w r g_s g_t  a_y a_g a_i a_h ; 
  
varexo kappa eta_y eta_g eta_i eta_h; 
  
parameters A p_g v_h delta_c delta_g nu_m_gg delta_i nu_m_ii delta_x nu_ss delta_y nu_gg delta_h nu_hh  beta 
phi theta rho gama alpha_i alpha_h alpha_g alpha_y alpha_x psi_h psi_i psi_g psi_y psi_x nu_m_g nu_m_i nu_h 
nu_g nu_s chi omega mu_y mu_g mu_i mu_h zeta epsilon_y epsilon_g epsilon_i epsilon_h delta tau_k tau_l  p_h 
p_i v_m  capomega_v capomega_g capomega_i capomega_h capomega_y; 
  
v_h=5.72; 
A=0.405324405; 
delta_c=1.1; 
delta_g=0.841591248; 
nu_m_gg=0.2; 
delta_i=0.863816687; 
nu_m_ii=0.2; 
delta_x=0.586494222; 
nu_ss=0.2; 
delta_y=0.7; 
nu_gg=0.2; 
delta_h=0.895874254; 
nu_hh=0.2; 
beta=0.96; 
phi=0.607623316; 
theta=0.911090619; 
rho=-0.11; 
gama=0.811011098; 
alpha_i=0.036183313; 
alpha_h=0.004125745272; 
alpha_g=0.058408752; 
alpha_y=0.2; 
alpha_x=0.313505778; 
psi_h=0.5964848; 
psi_i=0.309381618; 
psi_g=0.108672063; 
psi_y=0.073398567; 
psi_x=0.079017608; 
nu_m_g=0.1; 
nu_m_i=0.1; 
nu_h=0.1; 
nu_g=0.1; 
nu_s=0.1; 
chi=0.10; 
omega=0.95; 
mu_y=0.95; 
mu_g=0.95; 
mu_i=0.95; 
mu_h=0.95; 
zeta=0.01; 
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epsilon_y=0.01; 
epsilon_g=0.01; 
epsilon_i=0.01; 
epsilon_h=0.01; 
delta=0.025; 
tau_k=0.15; 
tau_l=0.10; 
p_g=2.307534701; 
p_h=7.79; 
p_i=3.20; 
v_m=0.7755; 
capomega_v=0.105145694;  
capomega_g=-0.139983299; 
capomega_i=-0.184991735; 
capomega_h=-0.192480869; 
capomega_y=-0.011859455; 
  
model; 
  
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*((1- tau_k)*r(+1)+(1- delta)) * (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-
1)))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c = (1-l)*(1-gama)* w*(1-tau_l)* (phi/(1-phi))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c=n*x*((1- gama)/ gama)/ (1+ (theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1))* q_e ^ (rho/ (rho-1))); 
  
e = c*(q_e *theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
  
w * l_h = alpha_h* p_h* e_h; 
  
r *((1- psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*(1-psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
v_h*((1-psi_h)*k_h ^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*psi_h*h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
w * l_i = alpha_i* p_i* e_i; 
  
r *((1- psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i*m_i^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*(1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i 
-1)*e_i; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i* m_i ^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*psi_i* m_i ^ (-
nu_m_i -1)*e_i; 
  
w * l_y = alpha_y * y; 
  
r *((1- psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*(1-psi_y)* (k(-
1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g-1)*y; 
  
q_e*((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i) ^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*psi_y*g^ (-
nu_g-1)*y; 
  
w * l_x = alpha_x * n*x; 
  
r *((1- psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*(1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
q_e*((1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*psi_x*s^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
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w * l_g = alpha_g* p_g* e_g; 
  
r *((1- psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g*m_g^ (-nu_m_g)) = p_g*((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)*(1-psi_g)*k_g^ (-
nu_m_g -1)*e_g; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g* m_g ^ (-nu_m_g)) = p_g*((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)*psi_g* m_g ^ 
(-nu_m_g -1)*e_g; 
  
e_h = a_h * l_h ^alpha_h * ((1-psi_h)* k_h ^ (-nu_h) + psi_h * h^(-nu_h))^-(delta_h/nu_hh); 
  
e_i = a_i * l_i ^alpha_i * ((1-psi_i)* k_i ^ (-nu_m_i) + psi_i * m_i^(- nu_m_i))^-(delta_i/nu_m_ii); 
  
e_g = a_g * l_g ^alpha_g * ((1-psi_g)* k_g ^ (-nu_m_g) + psi_g * m_g^(- nu_m_g))^-(delta_g/nu_m_gg); 
  
y = a_y * l_y ^alpha_y * ((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) + psi_y * g^ (-nu_g)) ^-(delta_y/nu_gg); 
  
x = l_x ^alpha_x * ((1-psi_x)* k_x ^ (-nu_s) + psi_x * s^(-nu_s))^-(delta_x/nu_ss); 
  
v_e = (exp(capomega_v))*(v_e(-1)^(omega))*exp(kappa); 
  
a_y = (exp(capomega_y))*(a_y (-1) ^(mu_y))*exp (eta_y); 
  
a_g = (exp(capomega_g))*(a_g (-1) ^(mu_g))*exp (eta_g); 
  
a_i = (exp(capomega_i))*(a_i (-1) ^(mu_i))*exp (eta_i); 
  
a_h = (exp(capomega_h))*(a_h (-1) ^(mu_h))*exp (eta_h); 
  
l = l_h+ l_i + l_g +l_y + l_x; 
  
tau_l * w *l + tau_k * r *k(-1) +v_h*h -v_e*h+ v_m*m_i + v_m*m_g-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g- g_t=g_s; 
  
g_s = p_g *e_g +p_i * e_i + p_h * e_h-q_e*e-q_e *s-q_e *g; 
  
e + s + g = (1-chi)*(e_h +e_i +e_g); 
  
k= y-c-v_e * h + (1-delta)*k(-1)-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g; 
GDP=A+n*x+y+q_e*e-v_e*h; 
end; 
  
initval; 
c=0.337915857; 
e=0.009866408825; 
x=1.010007997; 
l=0.33; 
y=1; 
GDP=2.101215168; 
e_g=0.017323554; 
e_i=0.00336425; 
e_h=0.001901324262; 
k=9.364512596; 
k_h=0.028670212; 
k_i=0.038420574; 
k_g=0.184667446; 
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k_x=5.287550443; 
l_h=0.00002789761551; 
l_i=0.0001778351454; 
l_g=0.001065944239; 
l_y=0.091306358; 
l_x=0.237421965; 
g=0.005701591201; 
s=0.004762216077; 
h=0.001792468442; 
m_i=0.005608390837; 
m_g=0.011182961; 
n=0.491705834; 
w=2.190427966; 
r=0.078431372; 
q_e=6.749634418; 
g_s=-0.065575779; 
g_t=0.275536049; 
v_e=8.19; 
a_y=1.267680833; 
a_g=0.060830377; 
a_i=0.024727613; 
a_h=0.021287879; 
  
end; 
shocks; 
var kappa = zeta ^2; 
var eta_y = epsilon_y ^2; 
var eta_g = epsilon_g ^2; 
var eta_i = epsilon_i ^2; 
var eta_h = epsilon_h ^2; 
  
end; 
  
steady(maxit=2000); 
check(qz_zero_threshold=1e-10); 
model_diagnostics; 
  
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100, order=2, irf=500,relative_irf ); 
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Table 6.8: Dynare Code for Subsidy Experiment 
 
% Dynare Code for Dynamic Modelling of Electricity Reforms in Bangladesh 
% Sakib Amin, Dr. Laura Marsiliani and Dr. Thomas Renström, Durham University Business School 
 
var  GDP c e x l y e_g e_i e_h k k_h k_i k_g k_x l_h l_i l_g l_y l_x g s h m_i m_g n w r g_s g_t v_e a_y a_g a_i a_h ; 
  
varexo kappa eta_y eta_g eta_i eta_h; 
  
parameters A v_h delta_c delta_g nu_m_gg delta_i nu_m_ii delta_x nu_ss delta_y nu_gg delta_h nu_hh  beta phi 
theta rho gama alpha_i alpha_h alpha_g alpha_y alpha_x psi_h psi_i psi_g psi_y psi_x nu_m_g nu_m_i nu_h nu_g 
nu_s chi omega mu_y mu_g mu_i mu_h zeta epsilon_y epsilon_g epsilon_i epsilon_h delta tau_k tau_l q_e q_s q_g 
p_h p_i v_m p_g capomega_v capomega_g capomega_i capomega_h capomega_y; 
  
v_h=6.552; 
A=0.405324405; 
delta_c=1.1; 
delta_g=0.857936486; 
nu_m_gg=0.2; 
delta_i=0.863816687; 
nu_m_ii=0.2; 
delta_x=0.586494222; 
nu_ss=0.2; 
delta_y=0.7; 
nu_gg=0.2; 
delta_h=0.895874254; 
nu_hh=0.2; 
beta=0.96; 
phi=0.607623316; 
theta=0.911090619; 
rho=-0.11; 
gama=0.811011098; 
alpha_i=0.036183313; 
alpha_h=0.004125745272; 
alpha_g=0.042063514; 
alpha_y=0.2; 
alpha_x=0.313505778; 
psi_h=0.5964848; 
psi_i=0.309381618; 
psi_g=0.302053239; 
psi_y=0.073398567; 
psi_x=0.079017608; 
nu_m_g=0.1; 
nu_m_i=0.1; 
nu_h=0.1; 
nu_g=0.1; 
nu_s=0.1; 
chi=0.10; 
omega=0.95; 
mu_y=0.95; 
mu_g=0.95; 
mu_i=0.95; 
mu_h=0.95; 
zeta=0.01; 
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epsilon_y=0.01; 
epsilon_g=0.01; 
epsilon_i=0.01; 
epsilon_h=0.01; 
delta=0.025; 
tau_k=0.15; 
tau_l=0.10; 
q_e=4.93; 
q_s=9.0; 
q_g=6.95; 
p_h=7.79; 
p_i=3.20; 
p_g=2.307534701; 
v_m=0.7755; 
capomega_v=0.105145694;  
capomega_g=-0.132152826; 
capomega_i=-0.184991735; 
capomega_h=-0.192480869; 
capomega_y=-0.011859455; 
  
model; 
  
1/c = beta*(1/c(+1))*((1- tau_k)*r(+1)+(1- delta)) * (1 +(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-
1)))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c = (1-l)*(1-gama)* w*(1-tau_l)* (phi/(1-phi))/(1+(theta/(1-theta))^(1/(rho-1))* q_e ^(rho/(rho-1))); 
  
c=n*x*((1- gama)/ gama)/ (1+ (theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1))* q_e ^ (rho/ (rho-1))); 
  
e = c*(q_e *theta/ (1-theta)) ^ (1/ (rho-1)); 
  
w * l_h = alpha_h* p_h* e_h; 
  
r *((1- psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*(1-psi_h)*k_h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
v_h*((1-psi_h)*k_h ^ (-nu_h) +psi_h*h^ (-nu_h)) = p_h*((delta_h*nu_h)/nu_hh)*psi_h*h^ (-nu_h-1)*e_h; 
  
w * l_i = alpha_i* p_i* e_i; 
  
r *((1- psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i*m_i^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*(1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i 
-1)*e_i; 
  
v_m *((1-psi_i)*k_i^ (-nu_m_i) +psi_i* m_i ^ (-nu_m_i)) = p_i*((delta_i*nu_m_i)/nu_m_ii)*psi_i* m_i ^ (-
nu_m_i -1)*e_i; 
  
w * l_y = alpha_y * y; 
  
r *((1- psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*(1-psi_y)* (k(-
1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g-1)*y; 
  
q_g*((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i) ^ (-nu_g) +psi_y*g^ (-nu_g)) = ((delta_y*nu_g)/nu_gg)*psi_y*g^ (-
nu_g-1)*y; 
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w * l_x = alpha_x * n*x; 
  
r *((1- psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*(1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
q_s*((1-psi_x)*k_x^ (-nu_s) +psi_x*s^ (-nu_s)) = ((delta_x*nu_s)/nu_ss)*psi_x*s^ (-nu_s-1)*n*x; 
  
v_m*alpha_g*((1- psi_g)*k_g^ (-nu_m_g) +psi_g*m_g^ (-nu_m_g))=((delta_g*nu_m_g)/nu_m_gg)* psi_g* m_g 
^ (-nu_m_g -1)* l_g*w; 
  
r* psi_g* m_g ^ (-nu_m_g -1)= (1- psi_g)* k_g^ (-nu_m_g -1)* v_m; 
  
e_h = a_h * l_h ^alpha_h * ((1-psi_h)* k_h ^ (-nu_h) + psi_h * h^(-nu_h))^-(delta_h/nu_hh); 
  
e_i = a_i * l_i ^alpha_i * ((1-psi_i)* k_i ^ (-nu_m_i) + psi_i * m_i^(- nu_m_i))^-(delta_i/nu_m_ii); 
  
e_g = a_g * l_g ^alpha_g * ((1-psi_g)* k_g ^ (-nu_m_g) + psi_g * m_g^(- nu_m_g))^-(delta_g/nu_m_gg); 
  
y = a_y * l_y ^alpha_y * ((1-psi_y)* (k(-1)-k_g-k_x-k_h-k_i)^ (-nu_g) + psi_y * g^ (-nu_g)) ^-(delta_y/nu_gg); 
  
x = l_x ^alpha_x * ((1-psi_x)* k_x ^ (-nu_s) + psi_x * s^(-nu_s))^-(delta_x/nu_ss); 
  
v_e = (exp(capomega_v))*(v_e(-1)^(omega))*exp(kappa); 
  
a_y = (exp(capomega_y))*(a_y (-1) ^(mu_y))*exp (eta_y); 
  
a_g = (exp(capomega_g))*(a_g (-1) ^(mu_g))*exp (eta_g); 
  
a_i = (exp(capomega_i))*(a_i (-1) ^(mu_i))*exp (eta_i); 
  
a_h = (exp(capomega_h))*(a_h (-1) ^(mu_h))*exp (eta_h); 
  
l = l_h+ l_i + l_g +l_y + l_x; 
  
tau_l * w *l + tau_k * r *k(-1) +v_h*h -v_e*h+ v_m*m_i + v_m*m_g-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g-r*k_g-w *l_g -v_m 
*m_g- g_t+ p_g * e_g=g_s; 
  
g_s = p_g *e_g +p_i * e_i + p_h * e_h-q_e*e-q_s *s-q_g *g; 
  
e + s + g = (1-chi)*(e_h +e_i +e_g); 
  
k= y-c-v_e * h + (1-delta)*k(-1)-delta_c*m_i-delta_c*m_g; 
  
GDP=A+n*x+y+q_e*e-v_e*h; 
  
end; 
  
initval; 
c=0.337915857; 
e=0.009866408825; 
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x=1.010007997; 
l=0.33; 
y=1; 
GDP=2.101215168; 
e_g=0.017323554; 
e_i=0.00336425; 
e_h=0.001901324262; 
k=9.364512596; 
k_h=0.028670212; 
k_i=0.038420574; 
k_g=0.184667446; 
k_x=5.287550443; 
l_h=0.00002789761551; 
l_i=0.0001778351454; 
l_g=0.001065944239; 
l_y=0.091306358; 
l_x=0.237421965; 
g=0.005701591201; 
s=0.004762216077; 
h=0.001792468442; 
m_i=0.005608390837; 
m_g=0.011182969; 
n=0.491705834; 
w=2.190427966; 
r=0.078431372; 
g_s=-0.065575779; 
g_t=0.275536049; 
v_e=8.19; 
a_y=1.267680833; 
a_g=0.071143485; 
a_i=0.024727613; 
a_h=0.021287879; 
  
end; 
shocks; 
var kappa = zeta ^2; 
var eta_y = epsilon_y ^2; 
var eta_g = epsilon_g ^2; 
var eta_i = epsilon_i ^2; 
var eta_h = epsilon_h ^2; 
  
end; 
  
steady(maxit=2000); 
check(qz_zero_threshold=1e-10); 
model_diagnostics; 
  
stoch_simul (hp_filter=100,order=2, irf=500, relative_irf ); 
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Appendix 6B 
Figure 6.1: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock in EPE Experiment 
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Figure 6.2: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock in FPE Experiment 
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Figure 6.3: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock in EEEP Experiment 
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Figure 6.4: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock in Privatisation Experiment 
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Figure 6.5: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock in Subsidy Experiment 
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Appendix 6C 
Technical Appendix 
Derivation of Welfare Equation 
The formula of welfare equation is derived by using the utility function as follows. If c1, e1, 
X1 and l1 are the steady state values in benchmark scenario, one can estimate the value of 
the utility, U1 for the economy using the following utility equation: 
U1 =  
 (   
 
 (   )  
 )
   
         
    
Similarly, if c2, e2, X2 and l2 reprents a new steady state values for an alternative scenario, 
the utility of consumers can be estimated as follows: 
U2 =  
 (   
 
 (   )  
 )
   
         
    
In principal, to get the actual change of consumption out of a policy option, we need to 
equate the value of the new utility function considering the new set of values of steady 
state variables and old set of steady state variables except the value of consumption. That 
implies, 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
Energy plays a very key role for the economic development of human societies. Energy 
goods are also important both as intermediate inputs for production and as final outputs 
that are often necessary for basic human welfare. According to Global Energy Assessment 
(2012), energy is crucial for the necessary transition to a more equitable and sustainable 
world and one where all have access to the energy services required for comfort and for a 
secure and healthy livelihood. Electricity is the mostly used form of energy and its central 
role in achieving economic progress is broadly accepted throughout the world. Oil is also 
one of the most important energy and known as “the blood of industry” in any economy 
(Ftiti et al., 2014). Therefore, ensuring affordable supplies of energy in various forms is 
central to the socio-economic development of a country.  
There are various channels exists through which energy (oil) price may have an impact on 
economic activity. A great number of studies have analysed why rising energy (oil) prices 
appear to hinder macroeconomic activities since the seminal paper by Hamilton (1983). 
Existing literature mostly focuses on oil or aggregate energy in investigating energy price 
and macroeconomic relationship. Some studies have also examined the possibility of a 
weakening relationship between energy price fluctuations and aggregate economic activity 
(Brown and Yücel, 2002). One common feature in almost most of the studies (mainly, the 
theoretical studies) is a focus on developed countries such as US or European countries and 
relatively less attention has been paid to developing economies despite the fact that energy 
(oil) can have serious adverse effect on their economy. 
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Dependency on oil-derived fuels in electricity generation has left the economy of many 
developing countries vulnerable to several adverse macroeconomic consequences. These 
electricity generation fuels are either available as indigenous resources or as traded 
commodities in the international market. Price volatility is inherent in good market, but has 
been advancing at a faster rate in oil market in comparison to other commodities over the 
past decade. An oil price shock is an indicator of extreme volatility. Oil price shocks 
represent a fundamental barrier to economic growth, due to its damaging and destabilising 
effects on macroeconomy. 
Therefore, in order to ensure macroeconomic stability and energy security, many 
governments in the developing countries provide subsidies to the energy markets. 
Following the internationally accepted definition of subsidy, one can identify two major 
types of subsidies that are provided by government: subsidies designed to reduce the cost 
of consuming energy (electricity) and fuel subsidies aimed at supporting domestic 
production (Ellis, 2000). Given their cost and persistence, it is obvious that these subsidies 
have important macroeconomic implications. Said et al. (2006) show that for a sample of 
countries in 2005, the average cost of expenditures on fuel subsidies was almost 2.5% of 
GDP. One IMF (2013) report shows that electricity and fuel subsidies exceeded 3% of GDP 
in four countries (Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, and Pakistan). Since government controls 
electricity prices, cost reflective tariffs in electricity tariff are also absent in many 
developing countries. For example, electricity prices in Nepal have been historically low to 
cover the costs and electricity is supplied to consumers at highly subsidised rates creating 
distortions on demand and adverse impact on fiscal balance (Jamasb and Nepal, 2011). 
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Thus, energy (mainly fuel and electricity) subsidies are large, wide and diverse (OECD, 
2013). These subsidies can be justified if overall social welfare is increased. However, in 
many countries in the world, the net effects of subsidies are negative and overall social 
welfare would be higher without subsidies (Moltke et al., 2004). They can place a heavy 
burden on government finances, weaken the foreign trade balance and stunt the potential 
of economies. This may be the case if the rationale of subsidy is invalid and inefficient. 
Electricity subsidies in India, for example, by undermining the financial health of the state 
electricity boards, undermine investment and the quality of electricity service (Moltke et 
al., 2004). Thus, electricity sector reforms became a global trend during the 1990s. The 
need for electricity sector reform arose from two primary concerns: firstly, the 
dissatisfaction over the poor technical, financial and managerial performance of the state 
owned electricity utilities. Secondly, the inability of government to mobilise sufficient 
investment capital for the electricity subsector’s development and expansion. According to 
Jamasb et al. (2014), the main driver of energy sector reforms in the developing countries 
are: burden of energy subsidies, low service quality, high energy losses, poor service 
coverage, capacity shortage and energy sector investment constraints. 
The underlying principle of energy reform policy is to take into account the overall well-
being of both individuals and society as a whole (Moltke et al., 2004). There are different 
types of reform policies those can be applied by considering their merits and demerits 
compatible with the economic conditions of the developing countries. A number of 
countries around the world have embarked on programmes of reform in order to promote 
investment, to improve technical performance and the productive efficiency of energy 
companies, and to enhance end-use energy efficiency. These reforms programmes have 
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initiated in Latin American countries and included variously the restructuring and 
privatisation of state energy companies, the introduction of competition, the promotion of 
foreign investment, and the price setting mechanism in energy markets.  
Moreover, unlike the developed countries, energy industries in many developing countries 
are still mostly or completely controlled by government and energy prices are set by 
government. The government in many developing countries also provide high subsidy on 
energy products to reduce the cost of consuming energy and to support domestic 
production. Although the motivations for changing the electricity industry structure vary 
from country to country, but in general, in almost all reforming countries, electricity reform 
has been a part of wider policies towards a liberal market economy and it is expected that 
successful reforms can improve the efficiency of the sector and provide better quality of 
service. Cost-reflective tariffs and proper subsidy schemes are also decisive for the 
sustainability of reforms. 
It is evident that reforming electricity market in developing small countries across the 
world is a complicated issue especially under the twin conditions of growing political 
instability and rapidly increasing electricity demand (Jamasb and Nepal, 2011). In 
principle, in order for the electricity prices to send the correct and efficient signals, they 
need to reflect the true cost of providing the service. Economic theory also suggests that 
cost reflective prices are desirable as it leads to net social welfare gain. This implies that 
the welfare gains by those who benefit from lower prices will exceed the welfare losses 
incurred by who stand to lose price increases. Therefore, Jamasb (2006) recommends that 
in most developing countries electricity reform requires extensive restructuring of pries 
and subsidy arrangements since the tariff can contain government subsidies to specific 
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users, cross subsidies from industrial and commercial users to residential consumers and 
cross subsidies among residential customer groups. 
While the economy wide implications of aggregate energy and oil price shocks have been 
broadly studied, the literature examining the macroeconomics of aggregate energy and oil 
price shocks in a mixed economy with government price setting mechanism remains 
relatively underdeveloped. So, electricity market liberalisation and price reforms and the 
linkage between aggregate energy and oil price shocks and macroeconomy in the 
developing countries are still an area which requires extensive research to develop 
appropriate models for policy experiments. 
The link between energy (both at aggregate and disaggregate level) and economy in 
Bangladesh is strong and any disruption in energy supplies is bound to have a negative 
impact on the economy. Hence, it becomes important to protect Bangladesh’s economy 
from any kind of energy (oil) price shocks and maintain a cushion against such shocks. Like 
many other developing countries, Bangladesh is also carrying out electricity reform 
programmes. However, several initiatives still need to be undertaken by the Bangladesh 
government in the energy sector apart from just allowing the entry of the private sector, 
reducing government regulation and unbundling energy utilities to bring about reforms in 
the power sector. It also becomes important that market forces are allowed to play a role 
and induce further competition, which will ultimately provide better services to the end-
users at a competitive price. The market forces will also ensure that during times of crisis, 
demand and supply are balanced, as in such a situation the prices will indicate relative 
shortage and surplus in the sector. All the initiatives in various energy sub-sectors will 
boost the country’s energy security in the long run. 
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Energy and environmental problems are often complex and detailed modelling are 
necessary to analyse the interactions of the energy sector and the overall economy for 
policy references. Therefore, the complex dynamics between energy and economy have 
increasingly attracted modelling studies over the past decade. Analysing the interaction of 
the macroeconomy and the energy sector is also essential for gaining understandings into 
the mid to long term development of each of them (Bauer et al., 2010). The development of 
energy statistics made it possible to develop dynamic models with a rigorous description of 
energy market, and the inter linkages between economic activity, energy production and 
energy use. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are relatively new, but 
increasingly popular, additions to the tool kits of practical macroeconomic modellers 
(Jaaskela and Nimark, 2011). The main motivation for developing DSGE models reflects the 
appetite for frameworks that place emphasis on sound micro foundations and theoretical 
consistency. DSGE models can also play an important role in support of their forecasts and 
policy analysis in energy sector. 
My thesis investigated the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the consequences of 
energy (oil) price shocks and electricity market reforms towards the Bangladesh economy. 
In particular, within a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model and a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, the latter including a detailed model of the electricity sector, we 
have tried to show i) how important aggregate energy price shocks are to explain business 
cycle fluctuations in Bangladesh economy (Chapter 4) since no such study is done for 
Bangladesh economy and RBC is the first step of developing a DSGE model, ii) how would 
oil price shocks affect the macroeconomy of Bangladesh economy in the presence of 
government price controlling mechanism (Chapter 5) and iii) the outcomes of liberal 
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electricity price reforms policies at macro level as a move towards the free market 
economy (Chapter 6). The main contribution of this thesis is twofold. At first, we develop a 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a detailed disaggregation of 
the electricity sector which focuses on a mixed economy where government still controls 
some electricity prices when electricity and fuels enter both production and consumption 
functions (Methodological Contribution). Then, we propose some alternative electricity 
pricing schemes for Bangladesh as part of liberalisation towards free market economy and 
analyse the consequences of the electricity price reforms on household welfare, electricity 
market condition and macroeconomy in Bangladesh (Policy Contribution). Our model 
assumes that electricity supply comes both from public and private sectors. The model also 
allows the flexibility of multi-fuel option in the electricity generating sectors. Both these 
features are very important for developing country’s perspective. The summaries of 
different chapter are described as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on macroeconomic effects of 
energy (oil) price shocks and energy (electricity) market reforms and highlights their 
special features, findings and evolution through time as well as their limitation.  
Over the last three decades, the demand for energy (electricity) in Bangladesh has grown, 
as it has pursued policies geared towards greater economic growth and social 
development. However, the mounting debt burden from high subsidy coupled with 
distorted price of electricity has large economic and financial implications for the country’s 
capacity to achieve its goal in both the near and long terms. The 3rd chapter attempts to 
address current energy scenario in Bangladesh, examines the current fuel options in 
Bangladesh with their availability and impacts on environment, illustrates a 
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comprehensive review of electricity sector in Bangladesh and reviews energy and 
electricity sector reforms in Bangladesh. 
Chapter 4 made an attempt to explore to what extent movements in aggregate energy 
prices can help to explain business cycle fluctuations in Bangladesh. The main goals of this 
chapter is about the examination and validation of the basic RBC model with regard to its 
performance in terms of the common RBC properties and to see how important 
productivity shocks are to the basic RBC model, once the model is extended to allow for 
aggregate energy price shocks. Many macroeconomic researchers pay attention to the RBC 
model because it constitutes a useful benchmark framework as a vehicle for developing 
DSGE model to address the source fluctuations and the behaviour of different 
macroeconomic variables for policy analysis. One of the novelties of the RBC approach is 
that it takes a model that is (a) designed to explain the long run; (b) picked parameters 
designed to explain the long run but then, (c) used that model and those parameters to 
explain the short run (Sims, 2012).  
 We attempt to calibrate the RBC model to explain the quantitative business cycle 
properties of macroeconomic variables in Bangladesh economy. Then, we examine how the 
fluctuations of key economic variables such as investment, consumption and output are 
explained by the exogenous shocks. The model’s ability to describe the dynamic structure 
of the Bangladesh economy is analysed by means of Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
which yield useful qualitative and quantitative information. Our result shows that the basic 
RBC model does a modest job of replicating some of the broad features of annual data of 
1990-2010 in Bangladesh. Our results also show that exogenous shock’s impact on 
endogenous variables are in the right direction. We also reveal that aggregate energy price 
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shocks have a negative impact on macroeconomic variables in Bangladesh economy. 
Finally, we show that aggregate energy price shock does not explain the business cycle 
fluctuations in Bangladesh.  
In chapter 5, we have developed a DSGE model for a mixed economy with detailed 
disaggregation of electricity sector to examine the macroeconomic impacts of an 
international oil price shock and higher productivity shocks in Bangladesh economy. The 
contribution of this chapter is central to the thesis, as it develops an entirely new 
macroeconomic framework to address the impact of oil price shocks on economy. In order 
to obtain quantitative results the usual practice is to calibrate models to a particular 
economy and we simulate the model for Bangladesh economy to analyse the impulse 
response functions to productivity and oil price shocks pertinent in Bangladesh economy. 
The key difference of this model and the other energy models is the presence of 
government price setting mechanism, three different electricity generating sectors in 
addition to two production sectors which have not been experimented in energy literature 
till now. Our model further allows for fuel diversification which is highly realistic for a 
developing country’s perspective and somehow overlooked in the literature. The model is 
solved and quantitatively simulated, so that the dynamic impacts of various shocks can be 
computed. Our simulation results highlight several important dimensions to the 
relationship between oil prices and economic performances in Bangladesh. Firstly, oil price 
shocks have a negative welfare effect on the economy through reducing electricity 
consumption, non-electricity consumption and service consumption. Secondly, relative 
factor prices play a substantial role in shaping the energy sector as more resources are 
devoted towards IPP sector (private electricity generating company) through factor 
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market which expands IPP electricity production. Thirdly, higher oil price also acts as a 
negative technological shock which causes aggregate capital to reduce initially to prevent 
household consumption to fall by a large extent. Finally, industrial production increases 
because oil imports are now more expensive and industrial sector needs to produce more 
exportable goods to keep the trade balance unchanged. 
Chapter 6 examines some price reform experiments in electricity market in Bangladesh as a 
drive from mixed economy towards free market economy to improve the electricity sector 
and to remove electricity subsidy and price distortions. Thus, we consider the same energy 
augmented DSGE model developed in the previous chapter. The model is calibrated for 
Bangladesh economy to compute steady state values for different macroeconomic variables 
in the model and household’s welfare in the presence of existing electricity pricing schemes 
in Bangladesh. Then we compute the changes of the steady state values and household’s 
welfare from the proposed alternative electricity price reform schemes to draw policy 
implications. Our results show that electricity tariff and fuel subsidies have important 
effects on a number of macroeconomic variables and electricity market. For example, 
household consumption increases in all the different experiments ranging from 0.03 to 
2.49%. Our results also reveal that all the reform experiments are welfare and GDP 
enhancing.  
To conclude, it should be noted that the results in the thesis are directly relevant for policy 
making in Bangladesh. Since concerns over macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
sustainability are at the forefront of policy discussion in many developing countries, many 
of the lessons presented in this thesis are not only applicable to Bangladesh but also can 
easily be used to inform policy making in other developing countries as well. 
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The study, undertaken in this thesis, opens up several promising avenues for future 
research. First, a shortcoming of this thesis is that our models consider the representative 
agent approach for mathematical convenience. Although this representative agent method 
is widely used by the macro modellers, Boland (2013, 2014) argues that there are serious 
logical and methodological problems with the idea of a representative agent given the 
diversity of any real economy. Kirman (1992) also criticises the representative agent 
model and argues that the reduction of the behaviour of a group of heterogeneous agents 
even if they are all utility maximisers is both unjustified and leads to conclusions which are 
usually unreliable and often wrong. He highlights that the reaction of the representative to 
some changes in a parameter of the benchmark model (for example, a change in 
government policy) may not be the same as the aggregator reaction of the individuals. 
Thus, using representative agent models to analyse the consequences of policy changes 
may not be valid and policy recommendations to improve the welfare of the representative 
agent would be misleading in this case. Since the representative agent assumption is not 
necessary for building of DSGE models and it is used just for convenience, the model 
developed in this thesis can be extended with heterogeneous household agents for policy 
purposes. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that it is essentially silent on distributional issues. Chang 
(1997) argues that measuring distributional impacts of tariff adjustments is an inherently 
complex task. The electricity tariff structures in Bangladesh like many other developing 
countries are cross subsidised and the residential households pay lower subsidised tariffs 
than the industrial and service sector electricity consumers. Consequently, restructuring of 
electricity tariffs can result in considerable price increases for residential consumers while 
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industry and service sectors are usually the first group to benefit from cost reflecting 
pricing reforms (Jamasb, 2006).  
Given our results both from the impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomy and from the 
policy experiments, it is advisable that policymakers carefully assess the overall welfare 
effect of oil price shocks and when appropriate take some measures to redistribute welfare 
from industrial sector to the household sector. Since household heterogeneity is a crucial 
element in the determination of how the electricity market reform and energy (oil) price 
shocks affects the household’s behaviour and welfare more precisely, our DSGE model can 
also be extended with heterogeneous households in their income to examine the 
distributional effects of government intervention that means which types of household are 
mainly benefitted from the welfare retribution with their overall impact for accurate 
welfare comparisons and ensuring equity. Moreover, the heterogeneity nature of the 
extended model would also be useful to examine the results of reforms in cross subsidies 
which are common in many developing countries.   
A further possible future research is to extend the model with endogenous technology and 
environmental constraints in order to coordinate the energy policy debates and to 
investigate the behaviour of oil market price when oil in the ground is considered as an 
asset. It is also worth noting that any changes in local gas extraction would have some 
effect on longer term gas reserves. However, the model in its present form could not 
apprehend this effect and accordingly our model has not paid any attention regarding this 
issue. Thus, a further probable extension of the model is to impose a physical constraint on 
natural gas stock level where gas extraction must be less than or equal to the stock. This 
would certainly give more realistic picture from the different policy experiments. 
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Since Bangladesh is a disaster-prone country, we would also like to extend our DSGE model 
introducing a small time-varying disaster risk to analyse the dynamic behaviour of 
macroeconomic variables for policy analysis. For example, Gourio (2012) and Isore and 
Szczerbowicz (2013) argue that an increase in disaster risk leads to a decline of output, 
investment, interest rate etc. One could also use our model to compare the differences in 
welfare from price control and quantity control as reform instruments for policy 
alternatives. Another avenue of future research would to include pollution on our model to 
do some comparative static to evaluate the dynamic effects of specific emission policy 
choices. It would also be very thought-provoking to examine how a revenue neutral 
subsidy removal with equal cash payment to households would affect Bangladesh 
economy. Finally, we would also plan to extend the model by explicitly modelling the 
renewable technology since renewable resources as an alternative source of fuel will play a 
significant role in mitigating energy crisis in the developing countries. These are left for 
future research. 
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